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Abstract
In this thesis I will defend a Reductionist criterion of personal identity, and
show that that criterion supports certain commonsense claims about the morality
and rationality of special concern and about the morality of the distribution of
goods among persons.
In Chapter 1 (Introduction), I will introduce the problem of personal identity
across time. Persons seem to persist through certain changes, but we do not think
that they could persist through any and all changes. Thus, by examining a range
of both ordinary and science fiction cases, we can try to determine the necessay
and sufficient conditions of personal identity. We will see that a plausible theory of
personal identity supports and motivates the conmmonsense claim that we should
be specially concerned about our future selves and intimates.
In Chapter 2 (Non-Reductionism and the Reductionist Alternatives), I will
argue that we should reject a Non-Reductionist theory of personal identity, where
Non-Reductionism is the view that persons are separately existing entities.
Non-Reductionism is unable to provide a coherent account of why persons persist
through certain changes and not others, thereby committing us to a general
skepticism about personal identity. Therefore, we should conclude that persons are
not separately existing entities. I then describe the principal forms of
Reductionism, and thereby motivate the claim that we should not accept a purely
physical account of personal identity.
In Chapter 3 (Identity and What Matters), I discuss the question whether
persons can get new bodies. I present certain cases that suggest that we should
reject our initial intuition that persons can swap bodies. I then consider whether
we should accept the claim that it is not our identity that matters in our survival,
and suggest that Reductionists can continue to claim that identity matters.
In Chapter 4 (The Grounds for Special Concern), I defend the commonsense
view of special concern. Commonsense holds that my special concern for my future
self and intimates is justified by the fact that my future self and intimnates stand in
special relationships to me. I claim that this commonsense view can be motivated
and supported by the plausible Reductionist criteria discussed in Chapter 3. I
show that the commonsense conception is more plausible than the nimpersonalist
view that tries to ground special concern in terms of impersonal values.
In Chapter 5 (Persons, Compensation, and Utilitariansm), I discuss Parfit's
claim that if we were to deny that identity is what matters and accept that
psychological continuity is what fundamentally matters in our survival, then we
should be more inclined to find Utilitarianism plausible. I show that Parfit's view
of personal identity and what matters actually supports a moral theory in which
the relationships in which persons stand to one another have intrinsic significance,
rather than supporting the person-neutral theory of Utilitarianism.
Thesis Supervisor: David Brink
Title: Associate Professor of Philosophy
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In The MAtamorphosis Kafka tells us that Gregor Samsa woke up one morning
to find that he had turned into a giant beetle. Gregor had gone to bed the
previous evening with the body of a niman, but in the morning he has a new body,
the body of a bug. This bug that his family now sees remembers Gregor's life a.nd
has thoughts and beliefs similar to those that Gregor had the previous evening. As
we read Kafka's story, we sympathize with the plight of a man who has become
entrapped in such a horrid body.
Of course, I feel very confident that, given the laws of physics and human
physiology, I need not worry about waking up in the body of a beetle.
Nonetheless, Kafka's story seems entirely coherent. Initially, it seems possible in
some sense for a person to undergo the terrible changes that poor Gregor
undergoes. It does not seem that the opening statement of The Mletaomorphosis is
a contradiction. So a person seems to be able to undergo immense physical
changes and still remain the same person.
Suppose, however, that we alter Kafka's story somewhat. Later in the day on
which Gregor's family finds the beetle in his bed, Gregor's body conies back home.
The man who occupies this body remembers Gregor's life and has thoughts andl
beliefs similar to those that Gregor had the previous evening. His family is
naturally overjoyed that Gregor has comne home, that he has not turned into a
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beetle after all. The reader will wonder how that beetle came to be in Oregor's
bed, and, more importantly, how that beetle came to have Gregor's memories and
character. There seems to be no question whatsoever that that beetle is not
Gregor.
Perhaps, then, we should not accept Kafka's description of the events that
transpired at the Samsa home on that fateful morning in The Metamorphosis.
Perhaps Kafka should have told us that, one morning, a giant beetle woke up in
Gregor's bed and, oddly enough, that beetle was under the false impression that it
was Gregor. After all, this beetle has no more claim to being Gregor than does the
beetle in my variation on Kafka's story. How wrong we were to suppose that a
person could come to have the body of a beetle. Kafka's story is really about a
beetle that mysteriously comes to have a particular person's memories and beliefs.
Maybe it is mistaken to think that a person could possibly acquire the body of
a beetle. But let us change Kafka's story one more time. Suppose that the person
who wakes up in Gregor's bed one morning has Gregor's memories and beliefs but
Winston Churchill's body. Similarly, the person who wakes up in Winston
Churchill's bed has Churchill's memories and beliefs and Gregor's body. We will
probably be inclined to think that Gregor and Churchill have exchanged bodies.
If, for some reason, we do not want to say that, our next best option seems to be
to say that Gregor has somehow become just like Churchill and vice versa. Either
the persons involved have undergone immense physical change or they have
undergone immense psychological change.
Of course, persons never undergo these sorts of changes. But, when we try to
find the correct criterion of personal identity, we are trying to find the necessary
and sufficient conditions for being the same person across time. So we need to
decide whether persons could possibly undergo the sorts of changes that I have
described. Is a person the sort of entity that could acquire a new body? Is a
person the sort of entity that could acquire an entirely new character and
personality? We may wonder why we should be concerned about these questions
given that persons never do actually acquire new bodies or entirely new characters
(at least not over night). But persons do fall into comas in which most of their
mental lives cease, and persons do suffer total amnesia. Can persons survive in
these cases? In these cases some element of ordinary survival is missing. Bizarre
science fiction examples can help us to see what is a necessary condition of survival
rather than only contingently an element of ordinary survival.
Moreover, even if persons do not get new bodies or completely new personalities
over night, they do undergo drastic physical and psychological changes. I am very
different now than I was at six and I will change even more by the time I am
seventy. Nonetheless, it does seem that I was once a girl of six and that I will
(hopefully) be a woman of seventy. My body can double in size and I will still
survive, but if my brain or heart stops functioning I will not survive. Why is it
that I survive certain changes and not others? How much change can I undergo
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and remain the same person?
We will evaluate various criteria of identity by seeing how they deal with both
ordinary change and bizarre science fiction sorts of change. If a criterion is unable
to accommodate the persistence of persons through ordinary sorts of change, we
will have some reason to reject that criterion. Similarly, a criterion should be able
to accommodate our strongest intuitions about the science fiction cases. But, if we
are to rely on our intuitions about bizarre cases, we need to look at a wide range
of cases in order to try to eliminate inconsistencies. Many of our intuitions may be
clouded by an extrapolation from the ordinary run of cases. We want to be careful
not to mistake what we take to be good evidence of personal identity in ordinary
cases for the actual necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity. In
other words, we do not want to mistake our epistemological criteria of identity for
a metaphysical criterion of identity, where an epistemological criterion will tell us
not necessary and sufficient conditions of identity, but, rather, what can reliably
function as our evidence of personal identity. An adequate theory of personal
identity will provide an account of how our epistemological criteria are related to
the metaphysical criterion, but, nonetheless, some considerations may be relevant
to determining one but not the other (see Chapter 3).
Let us return to the first case of Gregor. As I said, we do initially have the
intuition that Gregor now has the body of a beetle. Most of us probably would
accept, at least initially, a Non-Reductionist explanation of our intuition. A
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Non-Reductionist about persons would say that somehow Gregor's soul (or spirit,
mind, or essence) has managed to leave Gregor's body and now inhabits the body
of a beetle. Gregor, of course, goes where his soul goes. The evidence that we have
for the migration of Gregor's soul is the fact that the beetle now has Gregor's
memory and character. At least some Non-Reductionists, however, would hold
that the soul could become dissociated from a person's character and memories.
Hindus, for example, believe that persons are routinely reborn as beetles and other
insects, but they do not believe that beetles remember their past lives.
But what is the relationship between a person's psychology and his soul? Can a
person's soul endure any and all psychological and physical change? In Chapter 2 I
will argue that we should reject Non-Reductionism about personal identity
because it fails to provide an adequate answer to these questions. It provides no
explanation either of how persons can survive certain changes and not others or of
how our psychological and physical evidence of identity is related to the
metaphysical conditions of a person's persistence. Reductionist views, on the other
hand, do provide such an account because they claim that one or more of the
elements of our survival that function as our evidence of identity are the necessary
and sufficient conditions of personal identity; Reductionists hold that continuity of
psychology and/or continuity of the body constitute the identity of persons across
time. In Chapter 3, however, we will see that it is very difficult to arrive at any
Reductionist view that accommodates all of our strongest intuitions. Part of the
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difficulty is that many of our intuitions are affected by one particular extrapolation
from the ordinary cases; we continue to assume that it is rational for a person to
care about her own survival.
For consider a case where I am offered a choice: I can die tomorrow or I can
choose to live for another fifty years. Of course, there will be situations where I
will seem justified in choosing to die tomorrow. I would rather die tomorrow than
live for fifty years in constant excruciating pain. I would rather die tomorrow than
live for fifty years with a homicidal pathological disorder. But, all else being equal,
I am justified in caring that I survive. Notice, however, that in ordinary cases,
once I cease to exist, my mental life does not continue on. Suppose, however, that
my body and brain were destroyed, but that my mental life were to continue on in
a replica of me. This is certainly not like ordinary death. My replica will finish my
thesis and support my family, things that would not get done if I died and my
mental life ceased. Is my replica me? We may be inclined to think so, because I
should not dread replication as I would dread getting hit by a bus. But maybe my
replica is not me, and replication is a case in which I cannot care that I do not
survive.
I think that most of us have an extremely strong intuition that I would survive
as the person with my body in a case where I was replicated without having my
brain and body destroyed. Moreover, we also seem to have a strong intuition that
it would be rational for me to care that the replica die tomorrow and that the
12
person with my body live for another fifty years rather than vice versa. But why
should I have that preference? Can I really care about this particular body? If
not, why care more about the person with my body? If she is me, can the mere
fact that I am identical with her matter? Perhaps my intuition that she is me is
even just an extrapolation from ordinary cases of survival. These are questions
that I will address in Chapter 3. Although I think that I will survive as the person
with my body and that, therefore, I am justified in caring more about her than
about the replica, I think that this is a very difficult conclusion for which to offer
any conclusive arguments. Why does identity matter if one component of identity,
continuity of body, does not seem particularly important? If identity just consists
in certain physical and/or psychological continuities, and those continuities seem
unable to support the sort of concern that we previously had for identity, we might
conclude that we should cease to be concerned about identity. My concern for my
future selves, then, should be the same sort of concern that it is appropriate for me
to have for any future person with whom I am psychologically continuous. Or a
more extreme view would hold that concern for future selves is unjustified.
We might, however, continue to claim that identity matters and claim that our
concern with identity is to be explained in terms of something other than the sorts
of continuities with which the Reductionist analyzes personal identity. In other
words, it is possible that concern about identity is not reducible to or analyzable
in terms of the constitutive elements of identity yet is still justifiable and rational.
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I think that we can explain why identity matters in terms of the sorts of projects
around which we structure our lives. I have a great many private projects, projects
such that if they are to be realized I must survive and realize them. For example, I
want that I finish my thesis; for this project to be realized, I must survive and
finish my thesis. These sorts of projects actually form the core of our relationships
to our future selves. Thus, a certain form of concern is actually partly constitutive
of my relationship to my future self. We can notice, also, that many of my projects
involve certain other persons, namely my intimates, my friends and family
members; for example, I want to take care of my child. These projects form the
core of my relationship to my child, so a certain form of concern is also partly
constitutive of my relationship to my child. So in Chapter 4 I suggest that special
concern can be grounded by the special relationships in which we stand to certain
persons, and that such an account is much more plausible than an account that
attempts to ground special concern on impersonal values such as the promotion of
virtue.
My account of special concern leaves several questions unanswered. It provides
an account of how to justify special concern for certain persons to whom we
already stand in certain special relationships. Thus, unlike the account that
grounds special concern in terms of impersonal values, it provides no answer to the
question about why we should form such special relationships in the first place.
Why should I stand in this sort of relatiolnship rather than some weaker sort of
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relationship to my future self? Why form friendships with other persons? If we
need to appeal here to an account of value to explain why these relationships
should matter, is it plausible to suppose that the account of special concern is not
value-dependent? Given the implausible results yielded by the value-dependent
account of special concern, I think that we have sufficient motivation for accepting
that our reasons for forming friendships are different in kind from our reasons for
being specially concerned about those persons with whom we are already friends.
We can hope that the account of why we should form special relationships will
offer further support for the claim that, once formed, those relationships provide
intrinsic reasons for concern. Because special concern is partly constitutive of
special relationships, an account of why we should enter such relationships will
also be an account of why we should develop special concern.
If we do accept the account of special concern that I offer, there are still
questions within the account that need to be addressed. First, as I point out at
the end of Chapter 4, my account seems to lead to the conclusion that my duties
to myself are stronger than my duties to any of my intimates, even my children.
Thus, it seems that it is wrong of me to bear a certain burden rather than having
an equal burden imposed on my child. This is a very unattractive conclusion, but
it is one that I do not have the resources to deal with here. It may be that we can
resolve the difficulty if we give an account of what form special concern should
take in various sorts of relationships. In so doing we will be giving a partial
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characterization of the very nature of the relationships, because these forms of
concern are partially constitutive of special relationships. In characterizing what I
owe my friend and how that should be balanced against what I owe myself, we will
be characterizing friendship itself. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of the
present project.
In Chapter 4 I am concerned primarily with special concern for future selves
and intimates. But I will indicate that we also stand in special relationships to
other persons, in particular, to our fellow countrymen. If these special
relationships can provide an account of familial duty and of friendship, perhaps
they can also provide an account of political duty and obligation. If so, the models
of family and friendship may provide interesting parallels to the case of political
community. Conversely, the case of political community may help us to
understand better the nature of family and friendship. What we take as given in
one case may help us to resolve unclear issues in another case. Again, however,
this is an issue that I leave for another time.
My account of special concern is motivated by the claim that certain projects
that are part of our relationships to our future selves constitute a basic form of
concern for our future selves. Derek Parfit has argued that we should abandon
those private projects. Although I reject his argument for that clainl in Chapter 3,
I think that it is important to see what implications such a view might have.
Parfit thinks that if we hold, as Reductionists, that our identity is not what
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matters while psychological continuity is what matters, we should find
Utilitarianism an attractive moral theory. I will argue that Parfit's view in fact
supports a moral theory in which the relationships in which persons stand to one
another are significant in and of themselves. We should accept that special
relationships play an important role in determining duties and obligations whether
or not we accept that identity matters.
The chapters that follow, then, are an attempt to show that the most plausible
Reductionist criteria of personal identity support and motivate many
commonsense claims about morality, in particular that our strongest duties are to
the persons with whom we interact most often. This may be surprising, because
most of us, before we begin to philosophize, probably accept some version of
Non-Reductionism, the view that I reject in Chapter 2. If the correct account of
personal identity is closely linked to commonsense claims about morality, how is it
that most of us accept that commonsense morality but not Reductionism? This
question raises interesting issues about the exact relationship between normative
issues and metaphysical ones, and about how a theory about one set of issues can
function as justification for a theory about the other set of issues. Perhaps we
should take it as further evidence for the theory of personal identity that I defend
that it is able to offer support for certain commonsense moral claims. After all,
our understanding of the nature of persons derives not only from metaphysical
conceptions but also from certain normative conceptions. Therefore, we should not
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be quick to think that all of our claims about the importance of persons must be
firmly grounded on claims about what constitutes the persistence of persons.
Claims about the rational and moral importance of persons may be prior to or
independent of any metaphysics. Nonetheless, the fact that a certain metaphysical
theory of personal identity can support those claims shows that we can have a
unified theory of the persistence and the importance of persons.
18
Chapter 2
Non-Reductionism and the
Reductionist Alternatives
1 Are We Separately Existing Entities?
1.1 Introduction
Yesterday I decided to write a paper on personal identity. Today I am starting to
write a paper on personal identity. The person who made the decision to write the
paper and the person who is now writing are the same person. In other words, the
person who made the decision is identical to the person who is now writing. What
does it mean to say that the former person and the latter person are identical? In
virtue of what facts is it true both that I decided to write and that I am now
writing? In this chapter I want to consider how a Non-Reductionist about personal
identity would answer these questions. As I said in Chapter 1, most of us accept,
implicitly, some version of Non-Reductionism.
All Non-Reductionists agree that the facts that constitute a person's identity
across time are, in some way, independent of the observable changes in a person's
body and psychology. Most Non-Reductionists hold that a person's identity across
time is determined by the existence of a separately existing immaterial substance
that underlies those observable changes. So the Non-Reductionist seens to be able
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to easily accommodate the persistence of persons through change. Nonetheless, we
will see that the Non-Reductionist has no adequate account of why persons persist
through certain changes and not others, and that, without such an account, the
Non-Reductionist is committed to a general scepticism concerning our judgments
of personal identity. Such considerations should motivate us to try to find a,
plausible Reductionist view of personal identity. So after a discussion of
Non-Reductionism, I will describe various forms of Reductionism and motivate the
claim that we should accept some version of Psychological Reductionism rather
than a purely Physical Reductionist view.
1.2 The Distinction Between Reductionism and
Non-Reductionism
Questions of the form "What makes it the case that person x is the same person as
person y?" can be answered in two different ways: one can respond as a
Reductionist or one can respond as a Non-Reductionist. 1 While a Reductionist
"claim[s] ... that the fact of a person's identity over time just consists in the
holding of certain more particular facts" (Parfit 210;2), Non-Reductionists, on the
other hand, claim that personal identity involves some 'further fact'. What is a
further fact, and how does such a fact differ from more particular facts? In order
1There may, of course, be other ways of answering this question, but I think that all of the cur-
rently or historically prevalent views can be regarded as either Reductionist or Non-Reductionist.
2 All references to Parfit are to Parfit 1984, unless otherwise indicated.
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to answer this question, we need to consider the principal forms of Reductionism
and Non-Reductionism.
Reductionism Reductionists differ over whether personal identity consists in
certain psychological facts or whether it consists in certain physical facts. A
Psychological Reductionist analyzes personal identity in terms of psychological
phenomena and their interrelationships. Psychological phenomena include
psychological events or states such as memories, experiences, beliefs, values, and
intentions. These phenomena can stand in certain relations to one another, in
particular, relations of similarity or causal relations. For example, when I vote for
candidate x, I still have the belief that he is the best person for the job, a belief
that I formed at some earlier time. My belief that candidate x is the best person
for the job may lead me to form an intention to vote for candidate x, and my
experience of seeing candidate x speak is the cause of my memory of seeing
candidate x speak. When a 'sufficient' number of the mental events or states of
person x and the mental events or states of person y stand in these relations to one
another, we say that x is psychologically connected to y. If x is psychologically
connected to y, and y is psychologically connected to z, then x is psychologically
continuous with z. The Psychological Reductionist claims that person z is
identical with person y if and only if z and y are psychologically continuous. (This
criterion will be developed and modified in section 2.2.)
The Physical Reductionist, on the other hand, analyzes personal identity in
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terms of physical or bodily phenomena and their interrelationships. The cells of a
human body are constantly being lost and replaced. Nonetheless, this process is
gradual. If a person lost the vast majority of his cells simultaneously, then,
according to a Physical Reductionist, he would not survive. In order to survive, a
person's body must trace a continuous path through space and time, and must
have its matter replaced gradually. In other words, his body must be both
spatio-temporally and materially continuous. If person x's body is both
spatio-temporally and materially continuous with person y's body, then we will say
that person x is physically continuous with person y. The Physical Reductionist
claims that person z is identical with person y if and only if persons x and y are
physically continuous. (This criterion will be developed in section 2.1.)
I have presented only a rough sketch of the main forms of Reductionism. There
are many variations on Psychological Reductionism and Physical Reductionism.
For example, certain versions of Psychological Reductionism have clauses
specifying how psychological continuity must be caused in order for it to be
sufficient for identity. Certain variations on Physical Reductionism specify that x
and y need have only physically continuous brains, not physically continuous
bodies, in order to be identical. And, of course, one may combine Psychological
Reductionism and Physical Reductionism, thereby claiming that physical and
psychological continuity are both necessary and only jointly sufficient conditions of
personal identity. But all of these various forms of Reductionism analyze personal
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identity in terms of the same sorts of facts that are relied upon by the
straightforward versions of Physical and Psychological Reductionism that I have
described in this section.
Non-Reductionism In the Discourse on Method, Descartes wrote
I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is solely
to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any
material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this 'I' - that is, the soul
by which I am what I am - is entirely distinct from the body (36;
emphasis my own).
In this passage Descartes takes a very common intuition, the intuition that I could
exist apart from my body, as supporting the claim that I must be some sort of
spiritual or intellectual substance, a separately existing entity that is distinct from
any of the physical phenomena used by the Physical Reductionist to explain the
persistence of persons. The persistence of the person, according to the Cartesian
Non-Reductionist, is determined by the persistence of the soul. This version of
Non-Reductionism is committed to substance dualism; it holds that there are two
kinds of substances, one mental and the other physical. Persons have physical
bodies only contingently, whereas each is identified with the mental substance that
is his soul. A person persists as long as and only as long as his soul persists.
It is clear how the Cartesian Non-Reductionist differs from the Physical
Reductionist, but how does his view differ from Psychological Reductionism? The
Psychological Reductionist need not posit any mental substance underlying
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psychological continuities, and he claims that it is these continuities rather than
some mental substance which determine personal identity across time. The
Cartesian Non-Reductionist claims that experiences must be had by "a substance
whose whole essence or nature is solely to think", that such a substance is
necessary if a set of experiences is to be united as the experiences of a single
person. Persons are not bundles of or constructions out of experiences and other
psychological events and states. Rather, persons are substances that have,
underlie, and bind together experiences.
Despite philosophical worries about substance dualism, Cartesian
Non-Reductionism is still a very intuitive account of what persons are and of how
they persist. Most of us do think that we are entities that could acquire new
bodies or even become disembodied, and Cartesian Non-Reductionism, unlike
Physical Reductionism, accommodates these intuitions. We also have the intuition
that we are entities that are distinct from any of our particular mental states, and
are even distinct from all of our mental states taken collectively. Cartesian
Non-Reductionism captures this intuition that seems to be in conflict with
Psychological Reductionism. Thus, if the Cartesian view turns out to be a good
account of personal identity, we will have at least one good reason to be attracted
to substance dualism.
Not all Non-Reductionists, however, are committed to substance dualism.
Instead of explaining personal identity in terms of the simple, unanalysable notion
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of a mental substance, one might try to explain personal identity in terms of a.
simple, unanalysable notion of a physical substance. Although we think that we
could be disembodied, we have also the conflicting intuition that persons persist as
long as and no longer than their bodies do. This latter intuition is what motivates
Physical Reductionism. But a Physical Non-Reductionist, unlike a Physical
Reductionist, will deny that we can give a reductive criterion for human bodies in
terms of material and spatio-temporal continuities. 'Same body', like 'same soul',
cannot be analyzed. It is the ultimate notion in terms of which we can explain
personal identity.
Despite Physical Non-Reductionism's greater economy with respect to kinds of
substances it posits and despite the body's seeming to be more familiar than is the
soul, I think that Physical Non-Reductionism is a less attractive alternative than is
Cartesian Non-Reductionism. The soul is typically taken to be an indivisible
substance that is not subject to change, so we can understand why the notion of
the soul is not further analysable. Human bodies, on the other hand, like all
physical objects, are, it would seem, divisible and subject to change. Therefore,
one is naturally led to wonder why the notion of a body is not analysable in terms
of the physical continuities appealed to by the Physical Reductionist. Thus, in
what follows I will concentrate on Cartesian Non-Reductionism.3
3In Chapter 3 we will see that Bernard Williams may hold some form of Physical Non-
Reductionism.
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Both Cartesian and Physical Non-Reductionism agree that "personal identity is
something ultimate, unanalysable in terms of such observable and experiencable
phenomena as bodily continuity and continuity of memory" (Swinburne 26). But
both views also add a claim about what sort of substance, mental or physical,
determines personal identity. Another form of Non-Reductionism, what Parfit calls
the 'Further Fact View', makes no claim about what sort of substance a, person is
to be identified with; rather, it holds only that personal identity is not to be
analysed in terms of mental or physical continuities. The Further Fact View, then,
is no more than a denial of Reductionism. Because such a view is only properly a
response to the failure of Reductionism as an account of personal identity, I will
leave it aside. Only if we were to find Reductionism implausible should we
consider the Further Fact View.
1.3 The Distinction
Now that we have a basic idea of what the main forms of Reductionism and of
Non.Reductionism are, we need to see what it is that characterizes a view as being
either Reductionist or Non-Reductionist. Let us now return to the distinction
between 'more particular facts' and 'further facts' and try to give it some more
substance. It is clear that physical and psychological phenomena are more
particular facts, while the existence of Cartesian Egos or souls or unanalysable
bodies are 'further facts'. So far, however, the distinction is unhelpful; it comes to
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no more than the distinction between the types of facts that Reductionists use to
analyze personal identity and the types of facts that Non-Reductionists use. What
we need to know is how facts such as psychological continuity and physical
continuity differ from facts such as the existence of Cartesian Egos.
One possibility is that we should view 'more particular facts' as 'familiar facts'
and 'further facts' as 'non-familiar facts', where familiar facts are ones that we
already know about or believe in the existence of before we come to analyze
personal identity. Consider the Psychological Reductionist's account of personal
identity. He analyzes it in terms of facts of whose existence we are already
convinced and about which we already have some understanding. We accept that
there are experiences, beliefs, and memories, and that these can stand in relations
of similarity or causal connectedness to one another, and we already have some
idea of what sorts of entities experiences, beliefs, and memories are. And the
Physical Reductionist asks us only to accept that there is matter that undergoes
change such as gradual replacement of parts and movement through space and
time. So Reductionists add nothing new to our ontology when they analyze
personal identity. The Cartesian Non-Reductionist, on the other hand, analyzes
personal identity in terms of facts with which we are not already familiar; he adds
new entities to our ontology. Cartesian Egos are not entities that we all think that
we understand. The Further Fact View is simply the denial that personal identity
can be analyzed in terms of anything that we already know about or can come to
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know about. The Physical Non-Reductionist starts with what looks like the
familiar notion of the human body but when he claims that it cannot be analysed
in terms of continuities, it becomes clear that this sort of body is "of a kind that is
not yet recognized in the theories of contemporary physics"' (Parfit 210).
Another way of getting at the difference between further facts and more
particular facts is to see further facts as being in some way distinct from the
evidence that we use, or could possibly use, in making at least third-person
judgments of identity. I have pointed out that there are two senses of the term
'criterion', one epistemological and the other metaphysical. An epistemological
criterion spells out a method by which we can determine questions of identity,
whereas a metaphysical criterion spells out the actual necessary and sufficient
conditions of personal identity. Any epistemological criterion should refer to facts
about physical and psychological continuities; these continuities are our evidence
of personal identity (except perhaps in first-person judgments - see section 1.3.2
below). If we are unsure about whether x is identical with y, we find out by
checking facts about physical and psychological continuity.
Reductionists appeal to the same facts in their metaphysical criteria as are
appealed 'to in our epistemological criteria. Non-Reductionism, on the other hand,
is precisely the view that the facts which are the necessary and sufficient
conditions of identity are distinct from the facts which we take to be good evidence
of personal identity. Some further fact distinct from the facts which we take to be
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evidential is what determines personal identity. The Non-Reductionist will agree
that facts about continuities are evidence of personal identity, but he denies that
those continuities are the necessary and sufficient conditions of identity. In section
2.2.3, I will consider whether this is a coherent and plausible position.
1.4 Why Should We Suppose That There Are Further
Facts?
1.4.1 The Subject of Experiences Argument
What reason do we have to posit separately existing spiritual substances? Recall
that Descartes suggested that it is easy to imagine oneself separated from one's
body. This thought prompts him to ask
But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that
doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also
imagines and has sensory experiences (83).
What Descartes says in this passage seems clearly true. I perform certain actions,
I feel certain emotions, and I perceive certain sensations. But, more than that, I
seem somehow to 'stand behind' my actions, emotions, and sensations. Even
though experiences belong to me, I am not my experiences; rather, I am an entity
that has experiences, I am a subject of ezxperiences. Just as I only contingently
have a body, so also do I only contingently have any particular experiences. A
subject of experiences is, in some important sense, independent of the experiences
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that it has.
Reid objected to Locke's version of Psychological Reductionism, because, he
contended, Psychological Reductionism cannot accommodate the truth of the
claim that persons are subjects of experiences. 4 A Psychological Reductionist
analyzes personal identity in terms of experiences and other psychological
phenomena and their interrelationships. But, Reid claims, all of our experiences or
ti'l "operation(s] of our minds" are "successive in their nature"; in other words, an
experience that I had yesterday is necessarily different from one that I am having
today. A subject of experiences or the 'self', however, must have a "[c]ontinued
uninterrrupted existence" (109; in Perry 1975). Therefore, Reid concludes, there is
a manifest problem in analyzing personal identity in terms of successive
experiences:
Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and
deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am
not action, I am not feeling; [i] I am something that thinks, and acts,
and suffers. My thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every
moment; they have no continued, but a successive existence; but [ii]
that self, or I, to which they belong, is permanent, and has the same
relation to all the succeeding thoughts, actions, and feelings which I
call mine (109; in Perry 1975).
Reid is making two claims in this passage. First, he reiterates Descartes' point
that a person is something that has experiences and is not to be identified with
any or even with the entire collection of her experiences. Second, he says that an
41 will concentrate on Psychological Reductionism because that is the form of Reductionism
that Reid had in mind. As long as Reid's argument is not conclusive against any one form of
Reductionism, then it does not constitute a good argument for Non-Reductionism.
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identification of a person with her experiences would commit us to the view that
persons do not persist. Experiences are fleeting things, constantly giving way to
new and different experiences. But a person is something that has each of these
experiences in turn and yet remains the same person. I stand in the ownership
relation to each of my experiences, and the same I stands in that same relationship
to each momentary experience.
Let us begin with Reid's first point. Does the Psychological Reductionist deny
that a person is a subject of experiences, something that has experiences and is yet
distinct from those experiences? Hume (164, 168; in Perry 1975), of course, did
explicitly deny that a person is anything more than a bundle of perceptions and
sensations and he therefore concluded that the notion of a subject of experiences is
an illusory one. But a Psychological Reductionist can agree that a person is
nothing beyond a collection of experiences and yet not draw the concluZion that
there are no subjects of experience. Consider again the Psychological Reductionist
criterion of personal identity: person x is identical with person y if and only if x is
psychologically continuous with y. This criterion says that if person x has certain
experiences and person y has certain other appropriately related experiences, then
x is identical with y. So the criterion grants that persons are entities that have
experiences, that they are subjects of experiences. The Psychological Reductionist
claims that what it is for a subject of experiences to have a given experience is for
that experience to be a member of the collection that is that particular subject of
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experiences. Subjects of experience are distinct from experiences, because
collections of experiences are distinct from their members.
This Psychological Reductionist response does not seem entirely satisfactory.
As Parfit says, "[a] Reductionist can admit that ... a person is what has
experiences, or the subject of experiences. This is true because of the way in which
we talk" (223). Because the Psychological Reductionist agrees that there are
persons, and our concept of a person is the concept of a subject of experiences, the
Reductionist can also agree that there are subjects of experiences. The
Reductionist tells us that persons are collections of appropriately related
experiences; therefore, she concludes, subjects of experiences are such collections.
But the intuitive conception of subjects of experiences is a conception of entities
that are independent of momentary experiences in a way that collections are not
independent of their members. So the Psychological Reductionist, while
accommodating the mere claim that we are subjects of experiences, denies that
subjects of experiences are what, intuitively, they seem to be.
What Psychological Reductionism denies is that subjects of experiences are
further facts or souls that 'stand behind' experiences and perceptions. This notion
of subjects of experiences is intuitively compelling, and it is the intuition that
motivates Non-Reductionism. So to point out that Psychological Reductionism
accommodates subjects of experiences but not in this intuitive manner is just to
point out that Reductionism is not Non-Reductionism. Non-Reductionism, then,
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still owes us a reason to accept the intuitive picture of subjects of experiences. This
reason is supposed to be supplied by Reid's second claim. Reid says that persons
or selves are permanent entities, entities that persist through time. But then
persons must be entities that are distinct from and independent of psychological
phenomena, because psychological phenomena are only momentary. Experiences
constantly give way to new and different experiences. If we do not posit some sort
of further fact, we will have no way of accounting for the persistence of persons.
The Reductionist, however, can explain and accept the fact that persons are
temporally extended entities. A person is not to be identified with one particular
perception, but with a temporally extended series of appropriately related
experiences. If experience e is appropriately related to experience f, then e and f
are co-personal. Because e and f may not be co-temporal, the person, as a bundle
of appropriately related experiences, can persist through time. If the person is the
collection of co-personal experiences, then the person is related to each experience
in the same way; the person is the only maximal collection of co-personal
experiences of which each experiences is a member. So it does not seem that
persons must be further facts for it to be the case that persons are more than
momentary entities.
The only problem, then, that the Subjects of Experiences Argument presents
for Reductionism involves Reductionism's inability to capture the intuitively
compelling picture of a person as something which stands behind the constantly
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changing stream of experiences and perceptions. In section 1.4, however, we will
see that this picture creates some problems for the Non-Reductionist. But now we
need to look at another argument for Non-Reductionism.
1.4.2 The Argument from Introspection
The Non-Reductionist still needs to provide a compelling reason to posit a
separately existing entity. Butler claimed that such a reason is provided by an
understanding of how each of us acquires knowledge of her own persistence. He
writes that "by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was
myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self"
(Butler 100; in Perry 1975). He goes on to claim that
though the succesive consciousnesses which we have of our own
existence are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and the
same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent. The
person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and was felt an
hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the
same person; and therefore is one and the same (102; in Perry 1975).
Butler begins by reiterating the point stressed by Reid, that each of my
experiences is necessarily not identical with the succeeding experiences of
self-awareness. Nonetheless, Butler says, each of my experiences of self-awareness
is an experience of being aware of one and the same persisting self. Moreover, I am
aware of that self as persisting. Each time I have an introspective experience of
being self-aware, I know that it is the same self of which I was aware in the
preceding introspective state of self-awareness.
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How are these facts about self-awareness supposed to support the claim that our
identity through time must involve a further fact? These claims seem to support
the view that in introspection we are given non-inferential knowledge of our own
continued existence. I am aware that the person of whom I aim now self-aware is
the same person of whom I was self-aware previously. Cartesian Non-Reductionisml
offers a simple explanation of how this knowledge of persistence can be given to ime
through introspection. If I am an entity that stands behind my experiences, then
each of my experiences of self-awareness is an experience of being this particular
persisting entity. Each of the experiences is, of course, different, but they are all
experiences of being the same persisting separately existing entity. Thus,
introspection provides me with non-inferential knowledge of my own identity.
Merely by introspecting on my own states of self-awareness, I can know that the
self of which I am aware today is the same self of which I was aware yesterday.
Prima facie it seems that Reductionism cannot accommodate non-inferential
knowledge of self-identity. (Again, here, I will concentrate on Psychological
Reductionism.) What is it, according to Psychological Reductionism, for me today
to be identical with me yesterday? It is for my experiences today to be
appropriately related to my experiences yesterday, for me today to be
psychologically continuous with me yesterday. The relation between nmy
experiences is not, however, something that can be given in experience. Each
experience is different from the succeeding one, and each state of awareness I have
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can only be an awareness of my present state, not of that state's relation to any
other state. Therefore, if Psychological Reductionism were true, I could not have
knowledge of my own persistence as a result merely of introspection. Rather, I
would have to infer my persistence from facts about continuity. But, then, if
Butler is correct in claiming that I can have non-inferential knowledge of nly own
persistence, then Psychological Reductionism is false.
It is true that I do seem to have knowledge of my own identity through time,
and I never check facts about psychological continuity in order to acquire such
knowledge. But introspection can be a reliable source of knowledge about personal
identity without introspection's allowing me access to the necessary and sufficient
conditions of identity. Memory gives me access to past experiences, and because
memory is typically reliable, it will usually be true that I am who I think I am,
that the person remembering is identical with the person who had the experience
being remembered. Of course, there can be failures of memory and we often make
mistakes. When introspection is not reliable, we may need to go to great lengths
to check our own identities; we will need to investigate psychological continuities.
But the mere possibility of error does not impugn the Psychological Reductionist
criterion. In normal cases we can trust introspection to provide knowledge of
personal identity. So the Reductionist must deny that we have non-inferential
knowledge of our own identity: our knowledge is based on claims about the
reliability of memory or about continuities. Nonetheless, the Reductionist can
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explain the force of Butler's claim. We do appear to have non-inferential
knowledge in so far ns we typically are justified in relying directly on introspection
as a source of knowlege about our own identities.
Although the Reductionist must deny Butler's claim, it is not clear that
Non-Reductionism fares any better on this point. For there certainly are cases in
which one person thinks that he is aware, in succeeding consciousnesses, of two
distinct persons, or in which one person in succeeding states fails to be aware of
any persisting self. For example, if a man goes insane, he may come to think that
he is Napolean; he will mistakenly believe that his present experience is an
experience of a self that was at Waterloo. Or an amnesiac will be unable to discern
by introspection that his current state of self-awareness is an awareness of a self
that had a particular experience before the automobile accident that caused the
amnesia. Again, the mere possibility of epistemological failure does not impugn
the Cartesian Non-Reductionist criterion. But whereas the Reductionist had some
recourse in such cases of failure, we have to wonder what recourse is available to
the Non-Reductionist. If introspection fails to provide me with knowledge of my
identity, how can I, if Non-Reductionism is true, acquire such knowledge? I
cannot, of course, have any direct empirical knowledge that my self now is identical
with some previous self, because such identity is determined by the persistence of
an entity that is independent of any empirical phenomena. The Non-Reductionist
will have to say that I should rely, as does the Reductionist, on the evidence
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appealed to by third persons in making judgments about my identity; he will have
to appeal to facts about psychological and physical continuity. But for the
Non-Reductionist the self is somehow independent of these continuities. So can the
Non-Reductionist consistently appeal to such continuities as evidence of personal
identity? This is one of the questions that I will address in the following section.
1.5 Indeterminacy and the Epistemology of Personal
Identity
Derek Parfit argues, on the basis of his Combined Spectrum example, that we
should reject Non-Reductionism because it cannot allow that it can be
indeterminate whether I survive in some case. I think that, at least prima facie,
this fact might actually support Non-Reductionism, but I will describe Parfit's
example and argument because they are suggestive of some further problems for
the Non-Reductionist.
I will begin with a description of the Combined Spectrum. Consider the
following range of possible cases which involve variations in the degrees of physical
and psychological continuity which hold between me and a future person:
Case 1: In this case nothing is done to me. Therefore, I am fully
continuous both physically and psychologically with the resulting
person. This is just the normal case.
Case 2: Case 2 differs from Case 1 in that in Case 2 scientists replace a
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couple of my body cells with new ones and they alter a couple of my
beliefs or memories or other psychological states.
We can imagine many such cases and in each Case j the resulting
person is slightly less connected, both physically and psychologically, to
me than the resulting person was in case j-1. We have at the end of the
Spectrum,
Case n: In this case, the scientists again begin with me, but they
destroy my body and then make an exact replica, both physical and
psychological, of Greta Garbo. (Parfit 236-237)
I have described a range of possible cases. We are not to imagine that first the
scientists replace a few of my cells, and then a few more, and eventually they
destroy my body. Rather, there are many cases: in the first nothing is done to me,
in the second scientists only replace a few of my cells and stop, in the third
scientists replace a larger number of cells and stop, etc. In each case the changes
are instantaneous or as nearly so as possible.
Now, suppose that we were to consider each case and to ask about the resulting
person in each case 'Is she identical with me?'. It seems quite clear that in Cases 1
and 2 and cases close to the beginning of the Spectrum, the resulting person is me:
surely I can lose a few body cells and a couple of memories or beliefs and yet
survive. It also seems quite clear that in Cases n, n-l, and other cases near the end
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of the Spectrum, the resulting person is not me: after my body is destroyed why
should we think that the replica of Greta Garbo is mue rather than Greta Garbo or
an entirely new person who has just been created? But what about the cases in
the middle of the Spectrum? In those cases, is the resulting person me?
If we say that I survive in the cases in the near end of the spectrum but not in
the cases in the far end, what options do we have about the middle range of cases?
First, we could say that there is some case j in the middle of the spectrum such
that I survive in j but not in j+1. This option is plausible only for the
Non-Reductionist, not for the Reductionist. Non-Reductionists typically claimn
that the soul is indivisible; either one has a particular soul or one does not have
that particular soul. Having a soul cannot be a matter of degree. Thus, the
Non-Reductionist will say that in each case of the spectrum either the resulting
person has my soul or she does not. Because it seems that I do not survive as the
resulting person at the far end of the spectrum while I do survive at the near end,
it must be the case, according to the Non-Reductionist, that there is some case in
the middle range that is the first case where the resulting person does not have my
soul.
Parfit claims that it is implausible to suppose that there is such a first case:
It is hard to believe ... that the difference between life and death could
just consist in any of the very small differences described above [in the
Combined Spectrumj. We are inclined to believe that there is always a
difference between some future person's being me and his being
someone else. And we are inclined to believe that this is a deep
difference. But between neighboring cases in this Spectrum the
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differences are trivial.
Parfit concludes that it is implausible to suppose of any case j that I survive in j
while I do not survive in j+1. The best option for the Reductionist, then, is to say
that it is indeterminate whether I survive in the middle range of cases.
In order to motivate the idea of indeterminacy, let us consider another case
where most of us already are compelled to admit indeterminate cases. Take the
spectrum of color that ranges from orange to red. At the near end of the spectrum
are colors that are clearly orange while at the far end the colors are clearly red.
But what about the colors in the middle of the spectrum? It does not seem right
to say that they are orange nor does it seem right to say that they are red. We
usually call such cases 'borderline cases'. There is just no saying whether these
colors are orange or red; in other words, it is indeterminate whether they are
orange or red. In this color spectrum, I think that most of us would agree that it
is implausible to suppose that there is a sharp borderline such that on one side of
it all of the colors are orange but on the other side of it all of the colors are red.
Any borderline that we might draw would seem entirely arbitrary.
Now let us return to the Combined Spectrum. The Reductionist claims that
identity is determined by physical and psychological continuity. In the near end of
the spectrum, there are clearly sufficient connections to guarantee my survival
while in the far end there are clearly not enough. In the middle range of cases,
there is no saying whether there are enough connections; these cases are borderline
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cases. The notion of psychological continuity is vague. It involves the idea of
'sufficient' connections holding between x and y, but it can be indeterminate
whether there are sufficient connections just as it can be indeterminate whether a
particular color is orange or red. Having connections can be a matter of degree,
and how can it be that for some j there are sufficient connections in j but not in
j+1 when the difference between j and j+1 is trivial? Given the implausibility of
there being a sharp borderline in the Combined Spectrum and given the
Non-Reductionist's inability to accommodate indeterminacy (having a particular
soul is not a matter of degree), Parfit concludes that the Combined Spectrum is an
argument against Non-Reductionism.
In order, then, for Parfit's Combined Spectrum Argument to be a good
argument against Non-Reductionism, both of the following claims must be true: it
must be implausible that there is a sharp borderline in the spectrum, and the
Non-Reductionist must be unable to accommodate indeterminacy. Let us begin
with the claim that it is implausible to suppose that there is a sharp borderline
somewhere in the spectrum. Parfit's reason for thinking this supposition
implausible is that it would commit us to the claim that the difference between the
resulting person's being me and her not being me would consist in the very small
difference between neighboring cases. Such a small difference is not a deep enoulgh
difference to constitute the difference between my surviving and my not surviving.
I think, however, that this is a reason only for the Reductionist, not for the
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Non-Reductionist, to find it implausible that there is a sharp borderline
somewhere in the spectrum. According to the Reductionist, identity consists in
the connections described in the spectrum, so any difference between my surviving
and my not surviving must involve some difference in the connections. Parfit is
right to claim that that difference could not be as trivial as that existing between
neighboring cases. The Non-Reductionist, on the other hand, denies that identity
consists in connections; rather, he claims that identity is determined by the
persistence of a soul. So if there is a sharp borderline somewhere in the spectrum,
the difference in neighboring cases, according to the Non-Reductionist, is any-thing
but trivial, because in some case j the resulting person has my soul while in case
j+1 the resulting person does not have my soul. Because the soul is indivisible, it
is not all implausible for the Non-Reductionist to claim that there is such a case j
somewhere in the spectrum.
And, if the Non-Reductionist can plausibly hold that there is a sharp borderline
somewhere in the spectrum, then I think that this is a more intuitively attractive
option than the Reductionist option of claiming that it is indeterminate whether I
survive in the middle range of cases. In order to motivate the indeterminacy
option, I used the example of borderline cases on the spectrum of colors from
orange to red and pointed out that it is plausible to say, in those cases, that it is
indeterminate whether the given color is orange or red. But the issue of whether I
survive seems entirely different from the issue of whether a certain color is orange
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or red. For consider that I am told that the resulting person in one of the middle
cases will suffer great pain. Should I dread that pain? Should I be indifferent to
it? The answers to these questions seem to depend upon the answer to the
question about whether I survive. If it is indeterminate whether I will survive,
there seems no way of understanding how I should view the resulting person. It
just seems that either I will suffer pain or I won't. For these reasons we do not
want to be too quick to accept Reductionism and indeterminacy (cf. Swinburne
18-21). (I will consider how to deal with indeterminacy and future-directed
self-concern in Chapter 3.)
Parfit, however, has another reason for rejecting the Non-Reductionist option of
a sharp borderline. He claims that "[i]t is ... hard to believe ... that there must be
such a sharp borderline, somewhere in the spectrum, though we could never have
any evidence where the borderline would be" (239). If we were Reductionists, we
could have no way of telling which small difference between neighboring cases is
the difference between my survivng and my not surviving. If we were
Non-Reductionists, it seems that our problem would be more acute. At least the
Reductionist would know that the difference between life and death consists in one
of the small differences in connections. That, however, is what the
Non-Reductionist denies. For the Non-Reductionist the borderline occurs where
there are neighboring cases such that in the first the resulting person has my soul
while in the next she does not. But that change, it seems, has nothing to do with
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any small changes in connections. Because the soul stands behind and underlies
changes in psychological phenomena, it is difficult to see why any small change in
connections would cause or indicate the loss of the soul. So not only can we have
no evidence where the borderline is, we cannot even discern what sort of thing
would constitute evidence for the borderline.
Now an even more serious problem arises for the Non-Reductionist. If my
persistence is not determined by changes in degree of continuity, then how can we
be sure that I do survive in the near cases of the spectrum and that I do not
survive in the far cases? We are inclined to say that I can survive the sorts of
changes that occur in the near cases and that I cannot survive the sorts of changes
that occur in the far cases. We are unsure about whether the changes in the
middle cases are such that I can survive them. The Reductionist has an acount of
why I can survive certain changes but not others; he says that my identity is
determined by degree of continuity, which is in turn determined by whether
changes such as those described in the spectrum occur. The Non-Reductionist
theory of identity, on the other hand, does not offer an account of how such
changes are related to the persistence or non-persistence of the soul. Therefore,
the Non-Reductionist has no account of how we can know whether the resulting
person in any of the cases of the spectrum is me. Non-Reductionism, then, seems
to commit us to a general skepticism about personal identity; at least in the case
of third person judgments of identity, the basis for our judgments is no indicator
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at all as to whether or not there is personal identity. (And introspection would be
little help in the middle range of cases. What is at issue here is whether the
resulting person really is whoever it is that she thinks herself to be.)
The Non-Reductionist might respond that he posited the existence of a soul
precisely to be able to account for and to underlie the sorts of changes described in
the spectrum. Persons do persist through time and through drastic psychological
and physical changes. To account for the persistence of a person through such
changes, one must suppose that there is some entity such as the soul behind the
changes and not subject to the changes. But, then, the Reductionist can respond,
why not suppose that the soul is still behind the drastic changes at the far end of
the spectrum and that the resulting person is me? After all, the Non-Reductionist
allows that the soul can survive death. Part of the motivation for
Non-Reductionism lies in the fact that it can allow for persons to become
disembodied. So if the soul can survive a drastic change like death, why not
suppose that it also survives the drastic changes of the Combined Spectrum? The
Non-Reductionist does not offer us a theory of the persistence of the soul, so he
offers us no way of determining what sorts of changes are changes that would
cause the soul to cease to exist. The Non-Reductionist, then, has no reason to
reject the counterintuitive claim that I survive as the resulting person in the cases
at the far end of the Spectrum, but he also has no theory concerning which
changes are indications of the persistence of the soul. On the other hand, the
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Reductionist can account for the persistence of the person through change; for the
Reductionist identity is determined by whether or not changes are governed by the
sorts of regularities used to define psychological and physical continuities. We
seem to have no need for the soul, especially if it makes it the case that we could
never have knowledge of personal identity. The Non-Reductionist fails to offer an
account of why certain changes seem to provide good reason for claiming that a
certain person has ceased to exist.
The Non-Reductionist may respond by saying that connections are evidence,
even on his view, of personal identity. As we saw in section 1.2.1, the
Non-Reductionist, unlike the Reductionist, makes a much sharper distinction
between the metaphysical and epistemological criteria of identity. The
Non-Reductionist will say that the persistence of the soul is the necessary and
sufficient condition of personal identity, but our way of knowing about personal
identity involves the sorts of connections and changes described in the Combined
Spectrum. To point out that for the Non-Reductionist there is a sharp divide
between the sorts of facts involved in his metaphysical criterion and the sorts of
facts involved in our epistemological criteria is just to point out what differentiates
Reductionism from Non-Reductionism.
But how, we can ask, are the epistemological and metaphysical criteria related?
In order for our use of the epistemological criteria to yield knowledge, connections
must be in some way tied to the persistence of the soul. Perhaps the
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Non-Reductionist can offer some theory that says that we cannot account for the
laws and regularities that typically govern psychological continuity unless we posit
the soul as a regulating principle. If the soul were what regulates the continuities
that we observe, then we could conclude that when continuities are no longer
present, the soul must have ceased to exist or, at the least, have departed from the
body. This is the sort of claim that the Non-Reductionist would have to defend if
he wants to avoid a complete skepticism about personal identity. But I think that
it is very difficult to see why, even if the soul is what regulates continuities, the
presence of continuities need indicate the persistence of one and the same soul.
Parfit points out that
[a]s both Locke and Kant argued, there might be a series of such
entities that were psychologically continuous. Memories might be
passed from one to the next like a baton in a relay race. So might all
other psychological features. Given the resulting psychological
continuity, we would not be aware that one of these entities had been
replaced by another. We therefore cannot know that such entities
continue to exist (223).
Why might a series of souls not serve just as well as one persisting soul? I doubt
whether the Non-Reductionist can give satisfactory answers to questions such as
these (cf. Shoemaker 1984 124, 151).
I said above that the soul is typically taken to be an indivisible entity. But a
Non-Reductionist need not hold that having a particular soul cannot be a matter
of degree. If one could have a particular soul to a greater or lesser degree, then the
Non-Reductionist could agree that, in the middle range of cases, it is
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indeterminate whether I survive. Degrees of the soul, according to this version of
Non-Reductionism, would correlate with degrees of continuity. The main problem
with this approach is that, without some explanation of how it is that degrees of
the soul are consistently correlated with degrees of continuity, the
Non-Reductionist view is starting to look ad hoc. The Non-Reductionist seems to
be searching for some way to incorporate both a Reductionist criterion of identity
and the thesis that personal identity consists in some further fact. We should
conclude that the further fact is simply superfluous.
So, at the very least, the Non-Reductionist needs to show why psychological
continuities require an underlying immaterial regulating principle and why a series
of such principles would not do as well as a single persistent one, or why degrees of
a divisible soul are correlated with degrees of observable continuities. Without
arguments for either of these claims, it appears that Non-Reductionism commits
us to a general skepticism about personal identity, leaving us unable to understand
why persons can survive certain changes but not others. I think that we now have
enough reason to try to develop a plausible Reductionist view, despite its
commitment to indeterminacy about survival. We will see in Chapter 3 that
indeterminacy is not really a problem for Reductionism, that it coheres well with a
plausible theory about what matters in our survival.
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2 The Reductionist Alternatives
I have already briefly described two forms of Reductionism, Psychological
Reductionism and Physical Reductionism. In this section I will develop and
motivate these views, make some necessary modifications to the criteria discussed
above, and suggest some alternative versions of both views. I will attempt to
motivate the claim that psychological continuity is at least a necessary condition
of personal identity. The next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of whether
psychological continuity is also a sufficient condition of survival.
2.1 Physical Reductionism
Although Psychological Reductionism is the dominant view among philosophers
today, I am going to begin with a discussion of Physical Reductionism. I think
that Physical Reductionism is more easily motivated, while Psychological
Reductionism is only appealing after we see some of the inadequacies of the
Physical view. For consider: I have a body, I have the same body today that I had
yesterday, and I am quite sure that I will have this body tomorrow. Even
Descartes, our paradigm Non-Reductionist, admitted the pull of some form of a
Physical view: "I considered myself, firstly, as having a face, hands, arms, and the
whole machine made up of flesh and bones, such as it appears in a corpse and
which I designated by the name of body" (104).
So it is obviously true that I and all other persons have bodies. But, of course,
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having a body is not the same as being identified with a body. Books have covers,
yet we certainly think that a book can have its cover replaced and still remain the
same book. Even though, on the one hand, "there is the feeling that my identity
cannot possibly be the identity of a body I can clearly imagine myself exchanging
for another body, or even imagine myself losing altogether" (Wiggins 45), there is
also, on the other hand, the feeling that persons are related to their bodies in a
much more intimate way than the way in which books are related to their covers.
So, in some sense, it seems very natural to suggest the following as an identity
criterion for persons:
(1) person z is identical with person y if and only if x and y have the
same body.
In offering criterion (1) we have analyzed the identity of persons in terms of the
identity of certain physical objects, namely human bodies. If we accept (1), then
we are also committed to the following claims: a person cannot get a new body, a
person cannot survive without his body, and two persons cannot share one body.
The Physical Non-Reductionist could accept (1) as it stands. But, as I said
above, human bodies seem to be like other physical objects in so far as it seems
possible to give their identity conditions in terms of observable continuities. The
Physical Reductionist, then, goes on to analyze the notion of 'same body'. Bodies
are physical objects, so the identity conditions for bodies will parallel, in certain
respects, those for chairs, watches, ships, houses, etc. But living bodies are also
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significantly different from artifacts. I am not going to go into these issues in
depth; rather, I will only attempt to give some idea of what sorts of continuities
might be involved in the persistence of human bodies.
There are two factors which prima facie seem relevant to the identity of
physical objects: (i) spatio-temporal continuity, and (ii) material continuity.
Physical continuity will involve both (i) and (ii). Let us begin by considering (ii).
For some objects we might think that if that object is to persist, it cannot lose or
gain any matter. Locke (35; in Perry 1975) claimed that heaps and piles are such
objects. It is clear, however, that human bodies are not like heaps and piles in this
respect. Human bodies acquire entirely new cells every few years (people eat,
dispose of waste, lose weight, gain weight, etc.), but human bodies endure for
longer than a couple of years. It is clear that at least in any normal case, a person
has the same body throughout his entire life. So for human bodies, physical
continuity involves the gradual change of bodily matter. The change must be
gradual. Complete, instantaneous replacement of all or most cells would certainly
constitute the creation of a new body. How gradual must the change be? How
many cells can be simultaneously replaced without destroying the original body?
These are questions which will come up again, but for now we can simply say that
any replacement of cells cannot involve a 'significant portion' of the body's matter
without destroying that body and creating a new one.
Now, briefly, consider (i) spatio-temporal continuity. For an object to be
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spatio-temporally continuous is for it to trace a continuous path through space
and time (cf. Parfit 203). For example, an object cannot disappear in one spot
and then reappear suddenly in a different spot not contiguous to the first unless it
traces a path between the two spots. I suppose that the question about temporal
gaps is more debatable - can we dissassemble an object and then reassemble the
same object? 5 (Parfit 203-204). Again, I will not answer these questions although
I am inclined to think that a human body is the sort of object that cannot have
any spatial or temporal gaps in its history.
With these preliminaries we can restate (1):
Physical Reductionism: person x is identical with person y if and only
if person z's body is physically continuous with person y's body
As I have remarked, if we accept Physical Reductionism we can accept that person
x is identical with person y even if person y's body does not have all of the same
cells as person x's body. We want to allow such cases since it is an empirical fact
that the cells of a person's body are constantly being lost and replaced with new
ones, although it is never the case that all cells are ever simultaneously lost and
replaced (Parfit 204). But Physical Reductionism also allows that I could survive
an operation in which all of my cells are gradually replaced with new ones until all
of my old cells have been destroyed and new ones put in their places. A Physical
Reductionist could stipulate that the replacement of cells must occur as it does in
"Notice that if we answer 'yes' we will have to allow for spatial gaps as well if the object is
disassmbled and reassembled at spatially discontiguous points.
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the normal case, by some sort of 'natural' process perhaps, in order for physical
continuity to be sufficient for personal identity. However, we do want to allow that
a person could get artificial limbs or a liver transplant and yet have the same
body. I think that the Physical Reductionist would do better by stressing the
gradual replacement of parts; if the operation only takes a minute we would be less
inclined to say that I survive than if the operation takes a year.
Notice that we started with (1) and then reformulated it as Physical
Reductionism. We set out to capture the intuitive notion of having the same body
and arrived at the notion of a physically continuous body. A question then arises
as to whether having the same body is just to have a physically continuous body.
In the next chapter, I will suggest that cases of physical splitting force us to
answer no to this question. What I want to notice here is that much of the initial
appeal of the Physical Reductionist view derives from the intuitive idea of one
person, one body, and vice versa. Williams points out that "if I am asked whether
the person in front of me is the same person as one uniquely present at place a at
time t, I shall not necessarily be justified in answering 'yes' merely because I am
justified in saying that this human body is the same as that present at a at t" (1).
However, we do normally feel confident in identifying persons on the basis of
bodily criteria. If I am trying to pick the man who stole my wallet out of a police
line-up, I do not say "That is the body that took my wallet, but I cannot be sure
that it is the person who took mray wallet". I conclude from the fact that it is the
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same body that it is the same person.
However, such considerations can only serve to motivate the Physical view.
They cannot be used as an argument because, as I have said, we have to be careful
not to assume that our evidence of personal identity constitutes necessary and
sufficient conditions of identity. The Physical view does offer a simple explanation
of why some of our evidence is good evidence. But I often resort to other than
bodily facts in identifying persons. I may ask them questions about their past, etc.
Also, we often manage to identify persons whom we have never seen or cannot
presently see, as when I recognize whom I are talking with on the telephone even if
her voice sounds different. So perhaps persons only keep the same bodies
throughout their lives as a matter of contingent fact. Before we consider this
possibility, we need to consider one more issue within Physical Reductionism.
Body or Brain? Consider the following case taken from Shoemaker (1963
23-25). Brown and Robinson enter the hospital for a special type of brain
operation which requires the surgeons to remove the brains of Brown and
Robinson from their respective heads. When it comes time to replace their brains
in their heads, Brown's brain is accidently put into Robinson's body and vice
versa. The body which contains Robinson's brain then promptly ceases to
function. Let us call the surviving person, the one with Brown's brain and
Robinson's body, 'Brownson'. Brownson will claim to be Brown, he will remember
Brown's life, he will love Brown's wife, etc. Is Brownson Brown or Robinson or
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neither? Brownson has most of Robinson's body; in fact, he has all of it except for
the brain. Does he, then, have a sufficient amount of Robinson's body to make
him physically continuous with and, thus, according to Physical Reductionism,
identical with Robinson?
I think that most of us, at least initially, have the intuition that Brownson is
identical with Brown. This intuit;on mav , .,int to a problem for the Physical view.
Brownson has very little of Brown's body, so, on a straightforward interpretation
of 'physical continuity', Brownson is not physically continuous with Brown. One
suggestion is that the Physical Reductionist should concentrate only on the brain,
not on the entire body, that the Physical criterion should say that person x is
identical with person y if and only if x and y have the same brain. Of course,
human brains, like human bodies, lose cells over time (although some brain cells
are never lost), so the criterion would have to be modified to: person x is identical
with person y if and only if x's brain is physically continuous with y's brain.
But what is the motivation for concentrating on the brain? In the case of
Brownson, it is not the brain per se that inclined us to say that Brown is
Brownson, but rather the fact that Brownson has Brown's memories, values, and
beliefs, in other words, the fact that he is psychologically continuous with Brown.
For suppose that Brownson had Brown's brain and yet claimed to be Robinson,
had Robinson's memories, etc. We would not then be at all inclined to say that
Brownson is Brown. So the shift from continuity of the body to continuity of the
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brain is implicitly motivated by a concentration upon psychological features of
persons. What appeared to be motivation for a focus on brain continuity is really
motivation for some form of Psychological Reductionism. Apart from its being the
carrier of psychological continuity, it is hard to see why one might not offer as a
criterion of identity instead of continuity of the brain perhaps continuity of the
heart or continuity of the tongue. If a Physical Reductionist allows that persons
can have heart transplants or lose their tongues, surely he should also allow for
brain transplants. He has no purely Physical Reductionist way to justify
concentration upon the brain.6
So the Physical Reductionist should hold that Brownson is Robinson because
Brownson has the vast majority of Robinson's body. But our intuitions about the
Brownson case indicate that it seems plausible to suppose that a person could get
a new body. After all, as I said, the reason why we claim that Brownson is Brown
has to do with the fact that Brown's brain carries with it Brown's psychology. So
what if we could transfer the psychology without transfering the brain matter? Let
us consider just such a case as a way of motivating Psychological Reductionism.
"In "Human Beings" Mark Johnston does hold that "one would go where one's brain goes and
that one could survive as a mere brain"(78). He tries to justify his concentration upon the brain
rather than on other organs, but his emphasis upon continued mental life of a certain sort points
to more than a Physical Reductionist motivation for his view.
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2.2 Psychological Reductionism
To begin, we need to return to the intuition mentioned by Wiggins: he says that
he can clearly imagine himself exchanging his body for a new one. Recall that the
Physical view has as a consequence the claim that a person cannot get a new
body. So Physical Reductionism clashes with a very common intuition, an
intuition which I am going to use as motivation for Psychological Reductionism.
Let us now expand on Wiggins' remark. In order to do this, consider the
following case, taken from Williams' "The Self and the Future" (in Williams
Problems of the Self):
Body-Switch: You and I are captured by a mad scientist who wants to
use us as guinea pigs to test his new invention. I am placed in one
booth, booth A, and you are placed in a different booth, booth B. Let
us call my body 'A-body' and your body 'B-body'. The scientist then
pulls a switch, producing the following changes: A-body emerges from
booth A, but when we question this A-body person, she makes memory
claims which fit your past life, her statements express desires, beliefs,
and character traits that we previously associated with you, and her
mannerisms and personality resemble very closely those that you had
before the experiment. Similarly, the B-body emerges from booth B
and makes memory claims which fit my past life, etc.
7All references to Williams are to this work unless otherwise indicated
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From which booth do I emerge after the experiment? I think that many of us are
inclined to think that I emerge from booth B and that you emerge from booth A.
In other words, our intuition is that the experiment has caused you and me to
switch bodies. If this description of what happens is the correct description of
what happens, then, in this case you and I acquire new bodies - I get your body
and you get mine. Is such a thing possible?
Of course, Body-switch is not now technologically possible, because no scientist
has a machine that could cause you and me to exchange bodies. Body-switch may
not even be physically possible; the laws of human physiology and psychology in
this world may be such as to make persons' changing bodies impossible in this
world. We, however, are interested in whether Body-switch is metaphysically
possible. Because we are interested in finding necessary and sufficient conditions of
identity, we want to know whether body switching could happen in some possible
world. If it can, then Physical Reductionism would be an unsatisfactory
metaphysical criterion of personal identity.
Notice that we make our judgement in Body-Switch on the same basis as we
initially made our judgment in Shoemaker's Brownson case which I discussed
above. We seem to think that what a person remembers, believes, and values,
determines who that person is. So both the Brownson case and Body-Switch
should motivate us to consider that perhaps the conditions of identity are
psychological and not physical. I will now describe a view which, at least in one of
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its forms, would accommodate our intuitions about Body-Switch and Brownson.
This view is Psychological Reductionism.
2.2.1 Locke and the Memory Theory
The Memory Theory and its Initial Plausibility I want to begin by
discussing the version of Psychological Reductionism presented by John Locke.
Although this version of Psychological Reductionism is extremely inadequate, it
provides a good starting point for discussion, because the criticisms that have been
made of Locke's theory help to motivate a plausible form of Psychological
Reductionism, a form which still has Locke's theory at its core. Also, a discussion
of Locke's theory will allow us to discuss some issues that will clarify some issues
in later chapters.
Locke begins by saying that a person is a "thinking intelligent being, that has
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in
different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is
inseparable from thinking" (39; in Perry 1975). Because a person is a thinking
thing, his identity is due to his consciousness; therefore, it seems natural to define
personal identity over time in terms of memory, that is, in terms of consciousness
of past actions, thoughts, and experiences: "as far as this consciousness can be
extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of
that person" (Locke 39; in Perry 1975). Locke, in fact, seemed to hold the view
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that for person x and person y to be the same person, either y must remember
having all of the experiences, thoughts, and actions of x or x must remember
having all of the experiences, thoughts, and actions of y (Locke 46; in Perry 1975).
But this view is clearly false. I do not remember everything that I thought or did
yesterday or even this morning; Locke's view would lead to the conclusion that
only persons with absolutely phenomenal memories persist for any significant
duration. So we need to alter his criterion to the following:
Memory Criterion: person z is identical with person y if and only if a
remembers or can remember quite a few of the experiences, thoughts,
actions, etc. of y or vice versa.
The phrase 'can remember' allows us to say that x could be identical with y even
if x is asleep. We do not want it to be the case that x must actually be now
remembering an experience of y in order for it to be the case that x is identical
with y. The term 'quite a few' in our criterion is vague. In certain cases it will be
clear that enough memory connections exist to satisfy the criterion; in other cases,
such as cases of severe amnesia, it will be clear that there are not enough memory
connections. In cases such as those in the middle range of cases in the Combined
Spectrum, it will be indeterminate whether or not there are sufficient memory
connections (see section 2.3).Y
8It will differ from case to case what constitutes a sufficient number of memory connections.
For example, suppose that x remembers having a certain number of the thoughts, etc., of y and
that that is all that x remembers. In that case, we might conclude that x=y. However, suppose
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Locke's view captures the simple intuition that we are who we think we are. As
we saw in section 1.3.2, we trust the deliverances of memory to provide us with
knowledge of personal identity. If I remember being at the mall on Tuesday, that is
at least prima facie evidence that I am identical with someone who was at the mall
on Tuesday. When Brownson remembers Brown's life, we are inclined to think that
Brownson is Brown. Memory, then, seems central in determining who a person is.
Reid's Objection There are, however, two famous objections to Locke's theory,
objections first presented by Butler and Reid. I will begin by discussing Reid's
objection (Reid 114ff.; in Perry 1975). Reid asks us to consider the case of an
army officer who, as a child, was beaten for stealing fruit from an orchard. Then,
in his first battle, he leads an attack on the enemy, and, late in life, he is made a
general. When he was in his first battle, he remembered or could remember the
beating that he received as a child as well as other things that lie did as a child;
therefore, on Locke's theory, the young officer is identical with the child. Similarly,
the general can remember taking the standard and performing other actions done
by the brave young officer, so the general is identical with the young officer. The
general, however, does not remember being beaten as a child; in fact, the general
has no memories of childhood, so the general, according to Locke, is not identical
with the child. But, since the general is identical with the officer and the ufficer is
that x also remembers having an equal number of the thoughts, etc., of z, where z is not identical
with y; in this case, we would certainly hesitate in saying that x=y, or in saying that x=z.
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identical with the child, by the transitivity of identity, the general is identical with
the child. Thus, we have a contradiction: the general is identical with the child
and the general is not identical with the child.
In Reid's example, we have the old general (G), the young officer (0), and the
child (C). By hypothesis G does not have any memories of the actions or thoughts
of C, i.e. G has no direct memory connections to C, but G has direct memory
connections to O and O has direct memory connections to C. But, as we have
seen, since G=O and O=C, the transitivity of identity forces us to conclude that
G=C. Because the memory criterion yields the conclusion that G is not identical
with C, we have to revise Locke's memory criterion so that it yields that G=C.
Instead of direct memory connections, we ought to consider memory continuity,
where memory continuity is a relation between persons at times. Memory
continuity is the ancestral of direct memory connectedness:
person x at time t is memory continuous with person y at time t' if and
only if x and y are the endpoints of a series of persons at times such
that each person in the series is memory connected to the preceding
person in the series.
For example, if x at t is connected to z at t' and z at t' is connected to y at t",
then x at t is continuous with y at t" even though x is not connected to y. The
advantage of continuity over connectedness is that continuity, like identity, is a
transitive relation. We saw that even though G is connected to O and O to C, G
63
may yet not be connected to C. But because G is continuous with O and 0 with
C, G is continuous with C. Thus, memory continuity provides a suitable criterion
of identity. Our modified Lockean criterion will be as follows:
Revised Memory Criterion: person x at time t is identical with person y
at t' if and only if z is memory continuous with y.9
We started out with the intuition that memory and personal identity are
intimately connected: this intuition was the motivation for the simple Lockean
account. But after these revisions can we still appeal to our initial intuition? We
all know that memory can be an erratic thing: at various times of our lives we are
able to remember varying previous events, and which events we remember depends
upon other factors besides merely the temporal placement of the events. The
Revised Memory Criterion allows memory to wander Imore freely, as it were, and
that, I think, makes the Revised Criterion more intuitively pleasing than the
original Memory Criterion.
Butler's Objection Now let us turn to an objection first raised by Butler.
Butler charged that Locke's account of personal identity is circular: "one should
really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes,
and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge, in
9If one takes persons at times literally as temporal parts of persons, then the Revised Memory
Criterion would need to be restated as a criterion of the co-personality of temporal parts of persons.
I will continue to speak of persons at times while remaining neutral as to whether persons at times
are temporal parts of persons.
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any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes" (100; in Perry 1975).
Butler can be interpreted as saying that the concept of memory presupposes
personal identity. When we say that x remembers doing a, we are implying that x
is identical with the person who did a. So we cannot analyze personal identity in
terms of memory-continuity because memory presupposes personal identity;
Locke's account of personal identity is circular.
In order to understand Butler's worry more clearly, we need to consider what is
involved in a person x's remembering an event E (my account here follows that of
Shoemaker 1984, 81ff.): (i) z seems to remember event E, or we can say that z has
an 'apparent memory' of E(81). (ii) apparent memories must be like, in certain
respects, the events of which they are apparent memories. For example, the content
of an apparent memory of my birthday party will be different than the content of
an apparent memory of my trip home to Chicago. But, as Shoemaker points out,
if my birthday party was just like yours, my apparent memory of my birthday
party will be, in many respects, like your apparent memory of your birthday party.
Surely, though, I do not have a memory of your party just because your party was
like mine. So we add that (iii) z's apparent memory of E must be caused in some
appropriate way by his having been involved in E.10 So, even though my party was
like yours, it is my party that I am remembering because my memory was caused
by my having attended my party. Simply put, it is my party that I remember
toThis is what Shoemaker (1970) calls the 'previous awareness condition for remembering'(269).
65
because it was my party that I attended. And now we see why memory
presupposes personal identity: our third condition makes reference to the person
who is doing the remembering and says that she must have been involved in E.
Therefore, memory cannot be used to explain personal identity.
Butler is quite right: memory presupposes personal identity. Let us, then,
define a new notion which is like memory but does not presuppose personal
identity, and we will call this notion, after Shoemaker (1970), 'quasi-memory'. The
first and second conditions above also hold for quasi-memory, but condition three
is different: (quasi-iii) for x to have a quasi-memory of E, it must be the case that
z's apparent memory was caused by someone's, not necesarily z's, having been
involved in E. I can have a quasi-memory of your party if my apparent memory
is caused in some way by your party; perhaps our neurosurgeon can transfer
information from your brain into my brain. Quasi-memory does not presuppose
personal identity, so we can avoid Butler's charge of circularity if we define
personal identity in terms of quasi-memory instead of in terms of memory. Notice
that memories are a subclass of quasi-memories; they are quasi-memories in which
the someone who was involved in E is the person who has the apparent memory of
E. But it is important that I can quasi-remember the experiences or actions of
someone else. If I, however, quasi-remember a sufficient number of x's experiences,
then I am identical with x, that is my quasi-memories are actual memories.
11There is a weaker previous awareness condition on quasi-memory than there is on memory
(Shoemaker 1970, 271).
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But avoiding Butler's charge of circularity is not enough: we want to retain the
initial intuitive pull of Locke's theory. I said that many of us believe there to be
some intimate link between memory and personal identity: this belief could be
explained by the fact that memory presupposes personal identity. Do we have
reason to believe that quasi-memory should be part of the analysis of personal
identity? Suppose that I quasi-remember a sufficient number of person x's
experiences to satisfy the criterion of personal identity, or suppose that I am
quasi-memory-continuous with x. This means that my quasi-memories are
qualitatively just like memories, that x actually had the experiences that I
remember, and that my quasi-memories are causally dependent on x's experiences.
Of course, it is true that I can quasi-remember somebody else's experiences: this is
precisely the difference between memory and quasi-memory. Yet I think that it is
clear that if I had sufficient quasi-memory connections to x, we would have
evidence that I am identical with x, that my quasi-memories are actual memories
(cf. Shoemaker 1970, 279-280). As Parfit says,
In our statement of our revised...Criterion, we should not claim
that, if I have an accurate quasi-memory of some past experience, this
makes me the person who had this experience. One person's mental life
may include a few quasi-memories of experiences in some other person's
life... our criterion ignores a few such quasi-memo-y connections. We
appeal instead to overlapping chains of many such connections (222).
So we can avoid Butler's charge of circularity and still retain the intuition behind
Locke's initial account by appealing to the concept of quasi-memory.
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More Problems Even though we have avoided the charges that Locke's account
is circular and that it violates the logic of identity, I do not think that we yet have
a plausible criterion of personal identity. Consider the following case: suppose that
I am quasi-memory-continuous with person x. However, also suppose that there is
no other type of psychological continuity between me and person x. X and I have
different beliefs, preferences, ideals, goals, character traits, and mannerisms, and
my character traits are not in any way a development of x's, that is . is not the
case that if x had not been the way she was that I would not be the way that I am
(cf. Shoemaker 1984 90). In other words, the psychological traits (other than
quasi-memory) of x seem to bear no relation, either of causal dependence or of
similarity, to my psychological traits. Is quasi-memory alone enough to guarantee
identity? Consider the reversed case, where I do stand in these other psychological
relations to x but I am not quasi-memory-continuous with x. We normally call this
sort of case a case of 'amnesia', and "it seems conceivable that someone should
survive total amnesia, total loss of memory" (Shoemaker 86). If someone could
survive amnesia, then our revised Lockean criterion must be wrong.
Let us return to our intuition that memory and personal identity are intimately
linked. If one were asked to expand on this intuition, one might respond with a
counterfactual such as the following: if I had not had an experience E then I would
not be able to remember E. If it were the case that person x's apparent memory of
experience E was in no way dependent upon the experience of person y, then we
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would not take that apparent memory as evidence of the identity of x and y; for
this reason, we included a clause about causal dependence in out of
'quasi-memory'.
Now consider a case where person x shares some psychological trait p with
person y. We may have good reason to believe that if person y had not had trait p,
then person x would not have had trait p, and it "is precisely when the
circumstances are such that evidence of similarity is evidence of such a causal or
counterfactual dependence that evidence of similarity is evidence of identity"
(Shoemaker 1984 90). Of course, I may have trait p because my mother had trait
p and I have been greatly influenced by my mother; yet, it is clear that we would
not take this to be evidence that I am identical with my mother. In fact, I may
have a great many of my psychological attributes as a result of my interaction with
some other person. So the sort of causal dependence between psychological states
that is an indication of identity is more than a m ere counterfactual dependence. In
order for the relevant sort of dependence to be present, the content of the later
psychological state must be in some sense a development of the earlier states, a
development in which the earlier states determine and control the later states..
Also, we must consider such psychological similarity in conjunction with other
facts, including how many psychological connections exist; clearly, one or two such
connections will not do. So we now need to develop a new criterion of identity, one
that considers other psychological connections besides memory connections.
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Psychological Reductionism Psychological Reductionism takes into
consideration other sorts of psychological connections besides memory connections.
Our first task, then, is to make clear what other sorts of connections we might
reasonably suppose help to constitute our identity over time. For example, there is
an obvious counterfactual dependence between an intention to do a and the actual
later performance of a; I would not have done a if I had not intended to do a. Also,
person x's desires and beliefs can be dependent on the desires and beliefs of person
y. For there to be a psychological connection, x need not have the same beliefs and
desires as y; rather, x's beliefs and desires could be causally or counterfactually
dependent upon those of y. For example, x may believe that candidate z is the
best person for the job because y had certain general beliefs about what makes a
candidate the best candidate for a particular job. Similarly, x's desire to vote for z
may be dependent upon y's desire to vote for candidates of a certain sort. We can
find similar relationships if we consider psychological phenomena such as values,
ideals, and goals. So psychological connections are not merely, or only, connections
of similarity; they are connections of counterfactual dependence. If person y had
not had the experiences or traits that he had, then person i, would also have bad
relevantly different experiences or traits (Shoemaker 1984 89-90).
The first criterion which we considered, the Memory Criterion, defined personal
identity in terms of direct memory connections: person x is identical with person y
if and only if person x has 'a sufficient number of' direct memory connections to
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person y. We then saw that we needed to appeal to the transitive relation of
memory continuity. So Psychological Reductionism should appeal to a parallel
notion of psychological continuity:
Psychological Reductionism: person x at time t is identical with person
y at time t' if and only if x at t is psychologically continuous with y at
t.
Psychological Reductionism, then, avoids any Reid-like objections, and it
represents a significant improvement over the Revised Memory Criterion. Now let
us consider some modifications and variations of Psychological Reductionism.
The Cause of Psychological Continuity Consider the following case:
scientists wipe away all of my memories, inducing a state of amnesia. Then they
give me new memories, memories (or, quasi-memories) that exactly fit the life of
Eleanor Roosevelt. This is done by means of a small disk on which they stored
some information that was removed from Eleanor Roosevelt's brain. I said above,
in discussing the Lockean theory, that we take it to be good evidence that I am
the person who did x if I can remember (or, quasi-remember) doing x. In this case,
however, although I have an apparent memory of marrying FDR, we may not be
inclined to take that as evidence that I am the person who married FDR. If we did
not know about the scientist's tampering with my brain, we might be more
inclined, although not strongly inclined, to take my apparent memories of Eleanor
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Roosevelt's life to be actual memories. Once we know how I came to have the
memories, however, our intuitions about the case change to some extent.
We can construct similar sorts of examples for every sort of psychological trait
or state: if the scientist were to give me all of Eleanor Roosevelt's desires and
beliefs by inserting more disks in my brain, would I then be Eleanor Roosevelt?
Suppose that the scientist were to make it the case that I am psychologically
continuous with Eleanor Roosevelt as she was on the day that she died. Do we
want to say that Eleanor Roosevelt now inhabits my body? If we think that it
matters how I came to be psychologically continuous with Eleanor Roosevelt, we
will think that Psychological Reductionism needs to be modified. Perhaps
psychological continuity is only the criterion of personal identity if it has been
caused in the right way. For consider the following case: suppose that Eleanor had
never in fact married FDR. The scientist might still have given me the apparent
memory of having married FDR. So my psychological states seenm in some way too
independent of Eleanor's life, and we may then feel uncomfortable in saying that I
am identical with Eleanor.
So let us modify Psychological Reductionism:
Psychological Reductionism person x at time t is identical with person
y at time t' if and only if (i) z at t is psychologically continuous with y
at t', and (ii) this psychological continuity has the right cause.
As Parfit says, we then get three versions of Psychological Reductionism:
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These differ over the question of what is the right kind of cause. On
the Narrow version, this must be the normal cause. On the Wide
version, this could be any reliable cause. On the Widest version, this
could be any cause (207).
In order to get a clearer idea of how these three versions of Psychological
Reductionism differ, let us reconsider Shoemaker's Brownson case. Recall that
Brownson has Brown's brain, Robinson's body, and is psychologically continuous
with Brown. On the Widest version of Psychological Reductionism, Brownson is
Brown because Brownson is psychologically continuous with Brown and that is
sufficient for identity: the Widest version does not care how Brownson came to be
psychologically continuous with Brown. The Wide version will agree that
Brownson is Brown, but it agrees because Brownson is psychologically continuous
with Brown and this psychological continuity is the result of Brownson's having
Brown's brain. We can assume that brain transfers are reliable causes of
psychological continuity because the brain is the normal cause of psychological
continuity. Suppose, however, that no brain transfer was done, and Brownson has
just mysteriously become psychologically continuous with Brown. The Widest
version would still say that Brownson is identical with Brown, but the Wide
version would not agree. Mysterious occurrences do not qualify as reliable causes
or procedures.
Now consider a third Brownson case: in this case no brain transfer was done,
but the scientists have a reliable way of transferring information from Brown to
Robinson's brain, and we again call the resulting individual 'Brownson'. Brownson
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is psychologically continuous with Brown, and, on both the Widest and the Wide
versions, Brownson is Brown: the scientists' procedure is reliable. But, on the
Narrow version, Brownson is not identical with Brown; such a transfer of
information certainly is not the normal cause of psychological continuity whatever
the normal cause is. What would the Narrow version say about the case where
Brownson has Brown's brain? Most philosophers who discuss the Narrow version
take it to be the case that the brain is the normal cause of psychological continuity
and, thus, that Brownson is Brown if he has Brown's brain.
In the following discussion of Psychological Reductionism, I will focus on the
Wide version of the view. Any considerations that I will advance for thinking that
the Wide version is unsatisfactory will suggest that the Widest version is
completely unsatisfactory, so I will focus my discussion on the strongest, most
plausible version of Psychological Reductionism. Narrow Psychological
Reductionism is actually a version of what I will call 'Mixed Reductionism', and I
will discuss that view in the next chapter.
Fission Before we move on, we need to discuss one more revision of
Psychological Reductionism, a revision motivated by the following case:
Fission: Suppose that my two sisters and I are in an automobile
accident. My body is damaged beyond repair but my brain continues
to function. My sisters' bodies are undamaged but their brains have
ceased to function. At the hospital where we are taken after the
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accident, the surgeons remove my brain, split it in half, and put each
half in one of my sisters' now debrained bodies. We can assume that
half of a brain is sufficient to guarantee psychological continuity (Parfit
253ff.).
In this case, there are two resulting persons each of whom has half of my bi in and
is psychologically continuous with me. All of the versions of Psychological
Reductionism, the Wide, Widest, and Narrow versions, will yield that I am
identical with both of the resulting persons. But identity, unlike psychological
continuity, is a one-one relation. Because it seems clear that the resulting persons
are two distinct persons, I cannot be identical with both of them. So the
Psychological Reductionist concludes that I am not identical with either of the
resulting persons, because there is no more reason to suppose that I am one of the
resulting persons rather than the other. The Psychological Reductionist criterion
now reads:
Psychological Reductionism: x at time t is identical with y at time t' if
and only if (i) z at t is psychologically continuous with y at t', (ii) this
continuity has the right, or, a reliable cause, and (iii) confinuity has
not taken other than a one-one form.
How plausible is Psychological Reductionism? That is the question to which we
now turn.
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Chapter 3
Identity and What Matters
3 Can Persons Switch Bodies?
3.1 Introduction
I began my discussion of Reductionism by describing the Physical Reductionist
criterioi, of personal identity. The Physical Reductionist criterion seemed
attractive initially because of its simplicity. It reduced the problem of personal
identity to one instance of the more general problem about the persistence of
physical objects. Then, however, we saw that mere physical continuity does not
seem to be enough to guarantee the survival of a person. Robinson was physically
continuous with Brownson, and yet we were not inclined to think that Robinson
survived as Brownson. And the Body-switch case seemed to show that physical
continuity is not even a necessary condition of personal identity. I then described
Psychological Reductionism, a view which traces persons via similarity and causal
dependence of psychological states, thereby preserving our intuitions about the
Body-switch case. But how plausible is Psychological Reductionism? To answer
this question, we need to ask how much weight should be given to our intuitions
that persons can get new bodies over competing intuitions that we have in other
cases that I will discuss in this chapter. We will find that our discussion of identity
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conditions forces us to discuss what matters in our survival.
3.2 Williams's Argument Against Psychological
Reductionism
As I have said, the primary and most compelling motivation for the Psychological
Reductionist view is our strong intuitions about the Body-switch case. Recall that,
in that case, person A goes into one booth and person B goes into a second booth.
A scientist then activates his machine. As a result, when the person with A's body
steps out of the first booth, she is fully psychologically continuous with person B,
and when the person with B's body steps out of the second booth, she is fully
psychologically continuous with person A. It seems plausible to claim that A and
B have exchanged bodies, that A now has B's body and vice versa. But if that is
the correct description of what has happened, then physical continuity cannot be a
sufficient or even a necessary condition of personal identity. Rather, psychological
continuity seems to be the criterion of personal identity. Because B-body person is
psychologically continuous with A, we are inclined to think that B-body person is
identical with A. (Similarly for A-body person and B.) Therefore, to challenge the
plausibility of Psychological Reductionism, one needs to challenge our very strong
intuitions about Body-switch. One needs to show that our intuitions are either
confused or should not be given much weight over competing intuitions in other
cases.
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Bernard Williams tries the first strategy of showing that our intuition about
Body-switch is confused. His argument relies on a variant of Body-switch.12 This
case is just like Body-switch except for the addition of a third person C. C steps
into a third booth when A and B step into their respective booths. The resulting
A-body and B-body persons are just as they were in the Body-switch case. When
the person with C's body emerges, she, like B-body person, is psychologically
continuous with A. So there are now two persons who are psychologically
continuous with A before she stepped into the booth - the resulting B-body person
and the resulting C-body person. Do we still want to say that A and B have
exchanged bodies? It seems implausible to suppose that that would be the correct
description of this case. After all, C-body person has the same claim to being A as
B-body person has. Both are psychologically continuous with A. If there were no
B-body person, we would be inclined to say that A and C h Lve exchanged bodies.
So we have no more reason to suppose that A is B-body person than we have to
suppose that A is C-body person. And A cannot be identical with both B-body
person and C-body person, because B-body person is clearly not identical with
C-body person. Therefore, we should say that A does not survive in the
three-person variant of Body-switch.
It seems, at least initially, that the three-person variant presents no problem for
Psychological Reductionism. In this case psychological continuity has taken other
'
2 Williams's example is somewhat different, but the relevant parts of it are the same.
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than a one-one form; in other words, psychological branching has occurred. After
A-body, B-body, and C-body persons step out of their respective booths, there is,
as a result of psychological branching, no unique person who is psychologically
continuous with A.. In our discussion of Psychological Reductionism, we amended
the criterion to deal with such cases of psychological fission. The branching clause
of the Psychological Reductionist criterion (clause (iii)) yields that A is not
identical with either B-body person or C-body person. Thus, the Psychological
Reductionist criterion with the branching clause yields an acceptable conclusion, a
conclusion that seems intuitively plausible.
Williams claims, however, that Psychological Reductionism does not appear so
plausible when we consider the original Body-switch case not independently but in
light of our reactions and plausible claims about the three-person variant. Williams
agrees with the Psychological Reductionist corclusion that A does not survive in
the three-person variant. But, he argues, it is implausible to suppose that A is not
identical with the B-body person in the three-person variant and yet still claim, as
the Psychological Reductionist does, that A is identical with the B-body person in
the original Body-switch case. If we claim that A does not survive in the
three-person variant, then it is implausible to suppose that A survives in the
original case. Williams claims that "to speak of identity in the simpler case would
be at least quite vacuous" (9). After all, all of the intrinsic facts about A, B-body
person, and the relationship between A and B-body person are exactly the same in
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both cases. To say that A is identical with B-body person in one case but not in
the other really comes to nothing more than saying that C-body person is not
around in one case but she is in the other. So if the claim of identity is to be more
than 'vacuous', we should say that A survives in neither case or that A. survives in
both cases. Because we do not want to claim that A survives as the B-body person
in the three-person variant, we should conclude that A does not acquire B's body
in the original case either. We should simply say that A stands in the same
intrinsic psychological relationship to B-body person in both cases, and, in the
three-person variant, she stands in that relationship to C-body person also. If that
is true, then the initial motivation for Psychological Reductionism is undermined.
We should, if Williams is correct, revise our initial reactions to Body-switch.
Those reactions were confused, due to our considering the case in isolation from
the relevant information provided by the three-person variant.
Whereas I started by saying that the branching clause prevents the
Psychological Reductionist from having any difficulties with the three-person
variant, Williams claims that the branching clause is precisely what creates
difficulties for the Psychological Reductionist. He says that the branching clause is
a 'quite arbitrary provision' (21) tacked on merely to save the Psychological
Reductionist criterion from yielding absurd conclusions. To see his reasons for
making this claim, we need to recall that the primary motivation for the
Psychological Reductionist criterion is our intuition about the Body-switch case.
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That case suggests to us that psychological continuity is the criterion of personal
identity. But the three-person variant shows us that psychological continuity,
unlike identity, is not a one-one relation. In the three-person variant, A stands in
the relation of psychological continuity to both B-body person and C-body person,
but A cannot be identical with both B-body person and C-body person. So the
Psychological Reductionist criterion requires the addition of the branching clause,
because the Psychological Reductionist does not want to have to say that A is
identical with both B-body person and C-body person. But then it appears that
the branching clause is 'arbitrary', ad hoc, tacked on to avoid potential
counter-examples to the Psychological Reductionist criterion. As Williams says,
"no principle P will be a philosophically satisfactory criterion of identity for Ts if
the only thing that saves P from admitting many-one relations among Ts is a
quite arbitrary provision" (21). In other words, any criterion that requires a
branching clause or something like a branching clause is unacceptable.
Of course, the three-person variant is only a counter-example to a Psychological
Reductionist criterion without a branching clause. A Psychological Reductionist
might respond that the branching clause is clearly not arbitrary, because it
preserves both the logic of identity and our intuitions about the Body-switch case.
Identity is a one-one relation, and we have strong intuitions in the Body-switch
case that A has acquired B's body because A is psychologically continuous with
B-body person. Therefore, a natural response to Body-switch is to claim that
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psychological continuity, when it takes a one-one form, is the criterion of personal
identity. This response, as I have said, embodies our initial reaction to the case
combined with our prior knowledge of the logic of the identity relation. The logic
of the identity relation simply constrains how we can apply the psychological
continuity criterion. Viewed in this way, the branching clause is not at all an ad
hoc or arbitrary reaction to cases such as the three-person variant. Rather, such
cases are simply examples of its necessity. After all, our initial reactions are about
a case where psychological continuity takes a one-one form. Why should we ever
have supposed that those intuitions apply to any cases where psychological
continuity takes a one-many form?
So Williams owes us more of a story about why we should regard the branching
clause as arbitrary. Williams seems to think that any provision which reflects
extrinsic facts rather than only intrinsic facts is arbitrary. "For", he says, "there is
a fairly clear sense in which what is true of B[-body person] when it uniquely bears
R [psychological continuity] to A is just the same as what is true of it when it
non-uniquely bears R to A; the uniquely.. .makes...no real difference to B[-body
person•' (78; emphasis my own). The sense in which what is true of B-body
person in Body-switch is also true of B-body person in the three-person variant is
that all of the intrinsic facts about B-body person are the same in both cases.
Also, all of the intrinsic facts about A and about the relationship between A and
B-body person are the same in both cases. Williams's claim is that the truth of
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the assertion that B-body person is identical with A can only depend on intrinsic
facts about A, B-body person, and the relationship between A and B-body person.
Therefore, a criterion of identity should depend only on intrinsic facts for the truth
conditions of claims about personal identity. The branching clause of the
Psychological Reductionist criterion clearly involves reference to extrinsic or
relational facts. It tells us that whether A is identical with B-body person depends
on whether A also stands in the relation of psychological continuity to some
C-body person, where C-body person is clearly not identical with B-body person.
Therefore, if Williams is right that the truth conditions of identity claims cannot
involve extrinsic facts about the individuals under consideration, then Williams is
correct in claiming that Psychological Reductionism is an inadequate criterion of
personal identity. Any criterion of personal identity that requires a branching
clause would be inadequate, because branching clauses are precisely clauses that
say that some extrinsic fact is relevant to claims about the persistence of persons.
But why should we suppose that whether A is identical with B-body person can
depend only on intrinsic facts about A, B-body person, and the relationship
between A and B-body person? After all, there is one sense, as Williams himself
admits, in which what is true of B-body person in the original Body-switch case is
not the same as what is true of B-body person in the three-person variant. B-body
person has different extrinsic properties in the two cases. In the former case, but
not in the latter case, he uniquely bears the relation of psychological continuity to
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A. But, Williams urges, such a difference in B-body person's extrinsic properties is
not a 'real difference to B[-body person]'. Only differences that can make a
difference to identity constitute real differences, and, Williams claims, extrinsic
properties do not constitute such differences. Intrinsic properties, on the other
hand, are real differences. But Williams must have some independent notion of
what a real difference is, or he will simply be begging the question against any
criterion with a branching clause. After all, without some independent notion of a
real difference, tht Psychological Reductionist can point out that, given that the
logic of identity is one-one, uniqueness would seem to be very relevant to identity
questions. For example, in order to determine whether a certain man is my
husband, one needs to determine whether I stand in the marriage relation to him
and only to him, because the spouse relation is a one-one relation (at least in most
states). So we need some independent explanation of why extrinsic facts cannot be
relevant to the truth conditions of identity claims.
One reason why extrinsic facts might seem irrelevant to identity questions is
because, in all normal cases, persons do not cease to exist unless there is some
change in their intrinsic properties. Consider how persons typically cease to exist:
they die of diseases, as a result of automobile accidents, they get stabbed or shot,
etc. In all of these cases, there is bodily failure. Something happens to a person's
body that causes it to cease to function or to support any sort of mental life, let
alone a psychologically continuous mental life. The creation of C-body person in
84
the three-person variant has no such causal impact on A's physical or mental life.
After C-body person steps out of her booth, A's body continues to function and
A's mental continues on in B-body person just as it would if C-body person were
not around. The causal effects of the creation of C-body person are very different
than the causal effects of B-body person getting terminal cancer or of solneone
putting a fatal bullet wound in A's body. But that is just to say that persons
never normally go out of existence as a result of the sorts of events described in
the three-person variant. Again, though, the Psychological Reductionist will say
that given both our intuition about the original Body-switch case and the logic of
identity, we should conclude that persons can cease to exist in other than the ways
with which we are familiar, as the result of events which are, in their causal
impact, extremely different from diseases or stabbings. As I have emphasized
before, mere extrapolation from ordinary cases is not sufficient to defeat a
metaphysical criterion of identity. If it were, we would have a quick argument
against the possibility of a person getting a new body, because persons never do
actually get new bodies.
I do think, however, that there is something compelling in Williams's
suggestions. It does seem odd to suppose that whether B-body person is identical
with A depends on whether C-body person happens to be around. After all,
identity is the relation that everything bears to itself and only to itself. Therefore,
in order to determine the identity of B-body person, why should we have to check
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any facts about some person such as C-body person who is clearly distinct from
B-body person? For imagine that B-body person emerges from her booth, but the
door to C-body person's booth gets jammed. B-body person then works feverishly
to get the door open. She wants to find out whether C-body person is
psychologically continuous with A so that she will know whether she, B-body
person, is identical with A. There does seem to be something implausible in
supposing that B-body person must know those facts about C-body person before
she can know who she herself is. Of course, as we saw in Chapter 2, we cannot
always trust the deliverances of introspection to yield knowledge of personal
identity. But if B-body person needs to verify the deliverances of introspection as
to whether she is A, it does seem odd to suppose that she can do so by checking
facts about C-body person who is clearly distinct from B-body person. Also, can
whether or not B-body person is identical with A depend upon facts at some
extremely remote distance? For imagine that C stepped into a booth in Siberia
while A and B entered booths in Idaho. How can the identity of B-body person in
Idaho depend upon the intrinsic characteristics of C-body person far away in
Siberia? Considerations such as these do seem to indicate that Williams's
suggestions about real differences and intrinsic facts have a compelling motivation.
But, on a second glance, these considerations may only be compelling if we
understand a criterion of identity to be a criterion in some epistemological sense.
For consider the cases that I just presented. In the first one, we imagine B-body
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person trying to open the C booth so that she can find out who she is. I think
that what seems odd about this case is that B-body person must know some facts
about C-body person before she can answer the question as to whether she is
identical with A. Similarly, in the second case, what strikes us as odd is that
B-body person in Idaho must know some facts about a person far off in Siberia
before she can kno.w the answer to the question as to whether she is identical with
A. We always manage to answer identity questions without any investigation into
such remote facts. Commonsense tells us that such facts are irrelevant to our
knowledge of personal identity. If Williams is right in claiming that "[(to enable us
to answer such questions is the point of a criterion of identity" (24), then it does
look as though the Psychological Reductionist criterion simply fails in certain
cases. We can know all of the facts about A, B-body person, and the relationship
between A and B-body person and still not be able to determine whether A is
identical with B-body person. We can know the entire history of B-body person
and still not be able to determine whether B-body person is A. Such results
certainly do not respect our intuitions about our judgments of identity and what
facts we need to know to know who someone is. Psychological Reductionism seems
to leave open the possibility that if we use only the evidence which commonsense
tells us is at all relevant, we will make wrong judgments about personal identity.
I do think that certain sorts of epistemnological considerations should influence
our evaluations of various criteria of personal identity. Recall, for example, my
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argument against Cartesian Non-Reductionism. I claimed that the Combined
Spectrum argument showed that, if Non-Reductionism were true, it seemns that it
would be impossible, in principle, for us to ever have knowledge about personal
identity. The Non-Reductionist fails to give us an adequate account of how the
facts that really determine a person's identity are related to the facts that we
typically use to determine a person's identity. Also, it seems that we never could
have access to those facts which really determine a given person's identity. So if
Non-Reductionism were true, we would be forced to accept a general scepticism
about our judgments of identity. We would never have knowledge of personal
identity. If we do make correct judgments about personal identity, they are silmply
lucky guesses, pure happenstance. I claimed that this was a good reason to reject
Cartesian Non-Reductionism and to look for a plausible version of Reductionisml.
Even though there is an epistemological worry about the Psychological
Reductionist criterion, it is not the same sort of worry that we faced concerning
the Non-Reductionist criterion. The Psychological Reductionist criterion certainly
does not make it impossible, in principle, for us to tell when a given individual has
survived. Neither does it make it the case that we can never have access to the
facts which determine a person's identity. We will sometimes have to travel long
distances to determine who a given individual is. The Psyc:hological Reductionist
criterion simply makes it the case that it may be very difficult to know where to
accumulate all of the facts relevant to a particular judgment of identity. But such
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cases do not undermine the judgments that we make in normal cases. The
Combined Spectrum argument showed that, if Non-Reductionism were true, we
could never have knowledge of personal identity. The cases that I presented above
as posing a problem for Psychological Reductionism show only that it could be
extremely unlikely that we would make correct identity judgments in certain cases
of psychological branching. However, we can be reasonably, even extremely
confident, in ordinary cases, that psychological branching has not occurred, and, in
such cases, we have access to the sorts of facts, facts about psychological
continuity, that determine the truth of claims about personal identity. The mnere
possibility of making an incorrect judgment does not commit us to any general
scepticism as did the Non-Reductionist criterion. The fact that a criterion of
identity leaves open the possibility that we are not infallible in our judgments of
identity is certainly no reason to reject it.
Of course, the Psychological Reductionist must, in certain branching cases,
appeal to facts which commonsense denies to be at all relevant to determining
whether, for example, B-body person is identical with A. I do not think, however,
that this is any reason to reject Psychological Reductionism. After all, here is
where commonsense may support some version of Non-Reductionism. For we can
imagine cases where it would also seem very odd to require the sorts of evidence
required by any form of Physical Reductionism to answer a question about
personal identity. For all introspection can reveal, I might be a replica of Diane. In
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order to find out, I would need to trace the history of my body. Of course, in all
probability I am not a replica, and, therefore, if Physical Reductionism were true,
I could have knowledge of my own identity and of the identity of other persons.
Most of us, I think, would find it odd to suppose that anything more than
introspection was necessary, except in cases of insanity or amnesia, in order to
discover our own identity (cf. Johnston "Reasons and Reductionismu" 11ff.).
Again, however, we have to be careful not to merely extrapolate fromn the ordinary
run of cases. As I said above, all of the ordinary cases of a person's going out of
existence involve some sort of bodily failure as a result, perhaps, of disease or a
bullet wound. Because a person's mental life always ceases when the body stops
functioning, we normally just check if a person's body is still working when we
want to know if that person still exists. Similarly, a person's mental life normally
does not continue on in more than one body; people do not normally undergo
fission. As long as a metaphysical criterion allows that what we check in normal
cases is generally sufficient in those cases to determine whether a person has
survived or whether a person is who she thinks she is, then I do not think that
epistemological considerations are sufficient to defeat the criterion. Because I also
think that such considerations are at the root of Williams's worry about the
arbitrariness of the branching clause and of the worry about real differences and
extrinsic facts, I do not think that Williams's argument that our intuition about
Body-switch is confused is a successful argument. Williams's argument does not
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defeat Psychological Reductionism.
3.3 Another Difficulty for Psychological Reductionism
I said above that in order to defeat Psychological Reductionism one would need to
show either that our intuitions about Body-switch are confused or that they
should be given little weight in comparison with competing intuitions that we have
about other cases. In the previous section, I showed why I think that Williams's
attempt at the first strategy failed. Now I want to suggest that the second
strategy might be more successful, because I do think that there is a sort of case
that raises serious difficulties for Psychological Reductionism. In these cases, our
intuitions strongly suggest that physical continuity is not at all irrelevant to
questions about personal identity.
Suppose that I am sitting in my office working on April 23, 1992, at noon.
Unbeknownst to me, scientists on board the Space Shuttle have developed a
method whereby they can clone any person whom they choose. This cloning takes
place via a new laser beam that locks on to a person and then reproduces the
person's physical cnd psychological composition. At noon on April 23, they create
a replica of me who has a body exactly similar to mine and is fully psychologically
continuous with me just before the replication. Psychological branching has
occurred, because after the replication there are two persons, the replica on the
Space Shuttle and the person in my office, who are both psychologically
91.
continuous with me before the replication. Thus, according to the Psychological
Reductionist criterion, I die as a result of the replication that takes place on the
Space Shuttle. Anyone who enters my office will see not me but a new person who
came into existence at noon on April 23.
Consider another similar case. Suppose that scientists have developed a new
drug that can cause radical personality changes, and the scientists are able to
determine what changes will take place. This drug contains vital information
encoded in bio-chemical material, information that will cause the person who takes
the drug to become psychologically exactly like the person from whom the
bio-chemical material was taken. The scientist take the relevant bio-chemical
material from my body . They are able to do this without my being aware of what
is happening. The scientists then administer the drug to Madonna, thereby
causing her to become psychologically continuous with nme before the
administration of the drug. Again, psychological branching has occurred. Both the
resulting person with my body and the resulting person with Madonna's body are
psychologically continuous with me before Madonna's taking of the drug. So,
according to Psychological Reductionism, I die as a result of Madonna's ingesting
this new drug.
I think that these cases raise two problems for Psychological Reductionism.
The first problem I will only mention here, and then discuss it further in the next
chapter. It seems very odd to suppose that the sorts of events described in the
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Space Shuttle and Madonna cases could cause my death. How could the creation of
a replica of me aboard the Space Shuttle kill me? How could Madonna's ingesting
a particular drug kill me? It certainly is a counterintuitive feature of Psychological
Reductionism that it yields that I die in these cases. The Psychological
Reductionist, however, has a response to this worry about death. He will say that
it seems counterintuitive to suppose that I die in these cases only because we
typically think that survival matters. For in order to reach the conclusion that the
events in these cases could not possibly kill me, one would reason in the following
way: It just seems wrong to suppose that it should matter to me whether a replica
of me is made on board the Space Shuttle or whether Madonna takes a dose of
some drug. But if these events cannot matter to me, and my death is an event
that would matter greatly to me, then it cannot be the case that the Space Shuttle
or Madonna events can kill me. The Psychological Reductionist responds that we
should reject the claim that my death is always an event that would matter to me.
As long as there is some future person who is psychologically continuous with me,
then I cannot rationally care whether I survive. Psychological continuity, not
identity, is what fundamentally matters in my survival. As I have said, however, I
will pursue this issue of whether survival matters in the next chapter.
Without addressing the issue of what matters, however, the Psychological
Reductionist might claim that my use of the term 'death' in these cases is
tendentious, because 'death' has certain connotations from ordinary cases. As I
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said in the previous section, ordinary death involves some sort of bodily failure.
So, the Psychological Reductionist will say, of course it seems odd to suppose that
the events described in the Madonna and Space Shuttle cases could cause my
death, because these events do not cause my body to cease to function. It may be
that our concept of death necessarily involves the idea of a person's body ceasing
to function. Therefore, in the absence of such bodily failure, it is odd and, indeed,
mistaken, to speak of my death. But that does not imply that I survive as one of
the resulting persons in these cases. What we should take it to imply, the
Psychological Reductionist can say, is that a person can cease to exist in other
ways than by dying. One such way is to be replicated or to undergo some other
sort of psychological branching. Because persons in all normal cases only go out of
existence by dying, we really should expect to have no definite intuitions about
what sorts of events might cause me to cease to exist in some other way than by
dying. To say that it is odd to suppose that I die in Madonna and Space Shuttle,
then, comes to no more than to say that the creation of a replica is very different
from contracting terminal cancer or getting hit by a bus.
Even if we accept this point, however, I think that the Psychological
Reductionist will have difficulty with the Space Shuttle and Madonna cases. Let
us recall the reason why the Psychological Reductionist, in the face of
psychological fission, added the branching clause that states that, in a case of
branching, neither resulting person is identical with the original person. In the
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three-person variant of the Body-switch case, we said that both B-body person
and C-body person had equal claim to being A because each was fully
psychologically continuous with A; therefore, the best option seemed to be to say
that A did not survive as either B-body or C-body person. But in neither the
Space Shuttle case nor in the Madonna case does it seem to be true that each
resulting person has an equal claim to being me. The fact that the person in my
office has my body seems to settle the matter in her favor. The replica seems to be
just a very good copy of me. And Madonna's taking of the drug simply makes it
the case that there is now someone around who has Madonna's body and is
psychologically continuous with me. It seems implausible that I do not survive as
the person with my body in these cases. We do not seem to have sufficient reason
to say that I have ceased to exist either by dying or in some other way.
What can the Psychological Reductionist say about these cases? He might
respond that these cases suggest a modification rather than a complete rejection of
Psychological Reductionism. In a case where my body is destroyed as the replica is
created, it does seem that the replica has a strong claim to being me. In order not
to rule out that possibility, we might admit physical continuity as a 'tie-breaker' in
certain cases of psychological branching, but not yet claim that physical continuity
is a necessary condition of personal identity. Thus, the Psychological Reductionist
criterion would say that person x is identical with person y if and only if (i) x is
psychologically continuous with y, and (ii) when psychological branching has
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occurred, only if x is physically continuous with y. Such a modified Psychological
criterion would yield plausible results in the Space Shuttle and Madonna cases and
still allow persons to exchange bodies as in Body-switch or get new bodies as in
simple replication.
The problem with this response is that it seems too ad hoc. Why should we
suppose that physical continuity can function as a tie-breaker and yet is not a
necessary condition of personal identity? Perhaps it is more plausible to accept
that physical continuity is a necessary condition of personal identity and deny that
persons can get new bodies. Of course, accepting these claims would entail a
rejection of our initial intuition in Body-switch. I want to now consider a Mixed
Reductionist view so that we can decide whether it has sufficient advantages to
force us to view our original intuition in Body-switch as being outweighed by
competing intuitions about Madonna and Space Shuttle.
3.4 The Mixed Reductionist Criterion
The Mixed Reductionist criterion says that person x is identical with person y if
and only if (i) x is psychologically continuous with y, and (ii) x is physically
continuous with y. This criterion avoids any problems involved with psychological
branching. For example, neither in the Body-switch case nor in its three-person
variant does A survive, because none of the resulting persons in either case is both
psychologically and physically continuous with A. The question that we need to
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address is whether there is any parallel problem with physical branching. Could
there be at some time two distinct persons, B and C, such that both are fully
physically continuous with person A at some earlier time?
It does seem, at least at first, quite plausible to suppose that we could have
physical branching just as we have psychological branching. As Williams says, "It
is possible to imagine a man splitting, amoeba-like, into two sinmulacra of himself"
(23). We imagine a man's body splitting in half. As it does so, each cell generates
a copy of itself so that we end up with two bodies that are indistinguishable from
the original body, each of which has half of the cells which the original body had.
It does seem right to say that each resulting person is physically continuous with
the original person. For imagine a case where half of a man's body is severely
burned. Scientists have developed a process where they can lop off the burned cells
and induce the remaining cells to duplicate. Surely a man could survive such a
process; therefore, the Mixed criterion should count the resulting body as being
fully physically continuous with the original pre-burning body. But then we must
count each of the resulting bodies in the splitting case as being fully physically
continuous with the original body. Thus, physical splitting does seem to be a real
possibility as much as is psycholt ,ical splitting.
Williams claims, however, that we should not equate physical branching with
psychological branching. For, Williams says,
a thorough application of the [physical] criterion would itself reveal the
existence of the reduplication situation, and so enable us to answer
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(negatively) the original identity question. To enable us to answer such
questions is the point of a criterion of identity. Thus, in this case, but
not in the others [the cases of psychological branching], the logical
possibility of reduplication fails to impugn the status of the criterion of
identity...these considerations perhaps suffice for us to say that in a
case of fission, such as that of an amoeba, the resultant items are not,
in the strict sense, spatio-temporally continuous with the original (24;
emphasis my own).
Here we can see Williams clearly relying on the epistemological sense of a
criterion. If the point of a criterion is to give us a procedure for determining when
a person survives, then the Mixed Reductionist criterion probably does fare better
than thek Psychological Reductionist criterion. We will be more likely to be able to
discover when physical splitting has occurred than we will be to discover when
psychological branching has occurred. But, to repeat the point that I made when
discussing psychological branching, we should not evaluate a criterion of personal
identity merely on the basis of how often it makes it easy for us to answer
questions of identity. As long as a criterion allows that we can have knowledge of
personal identity in the ordinary range of cases, then it ca.nnot be defeated by
epistemological worries. So I do not think that Williams has a good reason for
making a distinction between the significance of psychological branching and the
significance of physical branching.
Also, it is somewhat mysterious what Williams means when he says that "in ak
case of fission, such as that of an amoeba, the resultant iteims are not, in. the strict
sense, spatio-temporally continuous with the original". The relationship between
the original man A and the resulting person B is intrinsically exactly the same in
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both the first burning case and in the splitting case. If A is not, strictly speaking,
physically continuous with B in the second case, then we should conclude that he
is not, strictly speaking, physically continuous with, and, therefore, not identical
with B in the first case. To claim that strict physical continuity depends on
extrinsic facts such as whether C is around is simply to build a branching clause
right into our conception of physical continuity. The Psychological Reductionist
could have done the same thing and claimed that we do not have 'strict'
psychological continuity in the three-person variant of the Body-switch case.
Nonetheless, it just seems more straightforward to allow that there can be both
physical and psychological branching and add branching clauses to both the
Psychological and Mixed Reductionist criteria.
Williams might respond by saying that there is a reason why we can make a
distinction between strict physical continuity and non-strict physical continuity
but we cannot make such a distinction between strict psychological continuity and
non-strict psychological continuity. (What follows is not exactly Williams's
argument, but rather a modification of some remarks that he makes about identity
and exact similarity.) To see why, recall that, in my earlier discussion of physical
continuity, I suggested that its use as a criterion of personal identity is motivated
by the intuitive idea that a person persists as long as his body persists, i.e. that
same body implies same person and vice versa. The concept of physical continuity
is intended to capture the intuitive idea of having the same body, that is, it is
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supposed to be part of a reductive analysis of the concept of having the same body.
So we have strict physical continuity in the cases where we have the persistence of
one and the same physical human body. Now it is quite clear that in the physical
splitting case, we must say that two new bodies are created out of the original
body, because we have no reason to suppose that one of the resulting bodies rather
than the other is the original body and it is too odd to claim that we have, after
the splitting, one spatio-temporally dislocated body. And, yet, surely the resultant
bodies are, in some sense, physically continuous with the original body. So now we
have a distinction between strict and non-strict physical continuity.
The concept of psychological continuity, on the other hand, does not, and
should not capture the notion of 'same psychology'. I may have exactly the same
psychology as my doppelganger on Twin Earth, and yet I am not psychologically
continuous with my doppelganger because her psychological states are not causally
dependent on mine. Similarly, my self of twenty years hence will not have exactly
the same psychology as I now have, because my psychological attributes will
change over time. So we do not want to say that we only have strict psychological
continuity in the cases where we have the persistence of one and the same
psychology. But, if we do not, then we do not have the resources to distinguish
strict and non-strict psychological continuity.
I do not think that this sort of response is really going to help Williams out. It
seems to me that physical splitting cases simply show that the concept of physical
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continuity cannot capture our intuitive notion of same body. For in the case where
half of the man's body is burned away and then regenerated, we are inclined to say
that he survives with the same body, that there is physical continuity in the strict
sense. But then it is difficult to see why we do not have strict physical continuity
in the splitting case; after all, one of the resulting bodies in the fission case is
exactly the same as the body in the burning case. And yet, clearly, neither body in
the fission case can be the same body as the original body. So in the burning case
the man's having the same body as the original body just conies to his being
uniquely physically continuous with the original man, where physical continuity
must be of the same sort that we have in the fission case.
So we do not want to lay any more stress on the notion of 'same body' than we
do on the notion of 'same psychology'. The reductive analysis of both concepts
simply involves certain continuities in change of either physical matter or
psychological attributes when those continuities take a one-one form. I think that,
in attempting to use some notion of strict physical continuity, Williams may be
defending a form of Physical Non-Reductionism. A Physical Reductionist, as we
saw, will deny that we can give a reductive analysis of what it is to have the same
body through time. In normal cases it is clear that persons keep the same body,
and, Williams wants to say, it is clear that bodies do not persist through physical
splitting. If we interpret Williams as a Physical Non-Reductionist, then we can see
his earlier arguments as being arguments not simply against Psychological
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Reductionism but against any version of Reductionism because all versions require
branching clauses.
But the Physical Non-Reductionist faces a real problem with physical splitting
cases. Williams agrees with the Mixed Reductionist that neither resulting person
in such a case is identical with the original person. The Mixed Reductionist says
this because it seems that both persons, on her view, have equal claim to being the
original person. The Physical Non-Reductionist, on the other hand, has no reason
to suppose that both persons have an equal claim; it may be that one of the
persons has the original person's body. If having the same body is not just to
stand in one-one physical continuity, the Physical Non-Reductionist seems unable
to tell us why some one of the resulting persons does not have the original body in
the splitting case. The Physical Non-Reductionist is going to have some serious
epistemological worries, and he is going to have a difficult time explaining why
bodies survive certain changes but not others. In comparison, the sorts of
epistemological worries that beset Reductionism as a result of branching clauses do
not seem particularly troubling. So Williams's considerations are not persuasive
whether they are intended to support some version of Physical Reductionism or to
support Physical Non-Reductionism.
The Mixed Reductionism, then, cannot avoid the need for a branching clause.
(Notice that he has the choice of adding either a psychological branching clause or
a physical branching clause.) But then we need to wonder what motivation there
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is for Mixed Reductionisnl other than its being able to account for our intuitions
in the Space Shuttle and Madonna cases. Also, Mixed Reductionism faces the
same problem with the Brownson case that the Physical Reductionist faced with
that case. Recall that, in that case, Brownson has Robinson's body, Brown's
brain, and is psychologically continuous with Brown. Our intuition is that
Brownson is Brown and not Robinson, and we would think that Brownson is
Brown even if there happened to be someone else around who was also
psychologically continuous with Brown. Now it is true that in the Madonna and
Space Shuttle cases the person in my office stands in the same relation to me as
Brownson stands in to Brown, that is, she is psychologically continuous with me as
the result of having the same brain as me. ('Same brain', of course, can be
analyzed in terms of non-branching psychological continuity.) So we might take
Madonna, Space Shuttle, and Brownson to be evidence for what I called, in the
previous chapter, Narrow Psychological Reductionism. The Narrow Psychological
Reductionist claims that person x is identical with person y if and only if (i) x is
psychologically continuous with y, (ii), this psychological continuity has the
normal cause, continuity of the brain, and (iii) this psychological continuity has
not taken other than a one-one form.
When we discussed Brownson above, we saw that appeal to the brain is no
more than an appeal to psychological continuity. Why should we suppose that
psychological continuity must have its normal cause? The appeal to normality
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should make us wonder whether we are relying too heavily on an extrapolation
from ordinary cases. Death is tied to bodily failure, and, more specifically, to brain
failure. So our intuitions in Brownson and Space Shuttle may be dictated by our
sense that if the brain is functioning, th original person cannot be dead and must
follow her or his brain. But imagine that I have inoperable brain cancer. I elect to
have my neurosurgeon remove my brain, extract the information from it, put the
information in a new brain, and then put this new brain in my head. Doesn't this
procedure save my life? Do I really need that particular brain matter in order to
survive? If I could have a brain matter replacement operation, then we should
reject Narrow Psychological Reductionism. At this point, we might try to think of
a way to accommodate intuitions without an appeal to any sort of physical
continuity. What differentiates the person in my office from the replica on the
Space Shuttle other than the fact that she is physically continuous with me?
3.5 A Modified Psychological Reductionism
In this section I want to consider the possibility of offering a purely psychological
account of personal identity that will accommodate our intuitions about Madonna
and Space Shuttle. To begin, consider the following pair of cases. In the first, I
decide that I want to overcome my fear of flying. I therefore decide to attend a
series of classes designed to help people overcome a fear of flying. In these classes
various sorts of behavior modification techniques are used, and, as a result, after
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attending the classes, I am able to fly without undue anxiety. In the second case, I
need to undergo brain surgery. While the neurosurgeon is operating, he decides,
unbeknownst to me, to do some 'rewiring' that results in iny no longer being afraid
to fly.
In both of the above cases, I undergo a beneficial psychological change. But
there is clearly a difference in the two cases in the way that this psychological
change is brought about. In the first case, I decide to bring about the change and
deliberately undertake actions that lead to the change. The behavior modification
techniques assist me in bringing about these changes, but I interact with this
external partial cause of the change. I retain at least some control over the change.
In the second case, however, I am completely passive in the bringing about of the
change; in fact, I have no knowledge that the change is occurring. The change is in
no way a result of my will or intention, it is something in which I have no active
role. Let us call this second sort of cause of psychological change an 'external
imposition', where an external imposition is such that when it effects a certain
change in psychology it destroys a psychological connection. For notice that if the
scientist were to do sufficie:t changing via his process of 'rewiring', we would
arrive at a case wherein there is sufficient reduction of connections to make it such
that I do not survive in that case. In the first case, however, the change is itself a
strong psychological connection. The relationship betwen my intending to effect
the change and my taking action to bring about the change establishes a strong
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psychological connection between me and my future self.
Now notice that external impositions are such that they need not interfere with
psychological connections, because psychological connections involve not only
relations of appropriate causal dependence but also relations of simlilarity. So if the
scientist's rewiring caused me to maintain and also increased my fear of flying, this
external imposition would actually strengthen a connection between me and my
future self. Thus, an external imposition could maintain the same degree of
psychological similarity that existed before the imposition, but not the same
degree of causal connectedness in so far as interference by an external imposition
will always weaken causal connections.
Let us return to the Space Shuttle case. The replica in this case is created via a
scanning process that results in cloning. This process is such that if it were to
effect changes, it would destroy psychological connectedness; therefore, this process
constitutes what I am calling an external imposition. It is quite clear, on the other
hand, that the person in my office is psychologically continuous with me in such a
way that no external imposition is involved. The replica's being just like me is not
a result of any intention or deliberation on my part; I am completely passive in the
creation of the replica, while the maintenance of continuity with the person in my
office is something over which I have sonme control. I think that we should continue
to speak of continuity with respect to the replica because there are quite a few
connections of similarity between me and the replica; however, the causal
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connection between similar psychological states would not be in itself enough to
establish a psychological connection, whereas the causal connection between
similar psychological states is itself a psychological connection between me and the
person in my office. Thus, the replica is not as strongly continuous with me as the
person in my office is, because the person in niy office bears both connections of
similarity and appropriate causal connections to me, while the replica bears only
connections of similarity to me.
Why should we suppose that lack of any causal connections not involving an
external imposition will destroy personal identity, that is, why suppose that I
survive as the person in my office rather than as the replica? Is there any
motivation for such a modified Psychological Reductionist account of personal
identity? Notice that it never seemed to be a plausible option to offer a
psychological criterion that claimed that person x is identical with person y if and
only if x and y are exactly the same psychologically. We all recognize that persons
survive drastic psychological changes throughout the course of a lifetime. These
psychological changes do not simply happen to a person; rather, persons initiate
changes in themselves and change in response to their environment. This ability to
adapt and make reasoned choices about change is an important part of our
concept of a person as being not just a subject of experiences but also an agent.
So it is plausible to think that non-branching psychological continuity, if it is to be
the criterion of personal identity, must involve appropriate causal connections that
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preserve the centrality of agency to personal identity. The sort of psychological
continuity that involves too many external impositions seems to violate this
requirement. So, the Psychological Reductionist will say, there is a purely
psychological motivation for claiming that I survive as the person in my office in
both the Madonna and Space Shuttle cases.
Nonetheless, there are difficulties with this new view. Imagine a case where I
decide to be replicated by a process that simultaneously destroys my brain and
body. We can even imagine that I am completely in control of the entire
replication process; there are no scientists involved. It seems that the modified
Psychological account yields that I survive in this case, because the external cause
of continuity is not independent of my will; in fact, it is completely dependent on
my intentional decisions and actions. But now suppose that the replication
succeeds but my body is not destroyed as I had intended it to be. What does the
modified Psychological view say about this case? Surely not that I survive as the
replica even though I had intended to do so. But it has no reason to suppose that
I survive as the person with my body because mere physical continuity is
irrelevant on this view. Could it be that my wanting to survive as the replica
rather than the replication's being out of my control could make the difference
between my ceasing to exist and my not ceasing to exist? Surely I do not have
that much power over my own persistence. At the least, the modified
Psychological view has difficulty with a case such as this one.
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So far none of the criteria of personal identity that we have considered seems
entirely satisfactory. They seem either unmotivated or they yeild the conclusion
that I do not survive as some future person when we are strongly inclined to think
that I must survive as that future person. I suggested above that some of our
initial intuitions about cases might be clouded by the connotation that 'death'
carries of bodily or brain failure and that we should try to use more neutral
language. But perhaps 'survival' carries certain connotations just as 'death' does.
In all normal cases, a person's mental life continues only if she survives. Most of us
think that the continuance of our mental lives is valuable and that it is rational to
care that it continue; therefore, it seems rational for us to care that we survive.
But perhaps it is really the continuance of my mental life, not survival per se that
should concern me. If so, then in cases like Space Shuttle where it is clear that my
mental life continues, I should be more open to the possibility that I do not
survive in those cases; after all, we would still have what matters in these cases.
Then the problem for the Modified Psychological account that I presented in the
last paragraph would not appear very troublesome. Perhaps I do not survive in
the case where I decide to be replicated but my body is not destroyed, but I need
not be concerned about my failure to survive. After all, what I wanted was for my
mental life to continue in the replica and I have accomplished that goal. Can I
really care that my mental life also continues in my body? Let us turn, then, to a
discussion of what matters in survival.
109
4 Should We Care If We Get New Bodies?
4.1 Introduction
Most of us think that it should matter to us whether or not we survive. Thus,
when we consider a particular situation such as that described in the Space Shuttle
case and decide that the events described could not possibly matter to us, we then
conclude that the described events are not such as to be able to affect whether we
survive. Perhaps, however, we should conclude instead that we cannot, in certain
cases, rationally care whether or not we survive. If we accept such a conclusion, we
should shift our focus from questions about whether we are identical with some
future persons to questions about how we should regard those future persons, how
much and what sort of concern for those persons is appropriate. Is special concern
required in some cases even though I do not survive in those cases? I will begin by
considering what is involved in special concern for one's future self.
4.2 Future Selves and Fission Products
Commonsense holds that I have offered sufficient justification for my special
concern for my future self when I point out that she is my future self, that she is
identical with me. As Sidgwick says,
[i]t would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction
between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and
that consequently 'I' am concerned with the quality of my existence as
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an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not
concerned with the quality of existence of other individuals (498).
What does it come to for me to be 'concerned with the quality of my existence...in
a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of
existence of other individuals'? It means, among other things, that I have many
private projects, projects which are such that their formulation involves an
essential reference to me. For example, I want that I finish my thesis, that I see
the Mona Lisa, that I spend time with my friends, that I support my family, etc.
For these projects to be realized, I must survive and realize them. My desire that I
finish my thesis will not be satisfied unless I survive and finish the thesis. If any of
these private projects is justified, and they do seem justified, then I am justified in
wanting to survive, in wanting that there is some future self such that she is my
future self.
But notice that Sidgwick asserts that these claims about future-directed
self-concern depend in some way upon the commonsense belief that 'the
distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental'.
Sidgwick himself wonders whether this belief is undermiined by the Humean
account of personal identity. More recently, philosophers such as Parfit have
claimed that the belief is undermined by Reductionist accounts of personal
identity. Parfit argues that certain cases show that I cannot, in those cases,
rationally care that I do not survive. What matters in my survival is not identity,
but, rather, psychological continuity.
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To see why Parfit makes this claim, we need to look at cases where certain
conditions of my survival hold but some other condition does not. Suppose that I
have a degenerative and debilitating disease which has infected my body and half
of my brain. My surgeon removes the other half of my brain and puts it in an
available functioning debrained body and then destroys the other half of my brain
along with my body. If we assume that half of a brain is sufficient to guarantee
psychological continuity, any Psychological Reductionist criterion yields that the
resulting person, call her A, is identical with me.1 3 But now consider a second
case. Suppose that the surgeon were to realize, just after he has transplanted half
of my brain into A, that the other half of my brain is not diseased. He then
transplants it into another available functioning debrained body and then destroys
the rest of my body. Call this second resulting person B. Since we no longer have
non-branching psychological continuity, neither A nor B is identical with me
according to the Psychological Reductionist.
Suppose that the Psychological Reductionist is correct in claiming that I
survive in the first case but not in the second case. How should I then regard my
fission products A and B? Should it matter to me that neither A nor B is identical
to me? Since neither A nor B is identical to me, none of my private projects will
be realized if I undergo fission; if either A or B finishes my thesis that is not
sufficient to satisfy my desire that Ifinish my thesis. Thus, prima facie, it would
'aI will only distinguish Psychological Reductionism from the modified Psychological account
discussed earlier in this chapter when the two views yield different conclusions.
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seem rational for me to care that I survive rather than undergoing fission, because
if I undergo fission, none of my private projects can be realized. Therefore, I seem
rational in preferring that only one half of my brain is successfully transplanted.
But notice that my relation to A in the case where only half of my brain is
transplanted (the case where A is me) is intrinsically the same as my relation to A
in the fission case. Each of them is psychologically continuous with me as a result
of having half of my brain. However, in the first case, if A finishes my thesis, my
private project will be realized, whereas, in the fission case, if A finishes my thesis,
my private project will not be realized. The only reason why umy private project is
not realized in the fission case is because B is also around. But can I rationally
care that B is also around? If not, then I cannot rationally care whether my
private projects are realized. I should not care whether my thesis is finished by the
A of the first case or by the A (or B) of the fission case. Thus, I should have not
private projects, but, rather, quasi-private projects, where a quasi-private project
is a project such that its formulation involves an essential reference to someone
who is psychologically continuous with me. 4 Therefore, I cannot rationally care
whether I survive but only that there be someone in the future who is
psychologically continuous with me whether or not she is identical with me.
In the previous chapter, I considered Williams's claim that whether I survive as
A can only depend on the intrinsic facts about me, A, and the relationship
"4The notion of a quasi-private project is, in some respects, parallel to Shoemaker's notion of a
quasi-memory.
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between me and A. So Williams would argue that, because I do not survive as A
in the fission case, then I do not survive as A in the case where only half of my
brain is transplanted and the other half is destroyed; therefore, my private project
is realized in neither case. However, I rejected Williams's argument, claiming that
it traded on irrelevant epistemological considerations. Now notice, however, that
Parfit's argument about what matters has a structure similar to Williams's
argument about survival. Parfit claims that because the intrinsic facts about me,
A, and the relationship between me and A are the same in both cases, and we
have what matters in my relationship to A in the case where only half of my brainl
is transplanted, then we must have what matters in my relationship to A (and to
B) in the fission case. Should we suppose that extrinsic facts cannot affect what
matters in my relationrhip to some future person even though they can affect
whether I am identical with that person?
I think that it is prima facie more plausible to suppose that considerations
about extrinsic facts are irrelevant to what matters than it is to suppose that they
are irrelevant to questions about our identity. For imagine the fission case with a
slight variation. Suppose that the scientist transplants one half of my brain into A
and removes the other half of my brain and ships it to Siberia, where it is
transplanted into B. A completes my thesis without ever coming to know about B.
As I look ahead at my future, it does seem odd to suppose that I should care
about whether B exists when it is entirely possible that I know nothing about B.
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Here Williams's epistemological worries seem very important. Is it really plausible
to suppose that I need to know about B in Siberia before I can decide what sort of
and how much concern I should have about A and A's projects? If it is true that
extrinsic facts are relevant to my survival but not to what matters, then it must be
the case that what matters can come apart from survival.
A Mixed Reductionist can make a similar argument about cases of physical
fission. First, we imagine a case where half of my body is burned away. My
remaining cells reduplicate and I end up with a body that is just like and is
physically continuous with the one that I started with. I survive this process, so
the resulting person A can realize my private project that I finish my thesis. But
now we imagine a second case in which the other half of my body is not destroyed
but itself reduplicates to create a body indistinguishable from and physically
continuous with my original body. Now if A finishes my thesis, my private project
that I finish my thesis will not be realized because A is not identical with me. The
relationship between A and me is intrinsically the same in both cases. So how can
it matter to me that B is also around? The Mixed Reductionist will conclude that
what matters is psychological and physical continuity, not identity. So I should
have not private projects, but mixed-quasi-private projects. In other words, I
should want that someone physically and psychologically continuous with me
realize my projects whether or not she is identical with mne.
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The Psychological Reductionist argues that we have what matters in both the
burning case and the physical fission case, because in both cases there is
psychological continuity. But he also claims that we have what matters in the
psychological fission case, and that conclusion depends on the claim that I survive
if only half of my brain is transplanted. The Mixed Reductionist rejects this latter
claim."' So let us look at another case to see if it can shed light on these
competing conclusions about what matters.
4.3 Replication and the Branch-line Case
So let us consider a case of replication. Suppose that scientists can create replicas
of persons by using the laser scanning device described in the Space Shuttle
example. This laser scanner transmits to a waiting body the original person's
psychological states and dispositions. The waiting body was created from entirely
new matter but looks quite a bit like the original person's body. Upon duplication
the original person's body and brain are completely destroyed. Would I survive
this process of replication? In other words, would my replica be me? The
Psychological Reductionist would answer yes to both questions. It seems that the
modified Psychological account would say yes if I willingly consent to be
replicated. But now suppose that my brain and body are not destroyed in the
1SI am going to consider Mixed Reductionism rather than Narrow Psychological Reductionism
as the most plausible view with a physical continuity clause. As I said above, I think that Narrow
Psychological Reductionism is an unstable compromise between Mixed Reductionism and some
purely psychological account.
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replication process. So there are two resulting persons, the replica and a person
who is physically continuous with me, who are both psychologically continuous
with me, while only one of them is physically continuous with me. Psychological
branching (but not physical branching) has occurred. In this case, the Branch-line
case, the Psychological Reductionist will, then, say that I do not survive, because
there is no unique person who is psychologically continuous with me.
This is the Psychological Reductionist conclusion that I used to motivate Mixed
Reductionism. In the Branch-line case I think that most of us have a strong
intuition that I survive as the person who is physically continuous with me. How
can the creation of a replica possibly cause me to cease to exist? Prima facie, it
certainly seems that I must survive as the person with my body. The
Psychological Reductionist, however, may respond that it only seems that the
creation of the replica could not affect whether I survive because we think that I
should care whether I survive. When we seem convinced that I survive this process
of replication, we are really convinced of the fact that I should not care whether I
am replicated. If we claim that identity does not matter, then the conclusion in
Branch-line does not seem so counterintuitive. Perhaps I do not survive, but in this
case my ceasing to exist is not an event about which I can be rationally concerned.
There is a difficulty for the Psychological Reductionist in so far as our intuition
is not just that I survive in Branch-line, but that I survive as the person who is
physically continuous with me. Similarly, I think that most of us also have the
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intuition that it is rational for me before the replication to care more about the
person who is physically continuous with me than about the replica. Suppose that,
before the replication, I am asked to decide which person, the one who is
physically continuous with me or the replica, I would prefer to have undergo five
minutes of extreme pain. Does it seem irrational for me to prefer that the replica
undergo the five minutes of pain? Does it seem irrational for me to prefer that the
person with my body rather than the replica be given the money to travel to Paris
to see the Mona Lisa? I think that most of us would answer no to both questions.
Or consider that one of the resultant persons will die several hours after the
replication. Am I not justified in caring that the replica rather than the person
who is physically continuous with me die in a few hours? Most of us would think
me perfectly justified in being more concerned about the person who is physically
continuous with me than about the replica. So our views about what matters seem
to coincide with the Mixed Reductionist account of personal identity in this case.
Thus, Mixed Reductionism would allow us to retain, at least in this case, the
commonsense claim that identity matters.
The friend of the Modified Psychological account might say that, if I choose to
be replicated and I then replicate myself with the intention of destroying my body,
it is very difficult to see why my concern should be for the person whom I intended
to have destroyed. Of course, the Modified Psychological Reductionist will say, I
am entirely justified in caring more about the person who is physically continuous
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with me if the replication was done against my will or without my knowledge. But
if I choose to have my mental life continue in a new body, shouldn't I be concerned
about the replica rather than about the person with my old body? Consider,
however, the situation in which I have decided to replicate myself. In one minute,
the replica will be ready. I now realize that I do not have the appropriate
materials for destroying my body as I had intended to do. I am then presented
with the following choice: either the replica or the person with my body will suffer
five minutes of excruciating pain. Am I really irrational if I have a strong
preference 'hat the replica suffer the pain? It still seems that I am not, that I am
justified in caring more about the person who is physically continuous with me
than about the replica.
The Psychological Reductionist may respond by saying that it is not at all
surprising that we have the intuitions that we have in Branch-line, because in that
case, habit leads us to think that the person who is physically continuous with me
is also identical with me. After all, the relationship between me and that person is
the same as it would be in any ordinary case of survival. So when I look ahead to
the future, I am naturally inclined to focus more on the person who is physically
continuous with me than on the Replica. In order to try to counterbalance this
habitual tendency, we should try to consider the situation from the perspective of
the replica rather than from my perspective before the replication. My replica will
want to see the Mona Lisa just as much as I now want to see it and she will have
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the same reasons for wanting to see it. Also, the replica's mental life will be
exactly like, in all important respects, the mental life of the person who is
physically continuous with me. Given these facts, can I really care that the person
with my body see the Mona Lisa? Such considerations become even more
compelling when we consider the case in which I am replicated and my brain and
body destroyed. In this case our initial reaction is that I have been given a new
body. But, more importantly for present purposes, it is difficult to see why I
should care that the replica is not physically continuous with me. Again, the when
we look at the situation from the perspective of the replica, it is difficult to see any
important difference between a case of replication and a case where I survive in
the normal way. Shouldn't I be satisfied if my replica finishes my thesis and sees
the Mona Lisa? Can the importance of my private projects being realized really
involve their being realized by someone who is physically continuous with me?
Why should I care whether the person who finishes my thesis has some of the same
matter that I have?
There seems to be a very quick answer to these questions. If my survival
demands physical continuity, then it can matter to me whether or not there is
some future person who is physically continuous with me. If there is no future
person who is physically continuous with me, then I will not finish my thesis and I
will not see the Mona Lisa. Prior to forming my private projects, I do not know all
of the necessary conditions of their realization. I may have an independent belief
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that it is trivial whether or not those necessary conditions are realized. For
example, prior to forming my project that I finish my thesis, I do not know exactly
what is a necessary condition of my doing so. I may find out that, in order to
finish my thesis, I have to format my document in a particular way. I may
previously have thought that it can make no difference how the document is
formatted. However, after learning that such formatting is a necessary condition of
completing the thesis, it is rational for me to care that my thesis be so formatted.
Once I have projects, I may be committed to caring that the necessary conditions
of their realization be satisfied whether or not I know what those necessary
conditions are. So if the realization of my private projects demands that there be
someone physically continuous with me, then physical continuity is something that
I can rationally care about.
There, is, however, a significant difference between the relation of a necessary
condition of my persistence to the fulfillment of a private project and the relation
of the formattiag of my thesis to the fulfillment of my project that I finish my
thesis. When I formed my project that I finish my thesis, I had certain reasons for
undertaking that project. I had views about how the writing of a thesis could
enrich my life and contribute to my self-development, and also about how the
completion of a thesis could promote my other project of having a career as a
philosopher. I conclude that the formatting of the document is trivial in so far as
the formatting has no impact on how the thesis will promote my intellectual
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development. Nonetheless, I will conclude that the formatting is important in so
far as I need to do whatever is required of me to finish the thesis if I want to
insure that I fulfill my other project of having a career as a philosopher. So, in the
case of the formatting of the thesis, I have some explanation as to the ways in
which the formatting is trivial and as to the ways in which it is significant.
But now consider my project that I see the Mona Lisa. Suppose that, after I
form this project, I decide to be replicated and to have my brain and body
destroyed. Suppose that I am also told that if I go through with the replication, I
will not survive because the resulting person will not be physically continuous with
me. Therefore, if the replica sees the Mona Lisa, my private project that I see the
Mona Lisa will not be realized because the replica is not identical with me. But all
that is missing in this case is physical continuity. In order to justify my private
project, I need some explanation as to why physical continuity is significant, just
as, in order to justify my project that I complete my thesis, I needed some sort of
explanation as to why I should worry about the formatting of the document.
I do think, however, that the case of the formatting of the thesis indicates that
we need to be careful in assessing the significance of the body. For in the case of
the thesis, it is quite true that the formatting of the document has no
independent, intrinsic value. The formatting derives its significance from the role
that it plays in helping me to fulfill my project and thereby to fulfill other
projects. So we cannot evaluate the importance of physical continuity, or, for that
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matter, psychological continuity, independently of having some grasp of what role
they play in my projects as a whole and also of what role my private projects qua
private projects play in my life. Even if we were to spell out what the completion
of a thesis consists in, we might not have an explanation of what is important
about my completing my thesis, because we may still need an understanding of
how the thesis fits into the structure of my life. Similarly, a reductive analysis of
personal identity may not be sufficient to explain why identity matters. So,
keeping these considerations in mind, let us look at each of physical continuity,
psychological continuity, and private projects to try to see why each might or
might not have significance.
Let us begin with physical continuity. Why should I prefer that the replica
rather than the person who is physically continuous with me undergo the pain?
Why prefer that the person who is physically continuous with me rather than the
replica see the Mona Lisa? Do I really care whether someone who is physically
continuous with me finish my thesis? If so, how much physical continuity can I
rationally care about? Prompted by the cases of physical splitting, we might say
that we need at least as much physical continuity as there is between me and one
of my fission products. Then I should be equally concerned about my fission
products as I would be about my future self, but I should be more concerned
about either my fission products or mny future self than I should be about my
replica. But now suppose that one of my fission products has one more of my
123
original cells than the other has. Can that fact justify me in caring more about the
former fission product than about the latter? Surely not. Then suppose that one
fission product has two more cells, or three more cells, and so on. Is there some
point at which the number of cells has been reached such that now I am justified
in caring more about one of the 'fission' products than about the other? Again, it
seems not. Another option is to say that concern should decrease as physical
continuity decreases and that there will be a. region of middle cases where it is
indeterminate whether concern is warranted. Nonetheless, it will be clear that I
should care about the resultant person in the near cases but not in the far cases of
the spectrum. The problem with this option is that it is difficult to see why
concern should decrease as physical connections decrease. It really is difficult to
understand why I should care more about someone who is psychologically
continuous with me and has my legs, feet, left arm and pancreas, than about
someone who is psychologically continuous with me and has only my feet, one of
my legs, and my pancreas. And why care more about someone who has my legs,
arms, and skull than about my replica?
These sorts of considerations do seem to support the claim that I should be
equally concerned about both the person with my body and the replica. If that is
the case, then perhaps it is not implausible to suppose that I do not survive in
that case. Even though I do not survive, the Psychological Reductionist can still
hold that what matters, psychological continuity, is present in my relationships to
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both resulting persons. So my not surviving in this case is not something that
should worry me. In the simple replication case, I should not be concerned about
whether or not I survive. The replica's relationship to me contains everything that
matters, because the replica is psychologically continuous with me.
Now let us consider the suggestion that psychological continuity is what
fundamentally matters in my survival. Why should I care that there is some future
person such that she is psychologically continuous with me? Of course, a replica
who is fully psychologically continuous with me cannot realize any of my private
projects such as my project that I finish my thesis. However, given the fact that
my replica's psychological relationship to me is exactly the same as my
psychological relationship to my future self in an ordinary case, my replica will
finish my thesis in exactly the same way as an ordinary future self of mine would
have finished it. In so far as I want that I finish my thesis, I must attach some
significance to its being finished as I would have finished it. But if I am not going
to finish it, why should I not prefer that it be finished by a more talented
philosopher who will present more convincing arguments? Why should I think it
important that it be finished as I would have finished it if I had survived? It might
be that what I want is to be in some way responsible for the completion of the
thesis. As we have noticed several times previously, in order for there to be the
appropriate sort of psychological continuity between me and the replica, it must be
that the replica's psychological states are not only dependent on mine but are also
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in some sense under my deliberate control. More than wanting that ily thesis Ie
completed in some particular manner, I want that my thesis be a product of my
will and intention. As long as my replica is not psychologically continuous with me
as a result of an external imposition, it seems that whatever the replica does is as
attributable to my will and intention as is anything that a normal future self of
mine might do.
But consider my project that I see the Mona Lisa. Why suppose that I should
care that someone whose psychological states are appropriately related to mine see
the Mona Lisa, unless that person is me? What is it that I want in wanting that
my future self see the Mona Lisa? It just seems wrong to say that I want someone
to view it in the way in which I would view it, or that I want someone to view it
with the same frame of mind that I would view it. And it seems very implausible
to suppose that what I want is to be responsible for a certain person's seeing the
Mona Lisa. This project seems to represent a certain sort of concern for a
particular person, a sort of concern that is unanalyzable in terms of other
concerns. If this sort of project is justified, then it must be identity rather than
psychological continuity that matters. But can I justify my having the private
project that I see the Mona Lisa instead of my having the quasi-private project
that someone psychologically continuous with me see the Mona Lisa?
In order to answer that question, let us look at a case where I have both the
private project and the quasi-private project. Suppose that I have a daughter to
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whom I am extremely close. I alone have raised her since she was born, and I have
educated her myself. She and I spend most of our time together, influencing one
another's beliefs, desires, values, intentions, etc. Each of us has a great many
projects which essentially involve the other. So there are a great many very strong
psychological connections between my daughter and me. Now suppose that my
daughter and I have been planning a trip to Paris to see the Mona Lisa. Before we
are able to go, I develop a fatal disease. I know that I will not live long enough to
accompany my daughter to Paris. I am glad that at least she will see the Mona
Lisa but I am, justifiably it would seem, upset and extremely disappointed that I
will never see it. My daughter's seeing the painting does not satisfy my desire that
I see it, although I may regard her seeing it as the next best thing to my seeing it.
If I cannot see it, then I want, at least, that my daughter, the woman in whom I
instilled a love of Renaissance art, see it. Notice, as Parfit himself would insist,
that the difference in my psychological relation to my daughter and my
psychological relation to my future self is only a difference in degree, not a
difference in kind. In fact, given the way that I have told the story about my
daughter and the nature of our relationship, the difference in degree is not
extremely great.
The relationship that I have described is an extremely close one, even
abnormally close. Am I still justified in being disappointed that I will not be able
to see the Mona Lisa even though my daughter will see it? I think that I am. Of
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course, I am very glad that my daughter will be able to see the Mona Lisa, but the
fact is that I wanted the experience of seeing it and there is some loss for me if I
do not see it. There may be some people who 'live for their children', but in my
example I still have the private project that I see the Mona Lisa. I seem justified
in continuing to have that project even though I have a daughter whom I can
influence to have the same projects that I have. If that is the case, then it seems
that what I want in wanting my future self to see the Mona Lisa is not captured
merely because someone over whom I have a certain psychological causal influence
sees the Mona Lisa.
Consider again now the branch-line case, and suppose that I am told that the
person who is physically continuous with me will develop a fatal disease. As a
result, the person who is physically continuous with me will be unable to see the
Mona Lisa, although the replica will be able to travel to Paris to see it. If
replication contains everything that matters, then I should have no reason for
regret in this case; I should be satisfied by the replica's seeing the Mona Lisa. In
the case of my daughter, I was glad that my daughter would see the Mona Lisa,
but I had what seemed to be a reasonable disappointment in my not being able to
see it. The relationship between me and my replica is very much like the
relationship between me and my daughter, so I should be glad that, if I cannot see
the Mona Lisa, then at least my replica will see it. And if the person who is
physically continuous with me were to be cured of the disease, I would want that
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both she see the Mona Lisa and the replica see the Mona Lisa. But why is it
unreasonable in the branch-line case but not in the case of my daughter for me to
continue to have the private project that I see the Mona Lisa? Why is imy
disappointment at my not seeing the Mona Lisa legitimate only in the case of my
daughter but not in the branch-line case?
The Psychological Reductionist might respond that the sort of causal influence
that I have over my replica is diferent than that which I have over my daughter.
But the difference is only one of a very small degree, not of kind. The difference is
one of the strength and number of conections that hold between me and either my
replica or my daughter, and that difference is very small. The case of my daughter
is unusual in so far as in that case I have an unusually high number of projects
that involve another person, and, thus, an unusually low percentage of my projects
are private projects. In a normal case, the vast majority of my projects are private
projects. (This does not, of course, imply that I am selfish, because a private
project may take, e.g., the form that I help person x where x is not identical with
me.) Thus, a major component of my psychological relation to my future self is
my set of private projects and their persistence or realization (cf. Whiting 'FFS').
So my private projects are an important part of psychological continuity.
There may appear to be a circularity here in so far as private projects help to
constitute psychological continuity which in turn helps to constitute personal
identity, because private projects presuppose personal identity. A private project is
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a project such that it essentially involves a reference to someone identical with me,
but the explanation of what it is for someone to be identical with me involves a
reference to psychological continuity which will in turn be characterized by having
private projects as components. We can, however, define a new concept of a
minimal psychological continuity. Let us say that 'psychological continuity minus'
is psychological continuity without any connections involving private projects.
Private projects, then, can be characterized in terms of psychological continuity
minus. Notice that psychological continuity minus is a very thin sort of
psychological continuity (cf. Whiting FFS). Such a relation might be sufficient for
personal identity, but barely so. It will be the sort of relation that I stand in to my
future self who is in a coma such that her mental life consists only in random
memories and imaginings. However, in most cases of survival, the strongest
components of psychological continuity will be private projects. The claim that
psychological continuity matters, then, presupposes for its plausibility that we are
talking about psychological continuity with private projects, not psychological
continuity minus. But a quasi-private project must be a project such that it
involves an essential reference to someone psychologically continuous minus with
me, because quasi-private projects are supposed to replace private projects. Why
should I want that someone who stands in such a minimal relationship to me finish
my thesis? In normal cases where we have something like psychological continuity
minus, cases of certain sorts of coma or mental illness, we are often prompted to
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ask whether such a future is even worth having, and most of us think that it is not.
Of corse, however, once we adopt quasi-private projects, they will form the core
of a strong psychological relation to either our future selves or our replicas or
fission products; quasi-private projects will supplement psychological continuity
minus. Then again, however, I could adopt all projects regarding my daughter; I
could give up all of my private projects and change them to projects such that
they can be realized by either me or my daughter. Am I irrational if I do not do
so? It seems not. So why suppose that I am irrational if I do not change my
private projects to quasi-private projects that could be realized by either me or my
replica or my fission product?
Perhaps the reason that we cannot explain the significance of private projects
by referring to physical or psychological continuity is because private projects rely
on some Non-Reductionist further fact for their justification. It does not seem,
however, that the existence of such a further fact really underlies my special
concern for my future self. For it is not at all clear why I should care whether
someone with, e.g., my soul avoid pain and see the Mona Lisa. It seems very
difficult to provide an answer to the question as to why we should be specially
concerned about future persons with our souls or Cartesian Egos. The only answer
available to the Non-Reductionist is that such a person is identical with mie. So
future-directed self-concern does not seem to rely in any way on the existence of
some further facts.
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I think that the case of my daughter shows that I am justified, in the
branch-line case and in the simple replication case, in being disappointed if my
private projects are not realized. Therefore, if physical continuity is a necessary
condition of personal identity, I am justified in caring more about the person who
is physically continuous with me than about my replica. However, iin the case of
my daughter, I may care more that my daughter see the Mona Lisa than that I see
it, so I may be more disappointed if she cannot see it than I will be if I cannot see
it. But that might be true if my daughter and I had a less close, nmore nornlal
mother-daughter relationship. My projects involving my daughter are a forml of
concern for her, and that concern might be so strong that I feel comlpelled to
sacrifice the realization of some of my private projects in order to insure my
daughter's well-being. Similarly, if I decide to be replicated and I put a lot of work
into the creation of my replica, I may want to insure the replica's well-being.
Nonetheless, that does not show that I have no reason to regret the loss of my own
future even if my replica could take my place. Psychological continuity does seem
to matter and to be able to ground concern for persons with whom we are
psychologically continuous, but it is not clear that we must conclude that identity
does not matter in so far as it is not clear why I should change all of my private
projects to quasi-private projects.
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4.4 Indeterminacy and What Matters
There is, however, another feature of the Reductionist view which would seen to
show that it cannot be identity that matters in survival. Recall the Conmbined
Spectrum, the series of cases such that in each successive case the resulting person
was just slightly less connected, both physically and psychologically, to me, the
original person. In the middle range of cases, any Reductionist should say that it
is indeterminate whether I survive. It is indeterminate whether the resulting
person is identical with me. Should I go to a great deal of trouble to insure that
the outcome of my operation is such that it is not a case in the middle range but
rather in the near end of the spectrum, even if the outcome will be a case very
close to the middle range? How can I care, when there is only a slight difference
between the two cases? If I cannot care, then it would seem that I cannot
rationally prefer one outcome to the other even though I survive in the one
outcome but not in the other. So identity cannot be what matters in our survival.
We may wonder why the rationality of our attitudes may not be indeterminate
just as our identity is. In the near end of the spectrum I determinately survive, so
I can determinately realize my private projects. In the middle range of cases, I do
not determinately survive; therfore, in such a case, it is indeterminate whether my
private projects are realized if they are realized by the resulting person. If facts
about identity are indeterminate, then facts about the rationality of concern which
tracks identity, are also indeterminate. Whether or not I adopt such concern is a
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matter of psychological fact and will vary from person to person.
Parfit can respond in the following way. Pick the last case in which I
determinately survive and the first case in which it is indeterminate whether I
survive. If I am specially concerned about the resulting person in the former case,
should I not then also be specially concerned about the resulting person in the
latter case? The difference in connectedness between the two cases is trivial. How
can such a trivial difference make a substantial difference to my attitude towards
the resulting person? If it cannot, then I cannot rationally care whether I
determinately survive. The mere fact that the resulting person is me cannot make
a difference as to whether I should be specially concerned about that person.
It does seem, however, that I do have reason to prefer an outcome in the near
end of the spectrum over an outcome in the far end where it is determinate that I
do not survive. If it is not the fact that I survive in the former case which should
make me prefer that case, then it must be the strength of the connections which
should matter to me. As connections weaken, I should have less special concern for
the resulting person. Of couse, Parfit does want to defend this view. But I think
that it is extremely implausible when we consider a variation on our earlier
Branch-line case. Suppose that the process of replication is such that it will effect
certain changes in me, and it will effect these changes instantaneously. The
resulting person who has my brain and body will be like the resulting person in
the last case in the near end of the spectrum; the replication process will cause a
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significant weakening of connections, but, nonetheless, the person with my brain
and body is still determinately me. The replica, however, will be like the resulting
person in the next to the last case of the near end of the spectrum. So the replica
will be more strongly connected to me now than my future self will be. (Of course,
I am here assuming that the process of replication does not involve any external
impositions. Therefore, replication here does not destroy any of the relevant sorts
of causal connections.) Can I still rationally prefer that the replica rather than my
future self undergo the five minutes of pain?
I think that I can. Why should I care whether the replica is slightly more
connected to me now than is my future self? Mark Johnston suggests that we
consider a parallel case where it is my friend who undergoes the replication process
which alters her ("Reasons and Reductionism" 30ff.). Should I decide to have my
friend or her replica undergo the five minutes of pain? If I truly care about my
friend, then I will care about her even if she changes in certain ways. Even if she
changes dramatically by, say, developing Alzheimer's disease, I am still justified in
caring more about her than about some similar persons whom I have never met.
So surely I should care more about her than about a replica that is slightly more
connected to her as she is before the replication process. If that is the case, then I
would also seem justified in caring more about my future self than about a slightly
more connected replica. So strength of connections is not the basis of concern. Of
course, connections can ground concern, but they ground concern for particular
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persons. Once the concern is in place, it is concern not for the connections but for
particular persons.
So I do not think that it is irrational for me to prefer the outcome in which I
determinately survive in the Combined Spectrum. But should I go to a great deal
of trouble to insure that I determinately survive? I think that that is less clear.
Even in normal cases, we do not always think that we should go to great lengths
to prevent our own deaths. Imagine that my friend, as a result of the replication
process, will develop Alzheimer's disease. She asks me to let her die and then have
the replica take over her life. I will acquiesce, because I do not want my friend to
suffer. But I will still regret her loss. So the fact that I may not go to a lot of
trouble to insure either that I or a friend survives in no way shows that identity
does not matter.
4.5 Fission Products Again
At the end of section 2.3 I suggested that neither psychological nor physical
continuity can capture all that matters in private projects, that, in fact, private
projects are an important component of any sort of psychological continuity that
matters. But there is another component of identity, uniqueness. Perhaps I should
be rationally concerned that branching not occur because uniqueness matters. In
order to see if this is a plausible claim, let us consider the fission cases in which all
that is missing for survival is uniqueness.
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Consider the case of fission upon which Parfit based his claim that it is
psychological continuity rather than identity that matters. His argument depends
upon the claim that I survive when only half of my brain is transplanted but the
other half is destroyed, while I do not survive when each half of my brain is
transplanted into a new body. I do not find this claim very plausible. After all, if
the scientists took away half of my brain and destroyed it, I would still survive
with my body and the other half of my brain. Could it matter, then, if they
transplanted the other half of my brain? Would I not still survive as the person
who is fully physically continuous with me? But the other person is just like the
resulting person in Parfit's original fission case. So why suppose that I survive in
that case?
So let us concentrate on the case where I split like an amoeba. In this case, I
split in half and each half of my body spontaneously reproduces an exact copy of
the other half. Each of the resulting persons, A and B, has half of my brain so
each resulting person is both physically and psychologically continuous with me.
Certainly we do have reason to suppose that I would have survived if half of my
body had been burned and then regenerated. Both Psychological and Mixed
Reductionists can agree on that conclusion, and on the conclusion that I do not
survive in the fission case. There is no reason to suppose that I am one of the
resulting persons rather than the other and I cannot be both. How should I regard
A and B? Can I rationally care that A and B are not identical with me as long as
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they are both physically and psychologically continuous with me?
Parfit claims that in order for nme to rationally care that I do not survive in this
case, I must care about uniqueness. But how can it matter to me whether there is
only one or whether there are two future persons who are physically and
psychologically continuous with me? (I am abstracting from practical difficulties
involved with sharing, e.g., spouse or career; cf. Wolf 714.) As I said above, it is
difficult to see how extrinsic facts can matter in my concern for some future
person. Prima facie, it is not plausible to think that my concern for A can only be
rationally decided after I know whether the other half of my body has been burned
or whether, instead, B has come into existence. If my parents find out later that B
is around, should they come to regard A in a different light than they did when
they thought A was identical with me? It would seem not.
But whether or not A is able to realize my private project that I see the Mona
Lisa depends on whether A is identical with me. I have tried to show that it is
difficult to explain the importance of my private projects in terms of physical
continuity, psychological continuity, or even further facts. And now we see that it
is difficult to explain their significance in terms of uniqueness. We might conclude,
then, that private projects and concern for particular persons is derivative. Such
concern must be derivative from more impersonal concerns if it is to be justified.
This is an account that I will consider and reject in the next chapter. An
alternative is to deny that we can explain the significance of private projects in
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terms of the component elements of identity. The justification of my private
projects is independent of or prior to any views about the nature of persons. That
does not mean that our private projects are unjustified or irrational. It simply
shows that our concern with our identity need not appeal to any analysis of the
concept for its justification.1 6
Such an answer does not seem entirely satisfactory. But I think that it becomes
more so when we realize that it does not commit us to the claim that I should be
indifferent about my fission products. In my discussion of psychological continuity
above, I tried to show that psychological continuity alone does not explain the
significance that we attach to private projects. Nonetheless, that does not mean
that the realization of a quasi-private project should not matter to me at all. This
becomes quite clear when we consider the case of my daughter to whom I am very
close. Even though I will be disappointed if I will not be able to see the Mona
Lisa, it is still important to me that my daughter see it rather than that some
stranger see it, even if the stranger happens to be remarkably similar to my
daughter. And that fact is plausibly explained in terms of the relationship in
which my daughter stands to me, a relationship which differs only in degree from
my relationship to my fission products. Therefore, I should be very concerned that
one of my fission products rather than some stranger or even a friend finishes my
thesis. The relationship in which I stand to my fission products should ground
1eMark Johnston tries to justify it in terms of our ordinary practive involving self-referential
concerns; see "Reasons and Reductionism".
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concern for them. Nonetheless, I am not irrational in hoping that I do not split
like an amoeba.
Parfit, however, argues that fission is not as bad as ordinary death. In other
words, it is not as bad as my dying and leaving behind no one who is physically
and psychologically continuous with me. It may be true that it would be better for
every person if instead of dying and leaving behind no heirs to their psychology
they underwent fission. But, similarly, it may also be true that it would be better
for each of us to die with rather than without heirs to our fortunes (or debts). But
just because one situation that might obtain after our deaths is better than another
(and no one ever doubted that), that in no way shows that if the better situation
were to obtain then we should not rationally care about our own deaths. If I really
want heirs to my fortune after my death, and if I died now there would be heirs,
that does not show that I am irrational in wanting to survive even if by doing so I
will not be sure of having heirs. Similarly, even if dying with psychological heirs
were better than dying without them, I am not thereby irrational in wanting to
live. So even if Parfit regards fission as "not as bad as death", that in no way
supports the claim that fission is "about as good as ordinary survival" (cf. Wolf
715). But fission may be better than ordinary survival if it is the only alternative
to my developing Alzheimer's disease or, worse, a homicidal pathological disorder.
I may be glad that I will have fission products to take over my projects, just as
I would be glad if my daughter or student were to do so. But that does not show
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that all of my personal concerns should be quasi-personal concerns. Our concerns
seem to be independent of and prior to any metaphysical analysis of persons. They
need not appeal to any such analysis for their justification. These concerns can be
undermined, but they are not undermined by a mere appeal to any Reductionist
account of personal identity.
But we may wonder why our projects are not shown, by Reductionism, simply
to have no foundation. I think that such a conclusion would be acceptable if it
could be shown that private projects are based upon an implausible view of
personal identity such as Cartesian Non-Reductionism. As I pointed out above,
however, Cartesian Non-Reductionism seems unable to provide any account of
future-directed self-concern, and the legitimacy of private projects does not seem
to depend upon the truth of Cartesian Non-Reductionism. If our private concerns
continue to look justified in spite of the Reductionist analysis of personal identity,
before rejecting those concerns, we should attempt to provide another basis for
them. The full plausibility of my claim that identity matters depends upon some
fuller account of the nature of our practices involving private concerns, but I think
that we have sufficient reason to try to develop such an account rather than
abandoning our private projects in favor of quasi-private projects.
We may, however, decide that if Reductionism is unable to account for the
significance of private projects, then we should reject Reductionism. As I said
above, Cartesian Non-Reductionism does worse than Reductionism in justifying
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special concern. Perhaps, then, we have reason to accept the Further Fact View,
the view that claims only that personal identity is simple and unanalysable. If this
view were true, it would certainly explain our inability to analyze the significance
of private projects which involve personal identity. The friend of the Further Fact
View can agree that psychological continuity matters and that it can ground
concern for fission products, because he can say that psychological continuity is
involved in some way in personal identity as is evidenced by ordinary cases of
survvial. Yet, he will deny that personal identity is constituted by facts about
continuities; therefore, concern about identity cannot be reduced to concern about
continuities and uniqueness. The Further Fact View, however, still leaves personal
concern unexplained. Reductionism did this but also gave us an explanation of
how psychological continuities are involved in identity. It might, then, be better to
accept Reductionism and try to locate the justification of personal concerns in
some other place than in the metaphysics of personal identity.
Should we, then, prefer Mixed Reductionism or the modified Psychological
account? The advantages of the modified Psychological account are that it
accommodates our intuitions about Body-switch and Brownson and it does not
seem unmotivated as does Mixed Reductionism's physical continuity clause. The
modified Psychological account, however, does yield unappealing results in
Branch-line replication cases. Both views do just as well in explaining special
concern for fission products because both incorporate psychological continuity as
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an element of identity. However, Mixed Reductionism can do better in the case of
my daughter and the Mona Lisa because it can draw a more definite line between
self and others by appealing to physical continuity. I do not think that the Mixed
Reductionist need worry about the apparent unimportance of physical continuity;
as I have said, she can deny that concern about identity reduces to concern about
the constitutive elements of identity. Although I prefer Mixed Reductionism on
the basis of the Branch-line cases, I think that, given the complexity of our
intuitions, it is difficult to decide how much those intuitions about Branch-line are
an extrapolation from the ordinary run of cases. What we need is a better
rationale for the physical continuity clause; however, I will not attempt to try to
find such a rationale here.
Instead, I want to return to the fission cases and the case of my daughter. If
psychological continuity is present in both cases as well as in the intrapersonal
case, and all of those cases are cases where special concern seems warranted, we
might think that psychological continuity can ground special concern. So let us
turn to a consideration of the problem of special concern not only for future selves
but for other persons.
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Chapter 4
The Grounds For Special Concern
5 Introduction
Most of us are supplied at various times with opportunities and resources for
benefitting either ourselves or other persons. When such circumstances arise, we
typically choose to benefit those persons to whom we are related in special ways.
We benefit our own future selves, our friends, and our family members before and
to a greater extent than we benefit persons with whom we have had little or no
contact. And we do so even if we could have used our resources to benefit a
stranger more than we were able to benefit our future selves or our intimates.
How are we to justify such special concern? I think that the Reductionist views
that I dicussed in the previous chapter, Mixed Reductionism an l modified
Psychological Reductionism, suggest an answer to this question. According to
both views, psychological continuity is a necessary condition of personal identity.
My being psychologically continuous with some future self is at least part of what
it is for that future self to be my future self; moreover, certain elements of
psychological continuity such as private projects are part of what matters in my
relationship to my future self. Therefore, if we think that I should be specially
concerned about my future self, it seems plausible to suppose that psychological
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continuity is at least part of the story as to why such special concern is
appropriate. My future self's being psychologically continuous with me gives me
reason to be specially concerned about her.
The cases of fission and of my daughter showed, however, that psychological
connections can be present even in interpersonal cases. In fact, such connections
can exist in more ordinary interpersonal relationships with friends and family
members. So perhaps psychological continuity can provide reasons for concern in
not only the intrapersonal but also in the interpersonal case. We could then see
the Reductionist view as providing motivation for the commonsense claim that the
relationship in which I stand to certain persons is grounds for my having special
concern for those persons. My special concern for my future self and my intimates
is justified by the fact that they are my future self and my intimates, in other
words, by the fact that they bear certain psychological connections to me.
Some philosophers, however, object to the commonsense view. They claim that
it must be some feature of the object of concern, some feature independent of me,
that justifies my special concern. Otherwise special concern will be too egocentric
in that it will depend on the object of concern's relation to me rather than on
some feature of the object of concern which makes her worthy of concern. In what
follows, I will develop, in its strongest form, this Impersonalist challenge to the
common sense view. I will show that the Impersonalist approach is both
empirically inadequate and morally objectionable, and that we should accept the
145
commonsense position.
6 The Problem of Special Concern
I intend to consider the Impersonalist and the commonsense views as accounts
both of the rationality of and the morality of special concern. It seems plausible
that it is rational for me to be specially concerned about my future self and my
intimates, and also that it is morally justifiable and even required that I have such
special concern. We are inclined to think that, all else being equal, I am not
irrational in being more concerned about myself and my family than about the
governor of Idaho and that I am morally required to care more about myself and
my family than about the governor of Idaho. In this chapter I am interested in
finding a plausible account of how I can be justified, morally or rationally, in
singling out certain persons and having far greater concern for them than I have
for all the other apparently equally or perhaps even more deserving and even very
similar persons in the world. Even though we need not give the same account of
the morality of special concern that we give of its rationality, I think that the
commonsense view does and is intended to serve both functions. Although
Impersonalism may be intended as an account only of the rationality of special
concern, we will see that it has more plausibility as an account of its morality.
I want to begin by considering the commonsense view that special concern can
be justified in terms of special relationships. We can begin by noticing that we are
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inclined to think that I have offered sufficient justification for my special concern
for my future self when I point out that my future self is me. In the intrapersonal
case, there is only one person involved, and, as Sidgwick says,
[i]t would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction
between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and
that consequently 'I' am concerned with the quality of my existence as
an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not
concerned with the quality of existence of other individuals(498).
In the interpersonal case, however, the distinction between my mother and me
seems as 'real' as the distinction between the governor of Idaho and me. So why
should I be specially concerned about my mother but not about the governor of
Idaho? Such considerations may lead us to think that special concern for others is
more difficult to justify.
Nonetheless, special concern for others does seem, in some important respects,
to be like concern for one's future self. As Aristotle says,
one person is most a friend to another if he wishes goods to the other
for the other's sake, even if no one will know about it. But these are
features most of all of one's relation to oneself; and so too are all the
other defining features of a friend, since we have said that all the
features of friendship extend from oneself to others(1168b2-6).
We can notice that most persons care about themselves for their own sakes and, in
the case of the best sorts of friendship, care about their friends for their friends'
own sakes. Given this similarity between the intrapersonal and the interpersonal
cases, we have some motivation for accepting and trying to fill out Aristotle's claim
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that the 'defining features of a friend' are also features of one's relation to one's
future self. Therefore, we might try to model the justification of special concern
for others on the nature of the justification of special concern for one's future self.
If so, we need to find some factor present in both the intrapersonal and the
interpersonal cases that seems to have justificatory force in explaining special
concern. Again, we can look to Aristotle's claim that a [decent] person "is related
to his friend as he is to himself, since the friend is another himself" (1166a30).
Perhaps the features that define both my relation to my future self and my
relation to my friend can provide reasons for special concern. I bear certain
relations to my future self, such as relations of similarity. My future self will have
some of the same beliefs, desires, projects, and values that I now have. We do not,
however, want to appeal to mere similarity between me and my future self as a
grounds for concern. Persons typically change a great deal over time, especially
over the course of an entire lifetime, and often initiate positive changes in
themselves. It seems implausible to claim that if I improve myself in some way, I
then have less reason to be concerned about my future selves.
But we can notice that even if my beliefs change over time, my future beliefs
will be causally influenced by my present beliefs. The same is true of my desires,
projects, and values. So even if my future self is not very (or at all) similar to my
future self, I now will stand in certain relations of causal influence to my future
self. In order to accommodate (or at least not rule out) concern for far distant
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future selves or for future selves who are the result of self-improvement, I think
that we should emphasize causal relations more heavily than relations of similarity
as a grounds for intrapersonal special concern.
Recall that in Chapter 2 we defined Psychological Reductionism in terms of
psychological continuity rather than in terms of direct psychological connections.
This focus on continuity rather than on connectedness is, in other words, a focus
on causal influence rather than on similarity. Having the same belief, desire, etc.,
is a direct psychological connection. I now may be directly connected to myself of
a year hence, but will probably not be directly connected, at least not very
strongly so, to myself of fifty years hence. If I now am similar to myself of a year
hence, and myself of a year hence is similar to myself of two years hence, etc., I
now will be psychologically continuous with my far distant future selves. I will not,
however, be similar to myself of fifty years hence because similarity is not
transitive. Since causality is transitive, I now will have causally influenced myself
of fifty years hence.
More importantly, in Chapter 3, in the discussion of external impositions, we
saw that an important part of our conception of a person involves the notion of a
certain sort of agency. A person can form intentions, make decisions, and change
herself in accordance with those intentions and decisions. I will actively work to
make my future self different than I now am, and, hopefully, many of the changes
that I will effect will be for the better. Thus, it is plausible to suppose that
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psychological continuity without external impositions is a necessary condition of
personal identity and something that matters in my relation to my future self. We
focus on relevant causal relations rather than on relations of similarity, because, in
caring about ourselves, we care not about ourselves as static beings with certain
particular qualities, but about ourselves as changing, growing beings who can be
agents of their own change. (For a defense of the claim that both continuity and
connections matter, see Parfit 298-302, 312-315; for a response to Parfit, see Brink
1992 224ff.)
It seems right to claim that the relation that is, in part, what makes it the case
that some future self is my future self can provide a grounds for my special
concern for my future self, especially when that relation is part of what matters to
us in being persons. But the case of my daughter to whom I am very close showed
that such causal connections can be present in interpersonal cases. The causal
connections that are such an important part of psychological continuity are
certainly present in fission cases, because I am fully psychologically continuous
with both of my fission products. We saw that it seems plausible to claim that I
should be concerned about my fission products even though I am not identical with
either fission product. It also seems that I should be specially concerned about my
daughter. Given that causal connections are present in both of these interpersonal
cases as well as in the intrapersonal case, we have reason to think that these causal
connections ground the special concern that is appropriate in all of these cases. It
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seems that my relationships to my future selves, fission products, and daughter is
what gives me reason to be specially concerned about all of those persons.
Recall, however, that the case of my daughter was an extraordinary case. But,
even though we rarely have relationships such as that between my daughter and
me, we do causally interact with others, such as our friends. We share ideas
through conversation and we share experiences by spending time together (cf.
Aristotle 1170b10). We do often have similar beliefs, desires, and goals as our
friends do. However, when our friends change, we do not (always) cease to care
about them. This may indicate that we regard our causal interaction with our
friends as being more important than how similar we are to our friends. So if we
try to justify special concern for others on the model of special concern for our
future selves, it seems plausible to take causal interaction as at least part of the
intrinsic justification of interpersonal special concern. The fact, then, that I
causally interact with and influence in important ways both my fdture self and my
friends gives me a reason, in and of itself, for having special concern for both my
,future self and my friends. I will call this claim the commonsense claim about
justification.
Notice that the commonsense claim about justification will support differing
degrees of concern depending upon the degree of causal interaction. I should be
more concerned about my future selves and fission products than about friends
and family members and more concerned about friends and family members than
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about neighbors and acquaintances. But the commonsense claim does not entail
that I have no reason to be concerned about persons with whom I have no causal
interaction. I may have other reason to be concerned about persons to whom I
stand in no special relationship. I may be required to forego providing a trivial
benefit to a loved one if I can thereby provide an immense benefit to a complete
stranger. The commonsense claim simply says that causal relations provide
intrinsic reason for special concern, not that they provide the only sorts of reasons
or that the reasons that they provide cannot be outweighed by counterbalancing
reasons. All else being equal, however, I should be specially concerned about
persons with whom I causally interact in proportion to the degree of causal
interaction.
It is also important to see that the sorts of causal connections that provide
reasons for concern are the sorts of connections that exist in the intrapersonal and
interpersonal cases where it seems uncontroversial that such concern is warranted.
In these paradigm cases, there is mutual interaction founded upon the intentions
and goals of both parties to the interaction. In the last chapter, we saw that this
sort of interaction is missing when I interact with those sorts of external agents
that I called 'external impositions'. The sort of interaction that I have with the
neurosurgeon who rewires my brain is not the appropriate sort of interaction upon
which to base concern. I am not required to have special concern for my
neurosurgeon merely because he rewired my brain. Similarly, external impositions
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destroy some of what matters in my relationship to my future self. So if a terrorist
captures me and tortures me for years, I will causally interact with him, but that
causal interaction does not conform to the causal interaction that is present in the
paradigm cases. The terrorist is the interpersonal parallel of an external
imposition affecting my relationship to my future self in the intrapersonal case. In
both cases, one of the parties to the intf :action is passive; the interaction fails to
take account of her goals and intentions.
We can, however, imagine a case where I willingly submit myself to a
relationship in which I am enslaved, and my intentions and goals all involve my
'master'. Here there is mutual interaction based upon the goals and intentions of
both parties. Perhaps I do have an obligation to be concerned about my master in
this case. Nonetheless, that does not imply that I am committed to continuing to
be guided by the present norms of the relationship. To see why, consider an
intrapersonal parallel case in which all of my goals and intentions center around
my project to count the blades of grass on the Boston Common. In this case I am
required to be specially concerned about my future self, but, because my
well-being involves a revision of my projects, I am required to reevaluate my life
goals. Similarly, a consideration of the well-being of my master and of myself will
show that special concern should take the form of reevaluating the norms of our
relationship. Special concern is grounded by special relationships, but, in
determining what form special concern should take, we will often need to appeal to
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independent values.
If we accept that causal relations justify our special concern for our future
selves and our loved ones, we will accept that reasons for special concern are
agent-relative, where an agent-relative reason is one which cannot be stated
without an essential reference to the person whose reason it is (cf. Nagel 152-3,
Parfit 143). My reason to have special concern for my mother is agent-relative
because it is based on the relationship in which my mother stands to me. Also, I
will not have reason to have special concern for anyone who is not appropriately
related to me. Other persons may also have agent-relative reason to be concerned
about my mother if they also stand in a special relationship to her.
But recall Aristotle's claim that someone wishes goods to his friend for the
friend's own sake. In other words, one should care about one's intimates for their
own sakes. If, however, I base my concern for my mother on the fact that my
mother is related to me in a certain way, that may seem incompatible with my
concern being for my mother for her own sake. It might seem as if I should care
about my mother in virtue of some feature of her which is both independent of me
and central to her being the person she is. So my reason for special concern for my
mother should be agent-neutral, where an agent-neutral reason is one which can be
stated without any essential reference to the person whose reason it is. So if, for
example, reasons for concern are based on a person's moral worth, they are
reasons for anyone to be concerned about any person who has the appropriate
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worth. These characteristics of persons will, then, be the grounds for both
self-concern and concern for others on the agent-neutral, or, as I shall call it, the
Impersonalist approach.
The Impersonalist approach, then, will also explain why we should choose to
have special relationships with certain persons. Whatever feature of persons
justifies special concern will also provide reason for one to enter into special
relationships. So if someone is, for example, morally worthy, I have reason to
become friends with her and then to maintain special concern for her. The friend
of the commonsense view, on the other hand, will allow that concern can be
justified even if I am now in a relationship which I should not have entered, such
as my relationship with my 'master' described above. The Impersonalist may say
that certain impersonal values must be appealed to, even on the commonsense
view, in order to determine what form special concern should take. So it is
plausible to appeal to such values in justifying the creation and maintenance of
relationships as well.
The Impersonalist view might be further motivated by our noticing that it
seems, at least initially, to provide a more informative explanation of special
concern than the commonsense view does. The commonsense view seems to be
claiming that we are justified in being specially concerned about persons to whom
we stand in special relationships because we stand in special relationships to those
persons. Such an explanation might seem to be no explanation at all. The
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Impersonalist, on the other hand, points to some independent feature of persons
such as moral worth, some feature that seems to merit concern, in order to justify
special concern. We can understand why we should be concerned about moral
virtue, so we can understand why we should care about persons who have such
virtue. Given this strong motivation for the Impersonalist approach, it presents a
strong challenge to the agent-relative justification of special concern.
I will begin by considering an Impersonalist account of special concern for one's
future self, and I will then extend it into the interpersonal case until we arrive at
what appears to be the most plausible Impersonalist account of special concern for
others. I will then examine various agent-relative accounts, finally arguing that it
is implausible to suppose, as the Impersonalists must, that the relationships in
which we stand to others cannot provide intrinsic reasons for special concern.
7 An Impersonalist Account of Special
Concern for One's Future Self
What justifies my special concern for my future self? Let us consider an
Impersonalist account suggested by John Perry in "The Importance of Being
Identical". First, notice that each of us has many and varied projects at any
moment, where a person's projects (at a moment) are "any events a person at
[that] given moment wants to occur in the future" (Perry 74). For examnple, I now
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have the following projects: that I finish my thesis, that I care for my family, that
I see the Mona Lisa, that the Cubs win the World Series, that my friends are
successful, that poverty is reduced, etc. My projects, then, include not only those
things which I will actively work to bring about, such as the completion of my
thesis, but also anything which I simply hope or wish will come about in the
future, such as the Cubs winning the World Series.
According to Perry, my present concern for my future self is grounded by my
projects. Consider, for example, my concern that I not be in pain in the future.
Why do I care that I not suffer great pain in the future? Well, if I am in great
pain I will not be able to travel to Paris to see the Mona Lisa and I will not be
able to work on my thesis. So I have 'project-related' reasons for being concerned
about what happens to my future self. Because, as I pointed out above, my future
self stands in relations of causal influence and similarity to me, I can expect my
future self to share many of my projects. Thus, my future self is the person most
likely to finish my thesis, take care of my family, and so on. My reasons for having
special concern about my future self derive from what I can reasonably expect mny
future self to do or try to do in the future. Given the strong relations of similarity
and causal influence in which I now stand to my future self, my future self will be
the person most likely to further the maximum number of my projects.
As I said above, however, each of us has many and varied projects. Our
projects vary not only in their content but in their value as well. Suppose that I
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now have both the project that I finish my thesis and the project that I kill your
dog. My future self is the person most likely both to complete my thesis and to
kill your dog. It seems odd to suppose that I should have more concern for my
future self if she is likely to complete both projects rather than being likely to just
complete my thesis. In fact, we might think that my concern should be greater if
she will probably not be able to kill your dog. So Perry's account is most plausible
if we take it that concern is based not simply on my projects but on my valuable
projects. My concern for my future self should be grounded on her ability to
further many of my valuable projects.
It is important to notice that, according to the present account, the causal
relations provide no intrinsic reason or justification for special concern. It denies
the commonsense claim about justification. Special concern must be grounded on
my projects. I am justified in being concerned about anyone who is likely to finish
my valuable projects whether or not that person is in any way related to me. If for
some strange reason it happened that the governor of Idaho was more likely than
my future self to undertake my projects, I have reason to be more concerned about
the governor of Idaho than about my future self. But given that I very strongly
influence my future self, and that my future self will be quite similar to me, my
future self is far more likely than anyone else to finish a large number of my
projects. So my relationship to my future self provides eztrinsic reasons for
concern. Because these extrinsic reasons are typically very strong, we habitually
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develop correspondingly strong concern for our future selves.
But now consider an important distinction in kind among my projects. My
desire that I finish my thesis is clearly very different from lily desire that the Cubs
win the World Series. In order for the first desire to be satisfied, it must be my
future self who finishes my thesis. The satisfaction of the latter desire, however,
requires nothing of me, not that I help the Cubs win or even that I know that they
win the Series. The first sort of project is a private project because it essentially
involves reference to the person whose project it is. For any of my private projects
to be fulfilled, my future self must be the person to realize them (see Chapter 3 for
a discussion of private projects). Given the fact that all of us have many and
mostly private projects, doesn't the relationship in which I stand to my future self
give more than extrinsic reasons for concern, because that relationship is a
necessary condition of the realization of many of my projects?
Perry responds that private projects are only justified if one has the relevant
nonprivate project, where a nonprivate project is one that does not essentially
involve reference to the person whose project it is. If I have a given nonprivate
project, such as the project that my thesis be finished"1 , and I also have the belief
that if I do not finish it then it will not be finished and I will not have a job with
which to support my family, then I am justified in wanting that I finish my thesis.
My project that I finish my thesis, then, is only justified if I also have the
"The 'my' could be eliminated by giving a fuller description of the nature of my thesis.
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nonprivate project that my thesis be finished and the belief that if I do not finish
it, then it, and many other of my nonprivate projects, such as the project that my
family be supported, will never be finished. So Perry justifies future-directed self
concern by reference to my projects. I have a concern that my projects be realized,
and because my future self is likely to realize those projects, I am justified in
having a special, project-related concern for my future self. Of course, if I were to
undergo fission or replication, I would have the same project-related reasons to be
concerned about my fission products and my replica as I have to be concerned
about myself. (Notice that quasi-private projects are only going to be justified by
reference to the corresponding nonprivate projects and the belief that if they are
not realized by someone psychologically continuous with me then they will not be
realized.)
8 Extending the Impersonalist Account into
the Interpersonal Case
We can extend Perry's Impersonalist account of special concern for one's future
self into the interpersonal context. According to Perry's account, my special
concern for my future self is grounded by my valuable projects: I should have
special concern because my future self is the person most likely to further the
maximum number of my valuable projects. We could say that, analogously, my
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special concern in the interpersonal context is grounded by my valuable nonprivate
projects. My friend is likely to help me to further my valuable projects and will
also attempt to further them on her own. She will share many of my valuable
nonprivate projects. My concern is, ultimately, then, for my valuable nonprivate
projects, and my concern for any particular person, either my future self or my
best friend, is justified by the belief that that person will help to further my
valuable projects.
I think that such an account of concern for loved ones is very implausible.
Notice that it is not an agent-neutral account, in so far as my reasons for imy
concern for my loved ones depend upon what projects I happen to have. My
reasons involve essential reference to my projects. If someone had different
projects, then they would not have reason to have special concern for my loved
ones. If someone did not care about my valuable projects, then I would have no
reason to be specially concerned about her. But one has to wonder why the set of
valuable projects that I currently happen to have should be the basis of my concern
for either my future self or my friends and loved ones. What about my friend's
projects? Why do my projects take precedence over hers? If the Impersonalist
wants to motivate her view by pointing to its ability to take seriously the claim
that we care about our friends for our friends' own sakes, then it should not
entirely ignore my friend's valuable projects in offering grounds for concern for her.
The present account also leads to some unacceptable conclusions when we look
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at certain cases. Suppose that my best friend were diagnosed as having a
debilitating and eventually fatal disease. My friend will be too sick to help me
further any of my valuable projects. On the present account, I am no longer
justified in having any special concern for my friend. Certainly there are plenty of
other people who can help me to further my valuable projects, so I should seek out
one of those persons. I think that most of us would find sulch an attitude not only
unjustified, but morally objectionable.
So grounding special concern by reference to my current valuable nonprivate
projects seems dubious. My friend is a person with projects of her own, so concern
for her for her own sake would seem to demand concern for some feature or
features of her which are independent of me and my projects. The Impersonalist
needs to develop a more agent-neutral account of special concern. In "Impersonal
Friends""' Jennifer Whiting presents a view "in which the substance or content of
a person's character (as distinct from its relationship to one's own) is the ground
of concern" (Whiting 11). The justification for concern for my future self will be
analogous to the justification for special concern for others. If I consider the
character of my future self and my friends to be valuable, then my special concern
for each is justified. Thus, I have the same reasons for caring about my friend as I
do for caring about my future self, provided that she and I have the appropriate
characters.
'
8All references to Whiting are to this work unless otherwise indicated.
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Notice that this view, which we will call the 'character-based view', does handle
some of the problems I have raised for the other views that we have rejected. If I
care about my friend because she is virtuous, it seems that I care about her for her
own sake insofar as she is to be identified with her virtuous character. Her virtue
is not dependent on me or on my relationship to her. Also, consider my friend
with the debilitating and eventually fatal disease. In such a circumstance, her
projects will alter a great deal. Nonetheless, her projects may still be valuable,
even if they are not projects that I share. Thus, I have reason to help her in
promoting her ends even though they are not directly my ends. My friendship is
justified because of the nature of my friend's character, a character which involves
a commitment to valuable projects. I, as a virtuous person with valuable projects,
have reason to be specially concerned about any person with a virtuous character
and valuable projects.
Recall that I asked, at the beginning of the paper, what justifies me in caring
more about my mother than about the governor of Idaho if the governor of Idaho
is, in important ways, similar to my mother. Let us suppose that my mother and
the governor of Idaho have equally virtuous characters. If concern is grounded by
the nature of a person's character, then it seems that I should be equally
concerned about my mother and the governor of Idaho. The Impersonalist could
say that special concern is not justified, that I ought to be equally concerned
about all equally virtuous persons. If the Impersonalist takes this line, she is not
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offering an account of special concern, but, rather, a challenge to the commonsense
view that special concern is justified. Although we should take such challenges
seriously, I am here concerned only with the Impersonalist view as an alternative
account of how special concern can be justified. So we need to see how the
character-based view can justify my having more concern for my mother than for
the governor of Idaho. In discussing Perry's account of intrapersonal special
concern, we saw that he justified my special concern for my future self by pointing
to certain causal and epistemic considerations. Given the relations of similarity
and causal influence in which I stand to my future self, she is likely to undertake
my projects. Also, I have an intimate knowledge about her, so I can easily
influence and direct her actions. Similarly, the proponent of the character-based
view can point to causal and epistemic considerations that support my special
concern for my mother. I know my mother and am very familiar with her projects,
and, thus, I am more capable of helping her further her ends. Similarly, because I
interact with my mother on a regular basis, I am in a better causal position to
provide her with benefits. Also, I have very limited time and resources. So I must
choose a few out of the many equally worthy candidates for my concern.
Practically speaking, I should choose those I am in a position to know, such as
family members. In the case of friends, I will choose those with whom I enjoy
spending time. So the Impersonalist can provide strong extrinsic reasons for
special concern. In any normal case, one will be able to provide a justification for
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special obligations to one's self, one's friends, and one's family members.
Notice, however, that in offering even a pragmatic or extrinsic justification for
my greater concern for my mother than for the governor of Idaho, the
character-based view needs to assume that my mother is at least roughly as
virtuous as the governor of Idaho. For suppose that it is clear to me that the
governor of Idaho is far more virtuous than my mother. How can I then possibly
have reason to promote my mother's good rather than the good of the governor of
Idaho if I am in a position to do either? Similarly, suppose that it is also clear to
me that the governor of Idaho is more virtuous than I am or could possibly be in
the future. Should I not, then, on the character-based view, have greater concern
for the governor of Idaho then I have for my future or even my present self?' 9
This problem becomes even more acute when we consider persons who are not
virtuous at all or whose virtues are combined with many vicious or trivial projects.
Suppose that my mother is a person of this sort and I come to realize it. Does that
fact justify me in ceasing to care about my mother? Should I simply abandon her
to her less than fully virtuous ways? Or should I rather try to help my mother
develop more valuable projects? These sorts of considerations become even more
compelling when we consider the intrapersonal case. Suppose that I recognize that
19Whiting says that her "argument was inspired by Aristotle's conception of the ideal friend as
'another self' "(3; emphasis my own). For Aristotle, of course, the best sort of friendship is the
friendship between virtuous persons. So Aristotle's account of character friendship was not meant
to cover cases involving less than virtuous persons. In this paper I am concerned with accounts of
special concern in a broader sense, with differential concern of any sort. An account which cannot
justify my caring more about my mother than about the more virtuous governor of Idaho seems
far from being empirically adequate.
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I am rather a vicious individual who certainly has more moral failings than
virtues. In all probability, I will be unable to change very qui er, it will
take many years for me to develop valuable projects. Character, concern
seems to imply that I am unjustified in caring about myself, so I have no reasons
to embark on a course of moral self-improvement. I might as well just let myself
and those less than fully virtuous persons whom I know go to pot, as it were.
In developing her character-based view, Whiting even wants to say that if I am
not virtuous and neither are my intimates, not only do I not have a reason to
promote the projects of myself or my loved ones, but neither do I have reason to
promote the projects of virtuous persons such as, perhaps, the governor of Idaho.
In fact, she wants to claim that it is not simply that I do not recognize having
such a reason but, rather, that I objectively do not have such a reason. Her claim
is that only virtuous persons have reason to promote their own ends and the ends
of other virtuous persons (Whiting 14)20. So if I am less than virtuous, I have no
reason to have concern for myself, for my intimates, or for anyone else. Therefore, I
have no reasons to try to further my projects, my friends' projects, or the projects
of the virtuous. In fact, it looks like I have no reasons to care about anyone and no
one has any reasons to care about me. These conclusions seem unacceptable.
2 0Whiting does suggest (see, e.g., 4) that non-virtuous agents do have reasons for special concern
'in some sense'. She may intend us to love persons selectively even when they are not completely
virtuous. Just as I love the virtuous for their fully virtuous characters (Whiting 13), I can love
others for the virtues or other admirable qualities which they do possess. I can love persons in
spite of their flaws. In so far as Whiting might accept these claims, she seems to suggest a more
agent-neutral view such as the one I discuss in what follows.
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On the character-based view, the virtuous person has reason to be concerned
for and, thus, to promote the virtue of herself and other virtuous persons. So the
reasons that the virtuous person has are not fully agent-neutral, they are not
reasons for everyone to promote virtue. Specifically, they are not reasonr for the
non-virtuous to promote virtue and valuable projects. The reasons are not relative
to one agent, they are relative to the set of virtuous agents. A more fully
agent-neutral Impersonalist account would hold that everyone has reasons to
promote virtue. It seems plausible to suppose that everyone, be she virtuous or
not, has reason to promote virtue and valuable projects. Also, it seems that one
has reason to promote virtue in both the virtuous and in the non-virtuous; in fact,
one may think it more urgent to promote virtue in the non-virtuous. Now we have
reasons for self-improvement if we are less than virtuous, and we also have reason
to help to improve those of our loved ones who have serious moral failings.
We now have arrived at a fully agent-neutral Impersonalist account of special
concern, a view which I will call the virtue-promoting view. Each person has
reason to promote virtue in the form of valuable projects. The virtue-promoting
view does not justify my concern for a person by citing either that person's
relationship to me or that person's relationship to my projects. Instead, it appeals
to valuable projects, be they mine or my friend's. So it seems that my friend's
valuable projects provide anyone with a reason to be concerned about her.
Notice that the Impersonalist view could take several forms. Impersonalism
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says that I ought to promote virtue whenever I am able to do so. If an
Impersonalist claims that I ought to maximize the virtue that I promote, then she
will have a Utilitarian virtue-promoting view. But the Impersonalist need not be a
Utilitarian. For example, she might accept that there are certain constraints on
how I may treat people as I promote their virtue; Impersonalism could take a
Kantian form. In fact, we may take it that to treat a person as an end is simply to
help to promote her valuable projects. Therefore, the Kantian Imnpersonalist may
say, I should promote persons' virtue unless, by so doing, I thereby interfere with
someone else's valuable projects. Impersonalism, then, need not take a
consequentialist form. We can interpret the claim that we ought to promote virtue
not as an injunction to attain some goal but as a constraint on how we ought to
treat persons. In arguing against Impersonalism, then, I am arguing against a very
general view, one that could take Utilitarian or Kantian forms.
If I have reason to promote virtue in general, then it appears that I have equal
reason to promote virtue in both my mother and in the governor of Idaho. Also, I
have equal reason to promote virtue in both my future self and in the governor of
Idaho. However, the virtue-promoting view can offer an extrinsic justification of
special concern similar to the one offered by the advocate of the character-based
view. Each of us is in a better position, both epistemically and causally, to
promote virtue in ourselves and in our intimates (cf. Sidgwick 432ff.). I know my
intimates well, so I know what their projects are and which are valuable. I know
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their characters and dispositions so I know better than others how to try to
cultivate valuable projects in them. Also, I interact with my intimates regularly so
I am simply in a better position to influence and benefit them. And, of course, I
know myself even better than I know my intimates, and I interact with no one on
a more regular basis than myself. So I am in an extremely good position, both
epistemically and causally, to benefit myself; in fact, I am in a better position to
benefit myself than I am in to benefit my intimates. (See Section 12 for a
discussion of the problems arising from such a conclusion.) According to the
virtue-promoting view, then, the special relationships in which I stand to certain
people does provide extrinsic reasons for concern. From now on I will consider the
virtue-promoting view as the most plausible Impersonalist account of special
concern.
9 Alternatives to the Impersonalist Account
Both the character-based view and the virtue-promoting view are instances of
what Whiting calls a generic strategy or what I have been calling the
'Impersonalist' approach, which "is to take some characteristic common (or at
least potentially common) to oneself and others as the ground of concern and to
claim that this justifies taking any reasons for self-concern provided by this ground
to be the same in kind with any reasons for other-directed concern provided by
this ground" (Whiting 8). According to the virtue-promoting view, I have the
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same sorts of reasons to care about my future self as I do to care about my friend.
I can promote virtue in both.21
Whiting proposes that the alternative to the Impersonalist approach is an
egocentric strategy that takes the relationship in which one stands to a particular
person as providing the grounds for concern for that person: "if someone stands in
the right sort of relationship to me (whatever that is) then I may have reasons to
care for him the same in kind with those I have to care for myself" (Whiting 9).
Whiting wants to argue that there are objectionable features of the egocentric
strategy that should lead us to adopt the Impersonalist stategy. In her discussion
Whiting focuses on the self-extending version of the egocentric strategy. The
self-extending view takes concern for oneself as given and goes on to justify other
sorts of concern as species of self-concern. Special concern for my future self is
justified because my future self is just me in the future. So the good of my future
self is part of my own overall good. But now we can notice again that the
relationship in which I stand to my future self is, in some respects, like the
relationship in which I stand to my intimates; relations of causal influence and
similarity exist in both cases. If, in the intrapersonal case, this relationship allows
me to regard the good of my future self as part of my own good, then, where
similar (although weaker) relations exist in the interpersonal case, I should regard
2Notice that not all views with a generic strategy are agent-neutral. We have already noticed
that the character-based view is agent-relative in so far as reasons for concern are not reasons for
the non-virtuous.
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the good of my loved ones as also being part of my own good. Thus, concern for
others becomes an extension of self-concern (see Whiting 9; for a full discussion of
the self-extending view see Brink 1990). My reasons for caring about my best
friend are the 'same in kind' with my reasons for concern for my future self: the
good of each is part of my own overall good.
Whiting holds that the main problem for such a view is in accommodating the
thought that we care about our friends for their own sakes. How is that to be
reconciled with viewing my friend's good as a part of my own good? Whiting
claims that it requires that just as I view my own good as mine, I should view the
good of my loved ones as mine (10). She argues that this is objectionable because
it does not "grant independence to the value of another's good" (10). If the
self-extending view is unable to accommodate concern for our friends for their own
sakes, then we should reject the self-extending view. However, Whiting would not
yet have an argument for the Impersonalist view, because the egocentric
self-extending view is not the only alternative to the Impersonalist view.
In fact, the self-extending view is not an intuitively attractive view. It holds
that my reason for making a sacrifice for a loved one is the same in kind as my
reason for making a sacrifice for my future self; in both cases, the benefit that
results from the sacrifice is a benefit to me. Any good to my loved ones is really a
good for me as wefi. But we are often inclined to think that I should sometimes
sacrifice my own interests in order to advance the interests of my children or
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parents. On the self-extending view, such a sacrifice is literally impossible, because
any advance in the interests of my loved ones is an advance in my interests. So we
should consider an agent-relative view that preserves our intuitions.
The self-extending view is an agent-relative view, because it says that I have
reason to be specially concerned about a person if that person's good is part of my
overall good. The self-extending view is not, however, the only agent-relative view.
Consider the agent-relative view Broad called Self-referential Altruism (279).22
Broad claimed that Self-referential Altruism is the commonsense position. It
holds that each of us has specially urgent obligations to benefit certain
individuals and groups which stand in certain special relations to
himself, e.g. his parents, his children, his fellow-countrymen, etc. And
it holds that these special relationships are the ultimate and sufficient
ground for these specially urgent claims on one's beneficence (280).
Among other obligations, I have an obligation to be specially concerned about
those who stand in special relationships to me. My special concern for my mother
is justified by the fact that she and I stand in a very special relationship to one
another, the relationship of mother and daughter. Like the self-extending view,
Self-referential Altruism is self-referential, or, agent-relative, because it says that I
owe special obligations and concern to persons who stand in certain relationships
to me. Unlike the self-extending view, Self-referential Altruism does not say that
the good of those others is part of nliy own good and so by furthering their good I
am actually furthering my own good. Rather, it's altruism requires that I must
2 2 Whiting herself mentions this view, but only in passing (5).
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sometimes sacrifice my own good for the good of my mother or for the good of my
best friend. I do not view their good or their projects as my own. Thus, I do
acknowledge that the good of my intimates is independent of my own.
The important thing to notice about Self-referential Altruism is that it does not
engage in what Whiting calls "an unnecessary and potentially objectionable sort of
colonization" (10). It does not require me, in order to justify my special concern
for others, to appropriate their good as part of my own. So it seems that the
Self-referential Altruist will have no problems in accommodating the claim that we
should care about our friends for their own sakes. I also think that Self-referential
Altruism has a fair amount of initial plausibility. As Broad says, it does appear to
be the view of common sense, as I said at the beginning of this chapter. The
attractive feature of the view is that it takes special relationships such as the
friendship relation to provide, in and of themselves, reasons for concern. It
endorses the commonsense claim about justification. We want, I think, to say that
further concern is both justified and required once initial concern is in place no
matter how the initial concern came about. The fact that I have been friends with
Emma for over three years in itself justifies my having greater concern for her than
for someone that I just met yesterday.
Whiting wants to be able to agree that "the friendship relation itself...is taken
to provide reasons for concern additional to those (if any) existing prior to its
establishment" (7). On the virtue-promoting view, however, the friendship relation
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cannot itself provide a reason for concern. It will only be able to provide extrinsic
reasons for concern. As Whiting points out, I am justified in caring more about
my friend Emma whom I have known for years than about an equally virtuous
individual whom I have known for only a week because I will know Emma better.
I will be better able to promote her ends because I will have a better idea what
her ends are. Also, I will have spent more time with Emma and will thus be better
able to appreciate her virtues (Whiting 22-23). In the following two sections, I will
show that this Impersonalist account of my special concern for Emma and the
parallel account of concern for my future self is unable to yield plausible results
about duties of friendship and the justifiability of certain private projects.
Moreover, we will see that the Impersonalist cannot provide any reasons consistent
with her view for taking 'the friendship relation itself to provide reasons for
concern'.
10 The Rejection of the Virtue-Promoting
View in the Intrapersonal Context
The virtue-promoting view tells us to promote valuable projects wherever we are
able to do so. The reasons why we are under a special obligation to promote the
valuable projects of our intimates and our future selves are extrinsic. We are in
better epistemological and causal positions to promote virtue in ourselves and in
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our intimates. I now want to consider what sort of picture of future-directed
self-concern and friendship emerges when we consider the implications of the
virtue-promoting view.
Let us begin with the intrapersonal case of special concern for one's future self.
Why, on the fully neutral, virtue-promoting view should I be specially concerned
about my future self? I have certain projects now that I recognize as valuable and
I know that my future self is the person most likely to carry out the maximum
number of those projects. Also, given the causal relation in which I stand to my
future self, I am in an excellent position to see that my future self adopts other
valuable projects and strives to realize them. Ultimately, then, my concern for my
future self is grounded on a concern for the development, pursuit, and
accomplishment of valuable projects.
This sort of explanation of concern for my future self seems to leave entirely
unjustified certain forms of future-directed self-concern that seem entirely rational.
Many of my private projects are not grounded on nonprivate projects, and yet
they do seem to be justified projects. The justification of some projects seems to
depend on something other than the promotion of value, on some essentially
personal component. Consider, for example, my project that I see the Mona Lisa.
One may wonder, unless one is a hedonist, how valuable this particular project is.
Whether or not it is a valuable project, others will see the Mona Lisa whether or
not I ever see it. However, that does not seem to be suffimcient to undermine nimy
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concern for my future self that she see the Mona Lisa. Also, I may be in a position
such that I can more easily get others to see the Mona Lisa than I can get myself
to see it. Again, that does not seem to undermine my concern that I see the Mona
Lisa and that I exert effort to insure that I see it. My project that I see the Mona
Lisa is not grounded on any valuable nonprivate project. This project is essentially
private and yet I seem justified in being concerned that it be fulfilled.
If special concern for my future self is, at least in part, constituted by concern
for the fulfillment of private projects, then the grounds for concern cannot be
simply the promotion of value or virtue. These private projects have a
non-derivative, non-value-dependent personal component. Thus, if these projects
are justified, and they certainly seem to be, then special concern must be, at least
in part, justified by something other than the promotion of value.
What can the Impersonalist say about private projects that are not
value-dependent? Here I think we want to be careful to distinguish the
Impersonalist's ability to explain the empirical psychological fact that we have
non-derivative personal concern in the form of private projects from her ability to
offer an appropriate justification of such concern. As we have seen, the
Impersonalist can claim that, given my typically strong extrinsic reasons for being
specially concerned about my future self, I will develop habitually strong concern
for my future self (section 3). Eventually, I will develop special concern for my
future self that is non-derivative, or not based on nonprivate projects.
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Psychologically, my special concern will become dissociated from the projects that
initially grounded it, just as a miser's love of money for its own sake can develop
from an initial concern for what money can buy.2 3 So the Imnpersonalist may claim
that her account is empirically adequate.
The difficulty for the Impersonalist is that her account is not normatively
adequate in that she must claim that even if, psychologically, my special concern is
non-derivative, its justification is still derivative from my valuable nonprivate
projects. My habitually strong non-derivative self-concern is justified only because
the presence of such concern is typically necessary for the promotion of value.
Concern for my future self is necessary for the promotion of my valuable
non-private projects, and if it typically leads to non-derivative self-concern, then
non-derivative self-concern is justified only by reference to my non-private
projects. But my point above is that my concern that I see the Mona Lisa seems
justified without any reference to the promotion of valuable non-private projects.
In fact, for many of my private projects, it is difficult to see what the relevant
nonprivate project could be. I will return, at the end of this section, to the
question of whether this Impersonalist account is even psychologically adequate.
However, Whiting claims that non-derivative personal concern can be given
more than a mere instrumental or extrinsic justification. She says that "[a] certain
degree of self-concern (even if only instrumental) is pragmatically necessary for
281 owe this suggestion and the example to David Brink.
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agency" (21). She claims that each agent must see himself as a particular agent
with his own particular history and ends. As Bernard Williams says, "his actions
and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow from the
projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified" ("A Critique of
Utilitarianism", hereafter CU; 116-117). It is impossible for a person to view
himself as merely a tool for the promotion of value without becoming dissociated
from the projects that make him a particular agent. In fact, if he does not identify
with certain non-derivative private projects, he will cease to be an effective agent
for the promotion of value. Without private projects it is hard to see what value
there could possibly be to promote (Whiting "Friends and Future Selves",
hereafter FFS; 579, Williams CU 110).
I think that Whiting is pointing to important considerations. However, it is not
clear that the Impersonalist can accept these claims in a wide enough range of
cases. Perhaps the Impersonalist can say that if I am to be an effective agent of
any sort, I must have some projects that are not value-dependent and are
essentially personal. But consider again my project that I see the Mona Lisa. As
we noted above, this project does seem to be non-value-dependent and essentially
personal. Is this project necessary for any sort of agency?
Suppose that I could use the money that I have saved either to travel to Paris
to see the Mona Lisa or to provide a great benefit to a complete stranger. The
benefit to the stranger would promote her virtue considerably. I think that the
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Impersonalist must say that I should give my money to the stranger. My project
that I see the Mona Lisa is not a project such that I could not give it up and still
remain what we would properly call an agent. It does not seem to be in the sanme
class with my project that I not murder anyone (or even with my project that I
finish my thesis). All of us have many projects like my project that I see the Mona
Lisa, and these projects seem justified even if their forfeiture could lead to the
promotion of another's virtue. The Impersonalist appeal to the necessity of certain
projects as a condition for agency is not going to justify a wide enough range of
projects.
At this point, the Impersonalist could simply say that a lot of projects which
we had previously thought justified are not. Among such projects is my project
that I see the Mona Lisa. A concern for such projects does not effectively promote
value and should be abandoned. If the Impersonalist makes this response, she has
ceased to offer a justification of special concern. My having special concern for
myself consists, at least in part, in my wanting to provide certain benefits to
myself more than I want to provide equal or even larger benefits to persons whom
I do not know. My special concern for myself involves my wanting to see the Mona
Lisa more than I want to promote the virtue of a stranger. Non-value-dependent
personal projects partly constitute special concern. If such projects are unjustified,
then special concern is unjustified. The Impersonalist project looks wrong in the
intrapersonal case, because it cannot support a concern for one's own projects
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which is not proportional to the value promoted by such projects. But such
projects are part of special concern.
An egocentric or agent-relative view offers a much more plausible looking
account of the phenomena that I have been discussing. I want my future self to
avoid pain because I care about my future self. That concern is justified because of
the very special relationship in which my future self stands to me - the relation of
identity. So my personal projects do not derive their justification from an
underlying concern for valuable projects in general, Rather, the personal
component of my projects seems nonderivative. (In an earlier paper, Whiting
seems to agree with this view. See FFS 576ff.)
In fact, we can recall again that I stand in certain relations of similarity and
causal influence to my future self. According to both Mixed and Psychological
Reductionism, these relations are necessary conditions of personal identity across
time. The sorts of causal connections which exist between me and my future self
are connections between desires and intentions and the fulfillnlment of those desires
and intentions. My nonderivative concern for my future self is composed of such
psychological connections as my desire that I see the Mona Lisa, my intention to
avoid pain, my plan to hear operas, etc. So nonderivative concern is a part, and a
very important part, of the special relationship in which I stand to my future self.
I have been claiming that these private projects provide intrinsic reason for special
concern, so it seems right to suppose that the relationship of which they are
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components intrinsically grounds a more general special concern for my future self
(cf. Whiting FFS 564-566). So it is wrong to claim that my special concern ca.n be
derived from an underlying concern for valuable projects. A general concern for
projects is psychologically derivative from a more basic personal concern, although
I will probably come to see that my private projects can be given an independent
justification. And if this is the case, then we can question even the empirical
adequacy of the Impersonalist view. My nonderivative concern for private projects
gives rise, psy%,hologically, to more general value-dependent concern, rather than
vice versa as the Impersonalist must claim (cf. Whiting FFS 578).
Of course, the Impersonalist would be right if she claimed that private projects
are not essential components of personal identity. As we saw in the previous
chapter, I could persist without having the sort of concern that is composed of
private projects, even though most normal cases of persistence involve such
projects. Psychological continuity minus may be sufficient for survival. But again,
if I am to stand in a relationship that matters to my future self, I must have such
private projects. Those projects are constitutive of the sort of psychological
continuity that matters; once they are in place, they provide a grounds for concern
for my future self. Also, once they are in place, they are part of the psychological
continuity that makes my future self me; now I could lose certain elements of
psychological continuity minus and still persist. It is true of any given connection
that I could survive if it were destroyed, but all connections taken together
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constitute my relation to my future self. We could ask why I should have such
projects in the first place, in other words why I should stand in the relationship of
psychological continuity rather than psychological continuity minus to my future
self. Here is where we need to point to independent considerations, considerations
that arise from comparing a normal case of persistence to a case of, e.g., an
irreversible coma where we have psychological continuity minus. (Of course, if
one's mental life were to cease completely, one would not survive falling into such a
coma. I am assuming here that one maintains some sort of minimal mental life,
perhaps through random memories and imaginings.) The friend of the
commonsense view can say that one relation to one's future self is more valuable
than another, and still hold that once one is in such a relation to one's future self,
it is the relation itself, not the value, that provides a grounds for maintaining
concern. Given that most of us arc spontaneously psychologically continuous in
the full sense with our future selves, such worries never really arise.
11 The Rejection of the Virtue-Promoting
View in the Interpersonal Context
So the problem with the virtue-promoting view in the intrapersonal context is that
it does not provide an account of future-directed self-concern that explains how
actual concern is developed. It simply does not ring true. But we can remember
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that part of what appeared to be strong motivation for the Impersonalist approach
was the plausibility of the claim that we should care about our friends and other
intimates for their own sakes. So we might think that the Impersonalist view is
more likely to ring true in the interpersonal context. More particularly, we might
think that, given its neutral approach, the Impersonalist view might work better
as an account of our special moral obligations than it does as an account of the
rationality of special concern. Prima facie an agent-relative approach seems more
properly suited to an account of rationality than of the morality of special concern.
Let us, then, look at some implications of the Imnpersonalist account of special
concern for other persons.
I will begin by looking at what is, perhaps, one of the closest interpersonal
relationships, that of parent and child. Let us consider first the parent's concern for
her child. The advocate of the virtue-promoting view must claim that the parent's
concern for her child is justified by reference to the child's virtue. There are very
strong extrinsic reasons for the parent to be specially concerned about her child.
Because a parent is so close to her child, she has great influence over her child and
can guide and mold her child to a great extent. Thus, she can try to instill in her
child the desire and willingness to further valuable projects. In fact, the
Impersonalist can explain the extraordinary strength of a parent's attachment to
her child in terms of the fact that she is in an excellent position, both causally and
epistemically, to further her child's virtue from the very day of the child's birth.
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This account of the justification of parental love and concern looks very odd as
did the Impersonalist account of special concern for our future selves. Of course, it
would be natural and admirable for the mother to want her child to be virtuous
and to pursue valuable ends. But the Impersonalist is saying that a mother's
special strong concern for her child is or should be based upon a concern for the
child's virtue or valuable projects. In other words, a parent's concern for her child
as a particular person is derived from or secondary to a more basic concern for
valuable projects. However, analogous to the intrapersonal case, the parent's
concern for her child's well-being, which includes her desire that the child be fed
and warm, and her intention to provide pleasure for the child, is partly constitutive
of the parent-child relationship. At least part of the reason why she wants her
child to be warm and fed is because this particular child is her child. These sorts of
desires and intentions are strong psychological connections and also nonderivative
forms of concern for the child as the particular child she is. The parent's concern
for the child's virtue seems to be derived from the more basic nonderivative
concern that is a very part of the special relationship in which she stands to her
child. So it is getting it backwards to say that the parent cares about the child
because she can promote virtue in the child. Her concern for her child's virtue is
based upon and derives from the relationship in which she stands to her child.
The Impersonalist view, then, does not ring true in either the intrapersonal or
the interpersonal context. In the interpersonal context, however, the Imnipersonalist
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view also leads to some morally objectionable conclusions. Again, these are
clearest in the case of the parent-child relationship. For it is not simply her own
child that the parent could greatly influence and affect. There are many orphans
simply waiting to be nurtured by parents. Nonetheless, surely it is the case that
once a mother has her own child, she is justified in having far greater concern for
her own child than for all the others out there. Otherwise, one has to wonder what
would be wrong, according to the virtue-promoting view, in a parent exchanging
her own baby for one whom she could more easily benefit or make virtuous.
Parental feelings would usually prevent such occurrences, but it seems that we
want parents to have such feelings. The Impersonalist must say that such feelings
are unjustified if they prevent a parent from promoting virtue as effectively as she
is able. However, the lack of such feelings seems, in itself, a failing on the part of
the parent.
There are also cases where it seems that a parent's inability to promote virtue
in her child actually provides more reason for the parent to be specially concerned.
Many children are born with degenerative illnesses or severe mental retardation.
These factors certainly make it more difficult for a parent to promote the virtue of
her child. However, it certainly would not be acceptable, let alone justified, for a
parent to take one of these factors as a reason for not having special concern for
her child. We have a similar case when elderly parents develop Alzheimer's
disease. What reason do I have, on the virtue-promoting account, to continue to
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have special concern for my mother when she develops the disease, making it
imposssible for me to promote virtue in her? The answer, it seems, must be, none,
because the fact that she is my mother cannot, in and of itself, provide me with
reasons for special concern.
Let us now turn to the case of friendship, a case that, initially, may seem nmore
congenial to the virtue-promoting account when we recall another motivation for
the Impersonalist view. Imnpersonalism can give an account of how we come to be
justified in entering friendships. As we have noted several times, each of us has
limited resources. We have only so much time so we must choose a few people out
of the many available persons who could be our friends. So we need some way of
choosing whom we will befriend. Now it does seem plausible to suppose that, when
I am presented with a choice, I should enter into that relationship which offers the
best opportunities for me to promote virtue. We recognize virtue in persons, or we
recognize a chance to promote virtue in a person, so we become friends with that
person and become even better able to promote her virtue. Of course, we are only
presented with choices in the case of friendships, not in the case of family
relationships. I cannot choose whom I will have as my mother or my brother as I
can choose whom I will have as my best friend. So the Impersonalist view may be
more adequate for friendships than it is for family relationships. However, even
here Impersonalism gives the wrong account.
Let us suppose that I chose to befriend Emma because I thought that a
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friendship with her would enable me to promote many valuable ends that I could
not promote as effectively alone or with any other available person. Once Emma
and I are friends, I develop many projects which involve Emma. Should my
concern for Emma still be justified by reference to our ability to promote virtue?
Let us consider my project that I spend time with my friend Emma. How,
according to the virtue-promoting view, can I justify my project? I must say that
by spending time with Emma I will be better able to promote valuable ends. Also,
spending time with someone other than Emma is unlikely to lead to the realization
of as many valuable projects or opportunities for the pursuit of valuable projects.
So my concern that I spend time with my best friend must be grounded on the
fact that Emma and I will pursue certain projects in the future. Now this sort of
justification of my entering the friendship with Emma may be morally acceptable
(although, in most cases, it is far from being empirically adequate), but it is not a
morally accepatable justification of my maintaining the friendship with Emma. In
fact, such a justification makes a travesty out of friendship. It certainly does not
represent what we think the best sort of friendship is like. For, on the
virtue-promoting view, I should continue to see my friendship with Emma as
simply an expedient way to promote valuable ends that I could also pursue with
others. So if I meet someone better equipped to my purposes, I should ignore
Emma and spend time with the new person. But I care about Emma's projects
because I care about Emma, and I make projects involving her because I care
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about her. She and I may share ends that we both consider valuable, but we care
about each other independently of caring about our shared ends. Once Enuna and
I stand in the friendship relation to one another, I should not view her as one of
many persons with whom I could promote virtue. The fact that I stand in such a
relationship to her means that I must view her differently than I view others. I
now have spe Ial obligations to her. If continuing to be friends with Enmmna means
that some of my valuable projects may suffer, then, at least up to a certain point, I
am required to sacrifice the pursuit of some of my projects.
The Impersonalist could say that special concern is not justified in most cases.
Most of us have special concern when it is not warranted. Again, I am concerned
with the adequacy of the Impersonalist view as an account of special concern. A
view that would yield that the vast majority of friendships are unjustified is not
such an account. So can the Impersonalist justify the maintanence of friendships?
The advocate of the virtue-promoting view might respond by saying that she is
not committed to saying that I am sometimes justified in simply ceasing to be
friends with Emma. She could try to defend her claim in one of two ways. First,
she might try to claim that the sorts of circumstances that arise in close
friendships are necessary for the realization of valuable projects. For example, if
Emma and I are close and committed to one another we will be more likely to
achieve our valuable goals. We will be less likely to misunderstand or distrust one
another. This sort of response is inadequate. It is at least possible that an
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opportunity will arise when such circumstances are irrelevant to the pursuit of
valuable projects or even hinder such projects. Emma and I may become so
committed to one another that we become less committed to our valuable ends.
There is another response that the Impersonalist might make. She may claim
that the circumstances of closeness and intimacy are themselves valuable or are
necessary conditions of valuable goods such as the experience of intimacy. If
closeness and intimacy are intrinsically valuable goods, then, the Impersonalist can
say, the friendship relation does provide intrinsic reasons for concern because
closeness and intimacy are constitutive elements of the friendship relation. Once
Emma and I are close and intimate friends, the presence of valuable elements in
our relationship entails that Emma and I have special duties of concern to one
another. These duties are grounded by the nature of the relationship in which we
stand to one another, a relationship with intrinsically valuable components. Only
by having special concern for each other will Emma and I have the sort of
relationship that has intrinsic value.
I think that the Impersonalist is right in claiming that closeness and intimacy
are valuable and ought to be promoted. If I have an opportunity to further any
close and intimate relationship between two persons, all else being equal, I ought
to try and do so. However, I do not think that we should ground special concern
on the value of closeness and intimacy. If we do so, then what reason do I have for
maintaining and filrthering my special relationships with v'y intimates that I do
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not have for furthering and helping to maintain any special relationship between
any two persos? We want to be able to say that I am justified in having special
concern for my intimates and, thus, that I have special duties to promote valuable
components of my relationships to my intimates. If special concern is justified in
terms of the value of the relationship, then my duty is to promote special concern
and special relationships wherever I am able to do so. And there will be cases
where I can further others' relationships better than I can further my own
relationships with my intimates. So while I want to agree that certain components
of special relationships are valuable and that these components should be
promoted, I want to argue that special concern should not be justified by reference
to the value of those components, otherwise special concern will too often be
trumped by our more general duties to promote concern as such.
12 Self-referential Altruism and Self-Concern
I have suggested Self-referential Altruism as a plausible agent-relative alternative
to the Impersonalist view. Self-referential Altruism holds that each of us has
special obligations resulting from the special relationships in which each of us
stands to 'his parents, his children, his fellow-countrymen, etc.' My main purpose
in this chapter has been to show that an agent-neutral approach to special concern
is implausible, rather than to argue directly for a particular agent-relative view.
Nonetheless, I want to consider Self-referential Altruism in a bit more detail so
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that we can see what the advantages of the view are. I also want to point to some
difficulties for the view which I will not attempt to deal with here.
To begin, we need to be clear on exactly what Self-referential Altruism says and
what it does not say. Self-referential Altruism is, at least initially, intended to be
an account of special obligations, not of all obligations. It says that I have, all else
being equal, an obligation to benefit my mother rather than a stranger.
Nonetheless, I may, in certain circumstances, have an obligation to help the
stranger. If the benefit that I can give my mother is trivial compared to the
immense benefit that I can give the stranger, then I ought to benefit the stranger.
I should save a stranger's life before I give my mother five dollars. Self-referential
Altruism is not a denial of the claim that we have duties to even complete
strangers; rather, it is the claim that, all else being equal, we ought to benefit
those persons to whom we stand in special relationships.
The Self-referential Altruist may claim that our duties to persons other than
our intimates are grounded by something other than the relationship in which we
stand to those persons. But we can see Broad claiming that the relationship
between fellow-countrymen is a special relationship giving rise to special duties,
probably duties such as loyalty. Presumably, one's duties to one's children and
parents will be stronger than one's duties to one's countrymen, because one's
relationship to one's parents and children is stronger than one's relationship to
one's countrymen. So Self-referential Altruism can provide an account of special
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duties that extend beyond intimates and future selves to not only neighbors and
colleagues but also to fellow-countrymen. And the case of fellow-countrymen
suggests that the independent basis of our obligations to all persons may be the
relationships in which we stand to those persons. I do stand in certain relationships
to all persons; we are all morally equal, rational beings. Perhaps this relationship
grounds some duties, albeit duties more minimal than those owed to intimates and
countrymen. This sort of view sounds plausible and would yield plausible
conclusions about the relative weight of our various duties. Special relationships of
psychological continuity will ground special concern for future selves, intimates,
and fellow-countrymen, while the relationships in which all rational beings stand
to one another will ground a more general sort of concern for all persons.
My special duties to myself are my strongest duties because of the very strong
relationship in which I stand to my future self. This can seem an attractive feature
of Self-referential Altruism, because it will help keep my special duties to intimates
and countrymen from dominating my life. I do not have to and am required not to
completely abandon my own self-development for the sake of my children or
parents. But, what about cases where I can provide an equal benefit to or prevent
an equal burden on either myself or my small child? If I have stronger reason to be
concerned about myself than I have to be concerned about my child, then I should
take the benefit or impose the burden on my child. Surely, though, a parent ought
to give the benefit to her child or she should impose the burden on herself. At tile
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least, she is not irrational or morally wrong if she does so, but Self-referential
Altruism yields that it is irrational and immoral of her to help her child instead of
herself in this case.
How can the Self-referential Altruist deal with this difficulty? One strategy is
for her to point out that, given the dependence of a child on his parents, a parent
is typically able to provide great benefits to the child, benefits that outweigh the
burden imposed on the parent. In normal cases, then, a parent's duty will be to
her child. Therefore, a parent has a moral duty to develop an extremely strong
disposition to benefit the child, a disposition that will lead her to benefit her child
even when her duty requires her to benefit herself instead. Parents are required to
develop dispositions that will lead them, in extaordinary cases, to do the wrong
thing, so they will not be blameworthy for doing the wrong thing in those cases.
But it is still odd that a parent does something wrong in any case when she makes
a sacrifice so that her child would not have to make that sacrifice.24
The only thing that I can say here is that the Impersonalist has the same
difficulty. Given that my relationship to my future self is stronger than my relation
to any other person, my extrinsic reasons for benefitting myself will always be
stronger than my reasons for benefitting others. I can usually be more confident in
24This problem for the Self-referential Altruist recalls the example in the previous chapter where
either I can see the Mona Lisa or my daughter can see the Mona Lisa but we cannot both see it.
The question there was whether I should be disappointed if my private project is not realized and
also whether I should prefer that my private project or that my quasi-private project involving my
daughter be realized. I think that a fuller account of the role of private projects, particularly in
relation to our projects involving our intimates will help to shed light on the problem concerning
differential levels of concern. Unfortunately, however, I must leave these issues for another time.
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determining how to promote my own valuable projects than I can be in
determining how to promote anyone else's, even my child's. Of course, the
Impersonalist can point out that my reasons for having greater concern for myself
are only extrinsic reasons, that, on her view, my intrinsic reasons for concern for
my child are just as strong as my intrinsic reasons for concern for myself. But, on
the Impersonalist view, my intrinsic reasons for concern for the governor of Idaho
are just as strong as my intrinsic reasons for concern for either myself or my child.
I have the same intrinsic reasons for promoting virtue in one person as I have for
promoting virtue in any other given person. For the Impersonalist special concern
is a function of extrinsic reasons arising from the special causal and epistemic
positions that I have with respect to my intimates and my future self. So the fact
that my extrinsic reasons for concern for myself are stronger than my extrinsic
reasons for concern for my child is as much a problem for the Impersonalist as is
the fact that my intrinsic reasons for concern for myself are stronger than my
intrinsic reasons for concern for my child a problem for the Self-referential Altruist.
Recall that, in motivating the Impersonalist view, I said that the Impersonalism
may look attractive in so far as it offers an explanation of why I am justified and
required to have special cone. rn for myself and my intimates. My duty is to
promote virtue, and, the Impersonalist points out, it just so happens that I am
able to promote virtue best if I concentrate my attentions on myself and my
intimates. The Self-referential Altruist, on the other hand, seems to say just that I
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have reason to be specially concerned about persons to whom I stand in special
relationships because I stand in special relationships to those persons. Why
suppose that special relationships can ground concern?
I think that, once we look at the nature of those special realtionships, it
becomes clear why they can function as the grounds of concern. The causal
connections that help to constitute these relationships involve, in the intrapersonal
case, private projects. My desire that I finish my thesis and my future self's
working on the thesis in order to finish it make a strong psychological connection
between me and my future self, one of the connections that makes it the case that
that future self is my future self. These projects, in a very literal sense, define and
shape my life. My commitment to them is a part of what makes me the person
who I am. Similarly, my connections to my intimates is a part of what makes them
my intimates, the connections shape and define their role in my life. These
connections, in so far as they are central to my identity and represent my
commitments, seem to demand and warrant a very special concern.
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Chapter 5
Persons, Compensation, and
Utilitarianism
13 Introduction
According to Utilitarianism, we ought to maximize benefits and minimize burdens
and it is not morally significant, in itself, who gets the benefits and btlrdens. Tlhis
implies that we ought to balance benefits and burdens between persons. Just as a
person should, all else being equal, impose a burden on herself at one time in order
to receive a larger benefit at a different time, so should we, all else being equal,
impose a burden on one person in order to provide a larger benefit to a different
person. But, some critics of Utilitarianism have pointed out, if a person bears a
burden and receives a larger benefit, she is compensated. However, if we impose a.
burden on one person and someone else receives the benefit, the first person has
not been compensated. Because Utilitarianism treats the interpersonal case like
the intrapersonal case, Rawls claims that it "does not take seriously the distinction
between persons" (27). Call this objection to Utilitarianism the 'separateness of
persons' objection.
Derek Parfit argues that if we accept that Reductionism commits us to the
claim that psychological continuity, not identity, is what fundamentally matters in
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our survival, then we should not find the separateness of persons objection
compelling. According to Parfit, if identity is not what matters, then it cannot be
a 'deep' truth that each of us is a separate person. Therefore, compensation is not
morally important and we can balance benefits and burdens between persons as
well as within lives. So Parfit is claiming that a Reductionist view of personal
identity supports Utilitarianism by undermining the separateness of persons
objection.
In the last chapter, I argued that we can view Reductionism, Mixed or
Psychological, as motivation for a particular agent-relative account of special
concern, an alternative to an agent-neutral approach. Utilitarians, of course, are
among those who offer an agent-neutral account. Even though I argued in chapter
3 that Reductionists are not committed to the claim that identity is not what
matters, I will consider, in this chapter, whether Parfit is right that such a claim
would offer support for Utilitarianism. I will show that Parfit's arguments not only
fail to support Utilitarianism, but, in fact, suggest a moral theory in which
relationships in which persons stand to each other, in and of themselves, determine
certain duties and obligations. (In what follows I will focus on Psychological
rather than Mixed Reductionism because Parfit accepts a version of Psychological
Reductionism.)
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14 Utilitarianism and the Separateness of
Persons
14.1 Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is a teleological ethical theory. Teleological theories have two parts:
(i) a theory of value or the good, and (ii) a principle which states what the right is
in terms of what has value, or, more specifically, which states that the right is
whatever maximizes value (cf. Rawls 24). Utilitarianism is distinguished from
other types of teleological theories by its theory of value, according to which what
has value is the happiness of human beings, or any other sentient creatures.
(Although Utilitarian theories differ over the issue of what constitutes happiness,
this issue is not important for my purposes; therefore, I will use 'benefits' to refer
to whatever has positive value and 'burdens' to refer to whatever has negative
value.) I will be concerned only with act-utilitarianism, which evaluates individual
actions in terms of the amount of benefits which they bring about. According to
act-utilitarianism, a right action is that action which of the alternatives available
to the agent brings about the greatest net amount of benefits. The agent is
morally required to maximize benefits and, in so doing, he should not be
concerned about who gets the benefits and burdens. In other words, Utilitarianism
is person-neutral: it claims that it is not morally important, in itself, who gets the
benefits and the burdens. Only the net amount of benefits produced is morally
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important.
Why might one be motivated to accept a person-neutral moral theory such as
Utilitarianism? To begin, let us put aside the moral question and consider some
questions of intrapersonal rationality. Suppose that I can accept a certain benefit
later only if I forego a smaller benefit now. Assume that I can be certain of getting
the larger benefit if I sacrifice the present benefit, and that I do not forego any
other benefits by sacrificing the present one. It is plausible to claim that,
rationally, I should forego the present benefit and wait for the larger benefit. The
mere fact that one benefit is a present benefit and the other a future benefit
should not matter to me - both are benefits to me. Mere temporal placement of
benefits does not seem to be rationally significant; therefore, when someone is the
only person concerned, it seems plausible to suppose that he should maximize
benefits within his life, or 'aim at his good on the whole' (Sidgwick 381). I have no
reason not to get as many benefits in my life as I can possibly get. Of course, I
may decide that the way to achieve my overall good is to distribute benefits evenly
throughout my life, but, at least initially, it seems that I should only do so if that
is the way to achieve the most benefits possible.
But, Sidgwick says,
just as this notion [i.e. "the 'Good on the Whole' of a single
individual"] is constructed by comparison and integration of the
different 'goods' that succeed one another in the series of our conscious
states, so we have formed the notion of Universal Good by comparison
and integration of the goods of all individual human - or sentient -
existences. And here again, just as in the former case, by considering
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the relation of the integrant parts to the whole and to each other, I
obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any one individual is
of no more importance, from the point of view...of the Universe, than
the good of any other... And it is evident to me that as a rational
being I am bound to aim at good generally...not merely at a particular
part of it(382).
In the purely intrapersonal case where I am the only person affected, all else being
equal, it should not matter when I receive a benefit: whether I receive a benefit at
one time or at some other time, I still receive a benefit. From the perspective of
rationality, what is important is that I maximize benefits within my life. But
morality seems to demand that I consider not only my own life but all lives 'from
the point of view of the Universe'. Then, just as temporal placement of benefits in
the intrapersonal case is, in itself, unimportant, it seems that, analogously, it is
unimportant in the interpersonal case who receives a benefit. It should not matter
whether I receive a benrefit or you receive a benefit, as long as someone receives a
benefit, because no person's good is more important than the good of any other.
Our moral theory, then, should be person-neutral. We should be concerned only
with maximizing benefits among all persons as Utilitarianism does. Thus,
Utilitarianism can be motivated by viewing the morality of distribution of goods
among persons as analogous to the rationality of distribution of goods within a
single life.
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14.2 The Separateness of Persons and Compensation
Person-neutrality, however, is the very feature of Utilitarianism that leads to the
objection that it does not take seriously the 'separateness of persons'. What is the
'separateness of persons'? Dennis McKerlie says that "[d]ifferent people live
different lives. Each life consists of experiences that are not shared with the other
lives. These facts are sometimes referred to as the 'separateness of persons"' (205).
As Sidgwick claims, "[i]t would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the
distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental"
(498). The claims that 'different people live different lives' and that the distinction
between lives is 'real' are obvious truths. Surely, Utilitarianism does not deny
these metaphysical truisms. The critics' charge is that Utilitarianism does not
treat these truisms as 'fundamental'. Utilitarianism does not respond
appropriately to the separateness of persons.
In what way does Utilitarianism respond inappropriately to the separateness of
persons? Robert Nozick argues:
There are only individual people, different individual people, with their
own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of
others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens
is that something is done to him for the sake of others ... To use a
person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the
fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. He
does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is
entitled to force this upon him (33).
Suppose that I can provide one person with a large benefit only if I impose a
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smaller burden on some other person. Utilitarianism says that, all else being
equal, I am morally required to impose that burden because, by doing so, I
produce a net benefit. But, as Nozick points out, the person who bears the burden
does not receive an 'overbalancing good' - he does not receive a net benefit, a
benefit to some other person will not always make his life go better, because he is
a separate person. So it might be said that, given that each of us is a separate
person, we cannot force someone to bear a burden merely because, by doing so, we
could provide a larger benefit to a different person. In other words, a larger benefit
to one person will not always 'morally outweigh' a burden on a different person.
This claim is what Parfit calls the 'Objection to Balancing' (337; cf. Nozick 33,
Rawls 28). The Objection to Balancing is simply that we cannot treat the
interpersonal case in the same way that we treat the purely intrapersonal case;
even though it may be permissible to balance benefits and burdens within a life, it
is not permissible to balance benefits and burdens between lives. As Nagel says,
"[t]o sacrifice one individual life for another, or one individual's happiness for
another's is very different from sacrificing one gratification for another within a
single life" (138). The explanation for the disanalogy is that, whereas there is
intrapersonal compensation, "there can be no interpersonal compensation for
sacrifice" (Nagel 142).
If we are to compensate a person for a burden that we have imposed on him, we
must provide him with a benefit that counterbalances or makes amends for the
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burden. We have compensation when the person who bears the burden is identical
with the person who receives the benefit, i.e. there is intrapersonal compensation.
In the interpersonal case, however, where one person bears the burden and some
other person receives a benefit, the first person is not compensated for his
burden. 25 Now we do often attribute moral significance to compensation. For
example, if you are speeding recklessly and you hit me with your car as a result,
thereby causing me to be hospitalized for six months, we think that you have a
moral obligation to compensate me for the hardship which you have forced upon
me. You must in some way make amends for the harm that you have wrongly
inflicted upon me. Suppose, however, that you were rushing to the hospital
because you have been poisoned and, if you do not slow down to avoid hitting nie,
you will reach the hospital in time to receive an antidote that will prevent you
from having to be hospitalized for eight months. In this case, the benefit to you is
greater than the burden on me (total aggregate hospitalization is reduced by two
months if you hit me). Nonetheless, it still seems that you ought to compensate
me for my six months of hospitalization, because the benefit to you did not
compensate me for my burden.
These sorts of considerations support the following principle:
25 1It is true that if you are to compensate me, you must provide me with a benefit; however, in
certain cases, you can provide me with a benefit by providing someone else with a benefit. For
example, I have a desire that my loved ones be benefitted; therefore, if you benefit someone I love,
you thereby provide me with what I will call an 'indirect benefit'. To compensate me, then, you
must provide me with either a direct or indirect benefit that makes up for the burden that you
have imposed on me.
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Morality of Sacrifice: There are burdens such that if you impose one of
those burdens on me, then you ought to compensate me for the burden.
Utilitarianism, however, says that each person should maximize net benefits.
Thus, suppose that, after you hit me with your car, you can either pay for my
hospital expenses or use your money to provide a larger benefit to some other
person. According to Utilitarianism, you ought to give the money not to me but to
the other person. But you will not compensate me by giving that other person the
money; therefore, if Morality of Sacrifice is true, Utilitarianism is wrong.
It is important to notice that I have stated Morality of Sacrifice in such a way
that it allows cases in which I can impose a burden on you and yet not be required
to compensate you. For example, suppose that you and I are standing by a lake
when I spot a child drowning in the lake. In order to save the child, I must push
you out of my way so that I can dive into the water. You fall and scratch your
knee. I have imposed a very small burden on you in order to benefit greatly the
child - it is not at all clear that I have any obligation to compensate you for your
scratched knee. Nozick (33) and Rawls (4) sometimes speak as if we can never
balance benefits and burdens between persons, but it seems that we sometimes can
if the benefit is very great and the burden very small.
We can connect these considerations about compensation with the claims about
private projects in previous chapters. Each person has many private projects and,
in fact, most of our projects are private projects. My project that I finish my
thesis is a private project. Now, benefits to some other person will not always help
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me to finish my thesis. So if someone imposes a burden on me that disrupts nmy
work on my thesis, I must receive a counterbalancing benefit, a benefit that will
help me to further my thesis or some other of my private projects. If I do not
receive such a benefit, my project may not be realized. Given the fact that private
projects are central to my life and actually are the core of my relationship to my
future self, most interferences with my private projects will demand compensation,
because benefits to someone else may not help me to further my projects.
So it is a significant fact that you and I are separate persons because someone
cannot always compensate me by providing you with a benefit. I can impose a
burden on myself in order to receive a larger benefit, because the benefit makes up
for my burden - there is intrapersonal compensation. But, because there is no
interpersonal compensation, it is not always permissible to impose a burden on one
person merely to provide a larger benefit to some other person. Because
Utilitarianism treats the interpersonal case like the purely intrapersonal case, it is
said that it does not accord the proper moral significance to the boundaries
between lives.
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15 Reductionism and the Separateness of
Persons
Parfit offers two arguments that are supposed to show that the above objections to
Utilitarianism are weakened if we accept a Reductionist view of personal identity.
His second argument, which I will discuss in section 4, is directed against the
claims about compensation which are supposed to explain the significance of the
separateness of persons claim. His first argument, which I will discuss in this
section, is directed against the separateness of persons claim itself. Parfit argues
that Psychological Reductionism implies that the separateness of persons is not a
'deep' fact. Therefore, he claims, the boundaries between lives cannot be as
significant as we had thought.
15.1 Parfit's Argument: The 'Depth' of Personal Identity
The critics of Utilitarianism insist that, in distributing benefits and burdens
among persons, we ought to treat the boundaries between lives as morally
significant as Utilitarianism does not. Parfit argues that on Psychological
Reductionism the boundaries between lives are not as significant as we had
thought, because, on the Psychological view, identity is not as 'deep' as we hlad
thought it to be. Recall Sidgwick's claim that the distinction between one person
and any other person is 'real and fundamental'. Parfit claims that acceptance of
206
Reductionism should lead us to find that distinction less 'real and fundamental'.
Why is identity less 'deep' on the Psychological view than it is on
Non-Reductionism? Parfit offers two reasons for his claim about depth. Consider
the fission case where I split like an amoeba. Each of the resulting persons in this
case, A and B, is both psychologically and physically continuous with me.
Nonetheless, neither A nor B is identical with me, because psychological continuity
has taken a branching form. But I would 'have survived as either A or B if the
other had not existed. So my not being identical with A simply comes to the fact
that B happens to exist. B's existing, however, has no intrinsic effect on me, A, or
the relationship between me and A. But, then, how can we view the distinction
between me and A as 'real and fundamental'? The fact that A and I are distinct
persons simply comes to the extrinsic fact that B happens to exist, and it is
difficult to see how that extrinsic fact can matter. As we saw in Chapter 3, Parfit
concludes that it is not identity that matters, because identity depends upon
extrinsic facts. What matters is that I am psychologically continuous with A
whether or not I am identical with her. Thus, I should change my private projects
to quasi-private projects. 26
The fission case is, of course, a very unusual case. Nonetheless, the fission case
shows that psychological continuity is what matters, and psychological continuity
26If we are Mixed Reductionists who accept this argument, we would conclude that I should have
the mixed-quasi-private project that someone psychologically and physically continuous with me
finish my thesis, unless we accept Parfit's further argument for the claim that physical continuity
cannot be part of what matters (282-287).
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is present not only in relationships to future selves and fission products, but also in
ordinary interpersonal relationships. Even though the only persons with whom
you are fully psychologically continuous are fission products, you can bear some
psychological connections to friends and family members: intimates often causally
influence one another's beliefs and desires, share goals and projects, etc. Also,
connections usually weaken over time within a life: beliefs and values change,
memories grow dim, goals and projects are altered or abandoned, etc. So, on the
Psychological view, the connections which hold between persons are not different
in kind, and sometimes not even different in strength, from the connections which
determine personal identity across time, although there will be a larger number of
stronger connections in the intrapersonal case. 27
Parfit claims that these facts about Reductionism and psychological continuity
support our giving less significance to the boundaries between lives. The difference
between lives is simply a matter of degree, not a deep difference in kind. What
matters in my relationship to my future self is also present in my relationship to
other persons. The mere fact that some future person is me is not, in itself,
important. What is important is that I am psychologically continuous with that
person; I should replace my private projects with quasi-private projects. Because
elements of psychological continuity are present in interpersonal contexts, we
2 71f one is a Mixed Reductionist, one will hold that certain intrapersonal connections, physical
connections, are only present in very special interpersonal cases, such as fission cases and cases of
mothers and their children.
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should "regard the subdivisions within lives as, in certain ways, like the divisions
between lives" (Parfit 334). Reductionists should be open to viewing intrapersonal
contexts as analogous to interpersonal contexts, as Sidgwick suggested in
motivating Utilitarianism. The separateness of persons should no longer seem like
a fundamental fact, because the separateness of persons is only a matter of degree.
15.2 Response to Parfit: Reductionism and Full
Person-Neutrality
Parfit claims that "[w]e ought to be Reductionists. If this is a change of view, it
supports several changes in our beliefs about...morality" (347). I agree with Parfit
that acceptance of Psychological Reductionism should lead us to make some
revisions in our moral views, but, unlike Parfit, I do not think that Psychological
Reductionism lends plausibility to a fully person-neutral moral theory such as
Utilitarianism.
First, recall that Parfit's reason for claiming that identity is less 'deep' on the
Psychological view than we had thought it to be derives from a consideration of
the fission case. If you undergo fission, the distinction between you and A comes
to nothing more than the fact that B happens also to exist. Therefore, Parfit
concludes, the distinction between persons is not a deep distinction. But what has
Parfit really shown? I agree that it does not seem to be a 'deep' fact in the fission
case that you are not identical with A. We should conclude that the boundary
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between your life and A's life is not morally significant. A moral theory, then, can
justifiably claim that it cannot matter, in itself, whether you or A receives a
certain benefit. Utilitarianism, however, says that it is not morally important, in
itself, whether one person, or any other person receives a certain benefit, that is,
Utilitarianism is fully person-neutral. Does the claim that the difference between
you and A is not a 'deep' fact support the claim that the difference between any
two persons is not a 'deep' fact? I think not. You bear many strong connections to
A, but, at the most, you bear some very small number of weak connections to the
governor of Idaho. The relation between you and the governor of Idaho is not like
the relation between you and A in the fission case. So we can continue to view the
boundary between, for example, your life and the life of the governor of Idaho as
morally significant. The Psychological view, so far, supports only a very small
revision in our moral views, i.e. a revision concerning how we treat fission cases.
Parfit's argument depends upon extrapolating from the claim about we should
treat relations between persons and their fission products to a claim about how we
should treat all interpersonal relations. Given the special nature of fission
relations, this is an unwarranted extrapolation.
Recall, however, that psychological continuity can be a 'matter of degree', i.e.
you can bear some psychological connections to persons other than your fission
products. For example, intimates often have similar beliefs, goals, values, etc., and
they causally influence one another's beliefs, etc. You bear a great many
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psychological connections to your best friend or to your spouse. You bear fewer
and weaker connections to colleagues, acquaintances, etc. Given that on the
Psychological view continuity is what matters, not identity, we should cease to see
the distinction between a person and his intimates as being as 'deep' as we had
thought it to be. Again, I agree with Parfit on this point. But your relation to
your spouse or best friend is still very different from your relation to the governor
of Idaho. In fact, your relation to your spouse or best friend is significantly
different from your relationships to the vast majority of persons. The
Psychological Reductionist view decreases the number of morally significant
boundaries, but it does not show that none of the distinctions between lives is
'deep'; it does not support the full person-neutrality of Utilitarianism.
So the claim that psychological continuity is what matters should lead us to
draw new moral boundaries rather than leading us to reject all moral boundaries.
When we accepted that identity matters, we saw a sharp distinction between each
individual life. Now if we accept that psychological continuity matters we should
accept that distinctions between appropriately related persons are not sharp but
are matters of degree. Just as I am causally connected to my future self, so am I
causally connected, albeit to a lesser degree, to my mother and, to an even lesser
degree, to my colleagues. So the fact that my mother and I are separate persons is
not a very important fact, certainly not as significant as the fact that the governor
of Idaho and I are separate persons. Nonetheless, there is still a distinction
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between me and my mother and an even greater distinction between me and the
governor of Idaho. Our moral theory, then, should reflect these gradations in
significance of the distinction between persons. It might be reflected by, for
example, allowing more interpersonal balancing between intimates than between
strangers, by allowing that a benefit to my mother will outweigh a burden on me
in cases in which the same benefit to the governor of Idaho will not outweigh the
same burden on me. And, of course, I myself will be required to make certain
sacrifices for my mother that I am not required to make for the governor of Idaho.
This sort of moral theory is not person-neutral; rather, on this view, the
relationships in which persons stand to one another have intrinsic significance.
We can make a similar point if we consider private and quasi-private projects.
Parfit argued that if identity is not what matters, then I should abandon my
private projects. But if psychological continuity does matter, I am justified in
replacing my private projects with quasi-private projects. I am justified in
continuing to care that at least someone psychologically continuous with me finish
my thesis rather than that my thesis be finished by a complete stranger. So I can
hope that at least my fission product finishes my thesis. My project will only be
fully realized if my future self or my fission product finishes my thesis, but,
because my friend is continuous with me to some degree, my project will be
partially realized if my friend finishes my thesis. (Perhaps my friend must bear
some relevant connections to me such as sharing an interest in philosoplhy for this
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to be the case.) But my project will not even be partially realized if the governor
of Idaho finishes my thesis. The distinction between me and some other person is
more or less significant depending on the degree to which that other person can
realize my quasi-private projects. 28
The claims about the separateness of persons are, however, intended to support
certain claims about compensation. If Parfit can undermine the claims about
compensation, he will have lessened some of the import of the separateness of
persons claim. He will have forced us to wonder why even degress of separateness
should matter. So let us turn to Parfit's argument against Morality of Sacrifice.
16 Psychological Reductionism and
Compensation
Parfit argues that Psychological Reductionism supports both (i) a change in the
scope of distributive principles such as Morality of Sacrifice, and (ii) a change in
the weight of such distributive principles. According to Parfit, the Psychological
view should lead us to widen the scope of Morality of Sacrifice. Since the
Utilitarian ignores Morality of Sacrifice, widening the scope of the principle offers
no support for Utilitarianism. But, Parfit claims, we should also give the principle
28If we accepted that physical continuity is part of what matters, the distinction between me
and another person would be more or less significant depending on the degree to which that other
person can realize my mixed-quasi-private projects. My fission products and children will be able
to realize these projects to a greater degree than any other person will be able to.
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no weight; once we do that, it makes no difference what the principle's scope is. I
will focus, then, on Parfit's claims about weight; however, I will begin with his
claims about the scope of Morality of Sacrifice.
16.1 The Scope of Morality of Sacrifice
To begin, recall the case that I described in section 14.2 above: you hit mie with
your car and cause me to be hospitalized for six months. In order to compensate
me for that burden, you must provide me with a counterbalancing benefit; for
example, you ought to pay for my hospital expenses and give me some extra
money to make amends for my pain. Suppose that it takes twenty years of court
battles before I am able to get any money from you - I was a child at the time of
the accident and I am an adult when you finally pay me. Parfit claims that in
cases such as this we might think that you cannot compensate my childhood self
by giving benefits to my adult self. After all, connections weaken over twenty years
- beliefs, values, etc., change a great deal. Thus, because, e.g., my adult self is
similarly weakly connected to other persons, Parfit says that we should "treat
weakly connected parts of one life as, in some respects, or to some degree, like
different lives" (337). Because benefits to one person do not always compensate
another person for his burden, we should think that benefits to the adult may not
compensate the child. In such a case, it would not even be permissible to balance
freely benefits and burdens within a life. Parfit concludes that Psychological
214
Reductionism supports our giving distributive principles concerning compensation
"more scope, so that they apply even within a single life" (335).
Notice that Parfit is not denying that you can compensate me by giving me the
money twenty years after the accident. He is denying that you can compensate my
childhood self by providing a benefit to my adult self. At this point, Parfit is
assuming that my childhood self is an entity distinct from my adult self and that
both my childhood self and my adult self are entities different from me. Parfit's
shift in focus raises two questions, a metaphysical question and a normative
question. The metaphysical question is, are there such entities? Some
philosophers"2 do not think that there are such entities as my childhood self and
my adult self; rather, they claim that we have only one temporally extended
entity, the person, who was a child twenty years ago and who is now an adult. In
chapter 2, when I discussed the definition of 'continuity', I said that I would
remain neutral as to whether we should understand talk of persons at times as talk
about literal temporal parts of persons. I think that the more interesting issue for
our purposes is whether or not, even if there are temporal parts, we should be
concerned with temporal parts rather than with persons. Therefore, I am not
going to discuss this metaphysical issue. I will grant to Parfit his assumption that
my childhood self is an entity distinct from my adult self, but I think that it is
important to notice that Parfit and I are both making this assumption and that it
29See, e.g., Judith Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time" 201-221.
215
is a controversial assumption.30
I will, then, address only the normative issues that arise from Parfit's shift in
focus. My objection to Parfit is that he has not given us sufficient reason to think
that Morality of Sacrifice should be changed to
Morality of Sacrifice II: There are burdens such that if you impose one
of those burdens on a temporal part of me, e.g., my childhood self,
then you ought to compensate that temporal part of me.
Parfit simply points to the fact that parts of a life can be weakly connected, as
weakly connected as different persons. But we need to xconsider whether the
weakening of connections within a life is such that we should think that parts of a
person rather than persons are the morally relevant units with respect to
compensation. Suppose that in the case where you are driving recklessly and hit
me with your car, you cause me to suffer brain damage. Brain damage will, of
course, weaken the psychological connections between my pre-accident self and my
post-accident self - I will lose memories, some of my abilities will be impaired,
personality changes will occur, etc. Also, as a response to these changes, I will
have to change my life plans, thereby weakening the connections within my life
even further. It seems that you ought to compensate me for the brain damage that
you have caused. But, according to Parfit, you should compensate that part of me
which bears the burden. But the weakening of connections happens to me, not to
any part of me - I should be compensated for your having lessened my life
3 0Parfit himself does realize this at several points. See, for example, p.135.
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prospects. In this case, it seems that the very weakening of connections is what
makes it such that you ought to compensate me; therefore, the weakening of
connections within a life cannot be, in itself, a reason for thinking that Morality of
Sacrifice should be changed to Morality of Sacrifice II.
Parfit's shift in focus from persons to smaller parts of persons raises the issue of
why we thought Morality of Sacrifice was important in the first place. Why does
compensation of persons seem morally important? Why ought you to compensate
me if you impose certain very great burdens on me? I think that it is clear from
the brain damage case that something about a person's life prospects and plans
are at issue. Persons have plans involving their lives as a whole, and in those plans
they allow for certain changes to occur in their personalities, etc. A person's life
plans should not be constantly jeopardized by burdens imposed on him by others;
thus, if certain very large burdens are imposed on a person, he ought to be
compensated. It just is not at all clear that similar concerns will remain if we shift
focus to smaller parts of a person. However, I will not pursue this issue further
here, because it raises the issue of whether a person is justified in having plans
concerning his whole life - Parfit argues that, on the Psychological view, this claim
is undermined to some extent. But I do not want to look at that argument here.
I have only suggested a possible response to Parfit's claim about the change in
scope. Parfit's important claim, in so far as his 'defense' of Utilitarianism goes, is
that distributive principles such as Morality of Sacrifice should be given no weight.
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So let us turn to Parfit's argument for the claim that Morality of Sacrifice should
be given no weight.
16.2 The Weight of Morality of Sacrifice
Parfit argues that compensation is not morally significant and, that, therefore, the
Utilitarian is free to balance benefits and burdens between lives as well as within
lives. His argument is as follows:
Compensation presupposes personal identity. On the Reductionist
view, we believe that the fact of personal identity over time is less
deep, or involves less. We may therefore claim that this fact has less
moral importance. Since this fact is presupposed by compensation, we
may claim that the fact of compensation is itself morally less important
(338).
I agree with Parfit that 'compensation presupposes personal identity', that if you
are to compensate me for a burden imposed on me, then you must provide me
with some counterbalancing benefit. Of course, as I pointed out in section 14.2,
sometimes you can indirectly benefit me by benefitting one of my intimates;
however, I must receive some benefit, direct or indirect, if I am to be compensated.
Does this fact, together with the fact that identity is less 'deep' on the
Psychological Reductionist view, support Parfit's claim that compensation is not
as morally important as we had thought it to be?
Parfit sometimes writes as though he thinks that the mere fact that we have
rejected Non-Reductionism and accepted Reductionism justifies our changing our
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moral views as well. For example, he says that "[a] change in view often makes it
plausible to give to a moral principle a different weight. If this cannot be plausible
in the present case, this needs to be shown. I believe that it could not be shown"
(344). But I think that it is clear that the burden of proof lies with Parfit. He
needs to show how a lack of 'depth' undermines our attribution of moral
significance to compensation. The Psychological Reductionist view simply tells us
under what conditions person x is identical with person y. It tells us when the
person who bears the burden is identical with the person who receives the
counterbalancing benefit. The mere fact that we have changed our view about
these identity conditions does not justify us in revising our moral claims. Parfit
owes us a story about how the importance of compensation presupposes that
identity is a 'deep' fact. After all, we might just think, upon accepting the
Psychological view, that since compensation presupposes personal identity, and
identity is not a 'deep' fact as we had thought it to be, then compensation does
not presuppose any 'deep' fact.
Recall that one of Parfit's reasons for claiming that identity is not a 'deep' fact
on Psychological Reductionism involves the fission case. In the fission case you are
psychologically continuous with both of the fission products A and B; therefore,
you are not identical with either A or B. Now suppose that, before your fission I
hit you with my car and put you in the hospital for several months. Your fission
occurs before I pay you any money for hospital expenses, time lost, etc. Parfit
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claims that in the fission case I cannot compensate you by providing those benefits
to A, because A is not you - you receive no counterbalancing benefit if I give the
money to A. But then, according to Parfit, it is not plausible to suppose that
benefits to A can compensate you for your burden, even when B does not exist.
How could the presence of B make a difference as to whether you are compensated
by benefits to A? If benefits to A in the fission case do not compensate you, then
neither do benefits to A in the case where A is identical with you. Therefore,
Parfit concludes, "[w]e can defensibly hold that a benefit at one time cannot
provide compensation for a burden at another time, even when both come within
the same life" (343).
We need to alter Parfit's argument a bit. If you care about A in the fission case
and desire that A be benefitted, then I can provide you with an indirect benefit
when I directly benefit your fission product. So I could compensate you by
providing A with benefits. I cannot, however, directly or automatically
compensate you by benefitting A. Then Parfit should conclude that, similarly, I
cannot automatically compensate you by benefitting A in the case where A is
identical with you; automatic intrapersonal compensation is not possible on the
Psychological view. Of course, we may think that if there is not automatic
intrapersonal compensation, then, at the very least, compensation is not as
significant as we had thought, if not impossible, on Psychological Reductionisnm.
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I do not think that this conclusion supports full person-neutrality. It seems
right to say that, on Psychological Reductionism, because psychological continuity,
not identity, is what matters, it should not matter whether you or your fission
product receives a certain benefit; therefore, we need to focus on some notion
which, unlike compensation, does not 'presuppose personal identity'. So let us
define a new term, 'quasi-compensation'.3 1 Let us say that I can quasi-compensate
you for a burden that I impose on you if I provide a larger benefit to someone
psychologically continuous with you. For example, I can quasi-compensate you by
providing benefits to A when A is you or to A or B in the fission case. As I
pointed out in section 15.2, Psychological Reductionism should lead us to view the
boundaries between psychologically continuous persons as less 'fundamental' than
the boundaries between complete strangers. However, the distinction between you
and the governor of Idaho remains significant. Shifting emphasis from
compensation to quasi-compensation reflects the change in view about morally
important distinctions. So we should change Morality of Sacrifice to:
Morality of Sacrifice III: There are certain burdens such that if you
impose one of those burdens on me, then you ought to
quasi-compensate me.
According to Morality of Sacrifice III, we can balance benefits and burdens
between psychologically continuous persons, but still not between strangers.
31I borrow this term from Parfit (see "Comments"), but I define it somewhat differently and use
it for a different purpose. Cf. Shoemaker on quasi-memory in "Persons and Their Pasts".
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But we have to remember that psychological continuity can be a matter of
degree, so we should think that a person can be quasi-compensated to varying
degrees. For example, you will be fully quasi-compensated by benefits to someone
fully psychologically continuous with you such as your fission product or yourself,
while you will be less, or partially quasi-compensated by benefits to a friend or a
family member. Quasi-compensation, then, reflects what the morally relevant
boundaries are, that is, the boundaries drawn by psychological connections
between persons. So I think that Parfit is right to think that we should not worry
about compensation, but why should we not worry about quasi-compensation? If
we do, we cannot be fully person-neutral as is the Utilitarian. Rather, in balancing
benefits and burdens we have to pay attention to the relations between persons.
So let us consider what sort of moral theory is supported by Psychological
Reductionism. Consider again the case where I hit you with my car. My obligation
is to quasi-compensate you for your burden. But, suppose that you die as a result
of the accident. I can still quasi-compensate you by providing counterbalancing
benefits to your children or your spouse, although I will thereby quasi-compensate
you to a lesser degree than if I had been able to provide counterbalancing benefits
to you. Notice that my quasi-compensating you through your family does not
entail that the benefits that I provide to your family are benefits to you, not even
that they are indirect benefits to you. By shifting focus from compensation to
quasi-compensation, we are saying that what is morally significant is not that you
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receive a benefit that outweighs your burden but that someone psychologically
continuous with you to some degree receive such a benefit whether or not you even
know about the benefit. Of course, by providing a benefit to your spouse to whom
you are very closely connected I quasi-compensate you to a greater degree than if I
benefitted your coleague to whom you are less closely connected.
The importance of quasi-compensation also supports the commonsense view
about special obligations that I described in Chapter 4. Given that I am
quasi-compensated by benefits to my mother, I am obligated to bear burdens
whether it is she or I who will receive the benefit. Of course, given that I will be
fully quasi-compensated only by benefits to myself, my strongest obligations will
be to myself (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the difficulties created by this
conclusion). So I have no complaint if someone gives my mother a certain benefit
rather than giving me a somewhat smaller benefit; in either case I am
quasi-compensated to about the same degree. But I am not obligated to view a
benefit to a stranger in anything like the way that I view the same benefit to
myself. So my special obligations to my intimates arise from the special
relationships in which they stand to me. They are continuous with me to varying
degrees, so benefits to them quasi-compensate me to varying degrees.
The notion of quasi-compensation is very natural once we accept the
significance of quasi-private projects. As long as it was justifiable for me to care
that Ifinish my thesis, your interference with that project demanded that you
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provide me with a counterbalancing benefit, something that will help me to further
if not that private project, some other of my private projects. But, if psychological
continuity is what matters, I should have the quasi-private project that someone
psychologically continuous with me finish my thesis. Then, if you interfere with
that project, you should provide a counterbalancing benefit to someone
psychologically continuous with me. (Again, one might think that the benefit
should go to someone who is connected to me in some way relevant to that
particular project. But I think that I should view my intimates' quasi-private
projects in a way similar to the way in which I view my own. Therefore, as long as
my intimate can further her quasi-private project, I am quasi-compensated.)
In describing the moral theory that is supported by Psychological
Reductionism, I have said that one can be quasi-compensated to various degrees
depending upon the degree to which one is continuous with the person who
receives the counterbalancing benefit. Degree of continuity between you and some
other person is determined by the strength and number of connections that
compose the relationship between you and that person. As we have seen, in certain
cases degree of continuity may depend upon the nature of the connections. We
might wonder, however, why we should not concentrate simply on continuity rather
than on the connections that constitute the relations of continuity. After all, as I
argued in Chapter 3, it seems plausible to suppose that continuity alone is what
matters, and in section 16.1, I argued that full intrapersonal compensation need
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not be problematic as connections weaken across time within a life. I think that
we have to remember that what matters can decrease, even in the intrapersonal
case, if the causal connections are not of the appropriate sort, for example, if they
are the result of an external imposition. In Chapter 4 we noticed that there is an
interpersonal parallel of external impositions. In cases where causal interaction
fails to be the result of and in accordance with the intentions and plans of both
parties to the interaction, then we so not have grounds for special concern. These
sorts of cases show that it is important to look at the nature of the connections.
For purposes of quasi-compensation, then, degree of continuity is perhaps
determined more by the nature of the connections than merely by their number
and strength. The mere fact that someone is continuous with me is not sufficient
to determine how I should view benefits to that person. I must know whether the
connections involved in the continuity are, for example, primarily connections of
similarity or whether appropriate kinds of causal connections are also present.
Parfit could reply to my objections that there is a Utilitarian justification for
considering in what celationship I stand to those affected by my actions, that there
"are good Utilitarian reasons for agents to possess and act from a differential
concern for their own welfare and the welfare of those close to them" (Brink 1989
289). As Sidgwick points out (432ff.), each person benefitting himself and his
intimates will tend to be the best way for him to contribute to the overall greatest
happiness. For example, he himself will get greater pleasure from benefitting a
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loved one than from benefitting ;i complete stranger. I have greater knowledge of
how best to benefit my loved ones, and I am in a better position to do so because I
interact with them on a regular basis, So, on such a view, my connectedness to my
intimates justifies my giving their interests greater weight when I decide what
action I ought to perform. Similarly, when I can provide a benefit to one person
only by imposing a burden on some other person, I must consider the relationship
of the two persons involved: it will be easier for the first person to bear the burden
if he cares about the person who is going to receive the benefit.
This reply is inadequate. Psychological Reductionism implies that the nature of
certain relations, in themselves, justifies a weakening of the significance of certain
boundaries. In other words, it offers intrinsic reasons for treating
quasi-compensation as the morally important notion. The current Utilitarian
reply, however, offers only extrinsic reasons, reasons that do not appeal to the
nature of the relations in themselves. The friend of Utilitarianism might say,
however, that he can allow that the relations provide intrinsic reasons for treating
quasi-compensation as significant. He can agree with the Impersonalist (see
section 11) that certain components of relationships such as the friendship relation
have intrinsic value and, thus, in and of themselves, provide reasons for regarding
certain boundaries between persons as more morally important than others.
Again, however, the Utilitarian will have the same sort of problem with which the
lmpersonalist was faced. Components of friendship will become more benefits to be
226
weighed in the balance. If more good in the form of intrinsically good relationships
can be promoted by providing counterbalancing benefits to a stranger, then the
Utilitarian must say that the stranger ought to receive the benefits even if I am
not thereby quasi-compensated. So even if the Utilitarian can agree that the
relations provide intrinsic reason for treating quasi-compensation as morally
important, Utilitarianism will still too often allow the value of those relationships
to outweigh the significance of any particular case of quasi-compensation.
17 Identity and Compensation
Suppose that we were to deny that identity is not what matters. I argued in
Chapter 3 that we can continue to view our private projects as justified even
though no reductive analysis of identity can fully account for their significance. If
we accept my conclusion, then we can continue to view compensation as morally
important. Recall that in section 4.1 of this chapter I said that we do not think a
person's life plans should be constantly jeopardized by burdens imposed on that
person by others. Given the central role that private projects have in my life, I am
owed compensation for any unwarranted interference with my pursuit of those
projects. My private projects involve me and their significance does not reduce to
the independent significance of psychological and/or physical continuity.
Therefore, I must receive a counterbalancing benefit when certain burdens
interfere with my private projects.
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Of course, fission cases show that the next best thing to my finishing miy thesis
is someone psychologically continuous with me finishing my thesis. Given the
importance of psychological continuity, we should accept the importance of
quasi-compensation. Nonetheless, if you quasi-compensate me by providing a
counterbalancing benefit to my mother, you do not compensate me. By providing
the counterbalancing benefit to me, you would have both quasi-compensated and
compensated me. The quasi-compensation in the former case differs only in degree
from the quasi-compensation in the latter case. But the quasi-compensation in the
former case differs in kind from the compensation in the latter case. If you unable
to compensate me for a burden that you imposed on me, and you then provide a
counterbalancing benefit to my mother, it is not that you do what you ought to do
to a lesser degree; rather, you do the next best thing to what you ought to do. You
should have compensated me; if you cannot, then you should at least
quasi-compensate me.
If we continue to view compensation as an important notion, then we should
view the intrapersonal case as different in kind not in degree from the
interpersonal case. We will not have a continuum of similar cases, but, rather, an
analogy between the intrapersonal and the interpersonal cases given the presence
of psychological connections in both. But, given the importance of compensation,
my duties to myself will be different in degree and in kind from my duties to my
intimates. This conclusion would seem to heighten the difficulty faced when I have
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a choice to benefit myself or my child; now my duty to myself is not only stronger
but of a different order. Again, this is a somewhat unattractive conclusion that I
do not know how to avoid.
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